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SOCIAL DISTANCING BETWEEN NURSE AND PATIENT
ABSTRACT
This thesis accepts the claim of theories of knowledge
which presuppose a non-cognitive principle, such as
Derrida's diffFrance, as the condition of interpreting the
person's recognition of objects in the world. In non-
cognitive theories, the person's recognition of objects is
uncertain. This position is opposed to theories of
knowledge which presuppose a cognitive principle, such as
the ego of Descartes, and which claim that a correspondence
between person and object is certain.
The major aim of this thesis is to show how the nurse's
certainty about a correspondence excludes the patient's
recognition from her recognition. The effect is the
creation of a social distance between nurse and patient.
Another aim is to show how the nurse's uncertainty about a
correspondence allows nurse and patient to exchange their
recognitions. Such exchange, understood as the possibility
of accomplishing a kind of correspondence, decreases a
social distance between nurse and patient.
Achieving these aims involves an explication of how nursing
theorists interpret the nurse's recognition. For instance,
Orlando's (1961) idea of "exploration" is analysed to be a
non-cognitive and a minimal cognitive interpretation of the
nurse's recognition.
I draw on Johnson's (1974) work to elucidate how the
development of conceptions of nursing imply a cognitive
interpretation of the nurse's recognition. I then exemplify
how the nurse's recognition when based on Abdellah's (1960)
or Roy's (1984) conceptions of nursing of 'the whole
patient' is not corresponding with 'the whole patient'.
Finally, I examine the work of Benner et al (1996). I
discuss the difference between the principles Benner et al
and Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1996) presuppose in order to
explain the nurse's skill acquisition as a move through
stages from novice or advanced beginner to competency and
then to proficiency and expertise.
This discussion entails an analysis of the cognitive
principle of Benner et al (1996). In turn, I explicate how
the nurse's certainty of her recognition informed by her
practical knowledge to correspond with the situation of the
patient at the proficient and expert stage excludes the
patient's recognition from her recognition.
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PROLOGUE
Concerning the reception of From Novice to Expert, Benner
et al state in Expertise in Nursing Practice that: "Nurses
commented that From Novice to Expert put into words what
they had always known about their clinical nursing
expertise, but had difficulty articulating" (1996:XIII;
emphasis mine).
Reading those statements about three years ago, I was
reminded of my own response to From Novice to Expert. My
experience as a nurse, that is, of having seen many
patients with similar diseases in everyday work on the
ward, accounted, there was no doubt in my mind, for being
able to recognize what was going on with the patient.
Moreover, I had found it rather easy to convey to the
patient and others, for example, student nurses as well as
physicians, that my recognition, even though it could not
always be supported with 'numbers and micrograms', was a
certain grasp of the patient's problem. Considering From
Novice to Expert to be a study which postulates this view
of recognition, indeed 'put into words what I had always
known'.
Yet when I first read From Novice to Expert - way back in
the middle of the eighties - I was not any longer nursing,
but head of an institution that educates nurses as well as
nurse teachers. Being a 'head' meant that I was not any
more engaged in clinical as opposed to classroom teaching;
and it seemed to me, at the time, that the further I had
gotten myself away from the patient, the more demanding it
had become to convey, especially to student nurses, the
'ability' to see the patient's problem, which I considered
to be the very essence of nursing. In this way. From
Novice to Expert promised to be a helpful teaching tool.
On the other hand, I had been alerted by Benner's
definition of recognition, such as: "Experience, as it is
used here (Heidegger, 1962; Gadamer, 1970), results when
preconceived notions and expectations are challenged,
refined, or disconfirmed by the actual situation"
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(1984:3). Or, "Heidegger (1962) and Gadamer (1975) define
experience as the turning around of preconceptions that
are not confirmed by the actual situation" (1984:8).
Knowing very well that the knowledge ("preconceptions")
passed on to student nurses in the classroom is,
primarily, of a general kind, and knowing equally well
that student nurses, the moment they enter the ward, face
up to the "actual" situation, that is, the particular
patient, I thought that Heidegger and Gadamer, as
presented by Benner, were giving an answer to this
conflict between the 'general' and the 'particular' as
encountered by nurses in their everyday work in that the
latter: particular patient - does not confirm the former:
the nurse's general knowledge. Putting it in another way,
Benner's quotes, cited above, constitute the claim that
the nurse's recognition of the patient as based on her
knowledge ("preconceptions") is, according to Heidegger
and Gadamer, uncertain.
But Benner not only claims, following Heidegger and
Gadamer, that the nurse's recognition is uncertain. She
also derives the claim about the nurse's certain
recognition from them. Because Benner writes that:
"Experience" (the nurse's recognition as based on her
"preconceptions" not being confirmed by the particular
patient) "is therefore a requisite for expertise" (1984:3;
emphasis mine). Saying it differently, the nurse's
'unconfirmed' recognitions of the particular patient in
her everyday work are considered to be a necessity of
acquiring "expertise". Which means that Benner bases the
nurse's development of her recognition in terms of stages
from novice to "expertise", that is, the Dreyfus Model of
skill acquisition, on Heidegger and Gadamer.
By the time the nurse gets to the stage of expertise she
has developed, Benner claims, an "intuitive" recognition.
This "intuitive" recognition of the nurse at the expert
stage "zeroes in", according to Benner, "on the accurate
region" of the patient's problem (1984:32; emphasis mine);
the expert nurse's "intuitive" recognition is, for Benner,
V
following Heidegger and Gadamer, an 'accurate', that is, a
certain grasp of the particular patient's problem.
Yet, I wondered, how Benner (1984) could draw on Heidegger
and Gadamer for both: an understanding of the nurse's
perception as uncertain as well as certain. In other
words, From Novice to Expert is lacking an explicit
discussion of the theory underpinning the Dreyfus Model of
skill acquisition. Telling the reader that it is based
upon the study of "chess players and airline pilots",
Benner (1984) is not saying much about the theoretical
basis of those studies.
At the time of my first encounter with From Novice to
Expert, I did not have the resources to further
investigate this lack of explanation. I began my inquiry
only a number of years later in the context of my doctoral
studies. In the course of this endeavour I found out that
I was not the only one to miss a theoretical explanation
of the nurse's acquisition of an "intuitive" grasp in From
Novice to Expert. English points out that Benner's (1984)
notion of intuition "as a concept" is "somewhat ambiguous"
(1993:387). It "merely provokes", in his opinion, "further
investigation" (English, 1993:390).
English's claim that Benner's intuition needs "further"
study is implicitly endorsed by Darbyshire (1994). In his
response to English's (1993) critique, Darbyshire makes
reference to the work of authors other than Benner (1984),
for example, Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1987) or Dreyfus (1992),
in order to elucidate his assertion that "Benner's work"
is developed from Heidegger's "phenomenological"
understanding.
That the work of Benner (1984) is based on Heidegger is
also the opinion of Cash (1995). He states that Benner
"has applied" Heidegger's theoretical perspective as
interpreted by Dreyfus (1991) "in the context of
expertise" (Cash, 1995:527; emphasis mine). Nota bene,
neither Darbyshire nor Cash refer to Gadamer and how his
specific perspective on recognition underlies Benner's
notion of the Dreyfus Model of skill acquisition.
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But, more importantly, the possibility of founding the
Dreyfus Model, understood as the nurse's acquisition of a
certain ("intuitive") recognition of the particular
patient by the time she gets to the expert stage, on
Heidegger or Gadamer is challenged by Latimer (1993). She
describes Benner's idea of the nurse's skill acquisition
as a transformation of the nurse's "knowing that" into
"know how". In Latimer's words: "Benner claims that 'know
how' (for example, the qualitative difference in pulse or
the meaning of numbers) gained through experience and
acting in the world, transforms 'knowing that'"
(1993:312). She continues:
The difficulty here is that Benner's
claims to draw on Heidegger (1962) and
Gadamer (1976) are questionable since
...'sequence' (is) problematised by them
(Latimer, 1993:312).
Recalling that I had been wondering (see above) how Benner
(1984) could define the nurse's recognition, following
Heidegger and Gadamer, to be uncertain and to be certain,
Latimer suggested an answer. Heidegger and Gadamer
problematize, according to her, "sequence"; that is, the
nurse's acquisition of a certain ("intuitive") recognition
in terms of stages from novice to expert. If so,
Heidegger's and Gadamer's views on recognition, as defined
by Benner (1984), question Benner's (1984) claim about the
nurse's certain ("intuitive") perception at the expert
stage.
Accepting Latimer's position as a correct rendering of
Heidegger and Gadamer, and accepting, on the other hand,
that Benner's definition of an uncertain.recognition
offers also a correct reading of these theorists, then, in
order to validate both positions, it should be possible, I
concluded, to show in connection with the nurses' accounts
in From Novice to Expert the following: how Heidegger's
and Gadamer's theories of recognition undermine the
Dreyfus Model of skill acquisition. In more detail, how
the particular patient does not confirm the nurse's
recognition and that this is the case whether the nurse is
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considered by Benner to be at the stage of novice,
advanced beginner, competent, proficient or expert.
But such study was unrealistic, since Benner presents in
From Novice to Expert accounts of nurses from the stages
of novice and expert, but not from the 'between' stages:
advanced beginner, competency and proficiency.
Fortunately, Benner et al (1996) report in Expertise in
Nursing Practice a study of the nurse's skill acquisition
which provides nurses' accounts from the stage of advanced
beginner through to the expert stage.
Nonetheless, explicating - on the basis of these accounts
in Expertise in Nursing Practice - how Benner's (1984)
view of an uncertain recognition (following Heidegger and
Gadamer) challenges Benner's (1984) claim about a certain
("intuitive") recognition of the nurse at the expert stage
(following the Dreyfus Model), did not prove to be
straight forward. The reason being that Benner's
theoretical explanation of the Dreyfus Model of skill
acquisition in From Novice to Expert - as I have discussed
above - differs from the explanation Dreyfus and Dreyfus
(1996) and Benner et al (1996) give of the nurse's skill
acquisition in Expertise in Nursing Practice. These are
the main points of difference:
Firstly, Dreyfus and Dreyfus explain in Expertise in
Nursing Practice the nurse's skill acquisition from novice
to expert on the basis of the nurse's physiological brain
processes (Chapter Four in the thesis). This explanation
is in contrast to Benner's (1984) which derives the
Dreyfus Model of skill acquisition from Heidegger and
Gadamer. (It also contrasts with Darbyshire and Cash who
consider Benner's study in From Novice to Expert to be
based on Heidegger).
Secondly, Benner et al (1996) conceive in Expertise in
Nursing Practice the nurse's skill acquisition from the
stage of advanced beginner to expert in terms of the
nurse's development of "skills of seeing" and practical
knowledge as well as in terms of the nurse's development
of a mutuality of practical knowledge and emotions
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(Chapters Six and Seven in the thesis). This conception of
the nurse's skill acquisition adopts the explanation of
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1996) in a particular way (which I
will explain further below) and is, therefore, at variance
with Benner's (1984) (see first point).
Thirdly, Benner et al (1996) consider, on their
understanding of a "Cartesian view", the advanced beginner
nurse's recognition to be uncertain in the sense of being
"objective, disengaged, criterial" (Chapter Four in the
thesis). Grounding the claim about the nurse's uncertain
recognition on their rendering of a "Cartesian view"
opposes, however, Benner's (1984) definition of an
uncertain recognition which is derived from Heidegger and
Gadamer.
Fourthly, Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1996) develop, following
Heidegger, the notion of caring and differentiate the
nurse's caring from her bearing "the science and
technology of medicine on a specific body with a specific
disease" (1996:47). Benner et al (Chapter Nine in the
thesis), who specifically refer to the discussion of
Dreyfus and Dreyfus in Expertise in Nursing Practice,
distinguish "theoretically" between "medical and nursing
theory related to science and existential caring skills"
(1996:160).
Benner et al claim, on the other hand, that the nurse at
the proficient and expert stage reveals two recognitions:
"skills of seeing" based on her practical knowledge and
"caring practices" (with the former the nurse perceives
the 'body', with the latter the "concerns" of the
patient). Benner et al's claim in Expertise in Nursing
Practice about the nurse's acquisition of two certain
recognitions in terms of stages from advanced beginner to
expertise is in contrast to Benner's claim in From Novice
to Expert that the nurse acquires one certain
("intuitive") recognition.
Moreover, while Benner (1984) associates Heidegger and
Gadamer with the notion of a move ("sequence", Latimer,
1993) concerning the nurse's recognition from the stage
of novice (uncertain) to expert (certain); Benner et al
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(1996) relate Heidegger and the notion of move with the
nurse's recognition as "caring practices" at the
proficient and expert stage which implies that the nurse
at the (novice) advanced beginner and competent stage
apparently lacks such 'caring' recognition.
These five points indicate the major differences between
Expertise in Nursing Practice and From Novice to Expert
with regard to the theoretical conception of the Dreyfus
Model. But there is also a disagreement to be found
within Expertise in Nursing Practice: between Dreyfus and
Dreyfus, who explain the nurse's skill acquisition in
terms of stages on the basis of physiological brain
processes and Benner et al, who study the nurse's skill
acquisition in relation with cognitive accounts of the
nurse's 'brain processes' (Chapter Four in the thesis).
This disagreement and the differences listed before, in
short, these inconsistencies, could, however, not be
named in advance of the study. While I had hunches and
insights of inconsistencies, taking them together did not
add up to more than a puzzle. Yet it was necessary to
find a way out of this confusion, if I wanted to pursue
my project: to show how Heidegger's and Gadamer's
perspective on recognition (uncertain) as presented by
Benner (1984) undermines her claim and that of Benner et
al (1996) about the nurse's certain recognition at the
proficient and expert stage on the basis of their
conception of the Dreyfus Model of skill acquisition.
Finding this way proved to be complicated, since Benner
et al associate theoretical knowledge, the kind of
knowledge advanced beginner nurses' learn in nursing
school, with a "Cartesian view", and - on the other hand
- "skills of seeing" and practical knowledge as well as
"caring practices" with the Dreyfus Model of skill
acquisition. This link between a particular kind of
knowledge and a particular conception of knowledge
implies that Benner et al take theories of knowledge to
be descriptions of the person's recognition (Chapter Five
in the thesis).
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This understanding opposes a view that these theories are
interpretations of the person's recognition which raise
distinct claims. For example, a "Cartesian view" asserts
that recognition is certain; and Heidegger's theory
postulates that recognition is uncertain.
However, conceiving theories of knowledge to be
descriptions (rather than interpretations), as Benner et
al do, and connecting such notion with the Dreyfus model
of skill acquisition, inverts these claims: a "Cartesian
view" describes, for them, the advanced beginner nurse's
recognition as informed by her theoretical knowledge to
be uncertain; and Heidegger's theory denotes, for them,
the expert nurse's recognition in terms of "caring
practices" to be certain.
In order to be able to redress Benner et al's conception
about theories of knowledge (being descriptions and
relating them to the Dreyfus Model which entails the
inversion of claims), I have adopted the position that
there is a move in theorizing (interpreting) recognition
from 'certainty' to 'uncertainty' - rather than a move
with regard to the nurse's uncertain recognition as based
on her theoretical knowledge at the (novice) advanced
beginner stage to her certain recognition at the stage of
proficiency and expertise in terms of "caring practices"
as well as "skills of seeing" and practical knowledge.
This move in theorizing is hinted at by Benner and Wrubel
(1989) in Primacy of Caring. The authors write that
"Husserl's noema (an abstract mental structure that
accounts for the mind's directedness toward objects) is a
cognitive, representational view of the mind" which they
distinguish from Heidegger's view (1989:42; emphasis
mine) .
Benner and Wrubel are implying here that Heidegger does
not any longer have a "cognitive" view, that is, a
conception as the condition of interpreting recognition
(the "directedness" of a person's mind "toward objects")
like Husserl. And because Heidegger no longer
conceptualizes the condition of his interpretation, that
XI
is, because of his non-cognitive view, he has 'lost' the
basis upon which he could assert that the person's
perception is certain. But it is important to keep in
mind here that this 'loss' means for Benner and her
colleagues a certain recognition.
Adopting the position that theories of knowledge are
interpretations of recognition and that they have moved
from a cognitive to non-cognitive stance, and that
Heidegger's as well as Gadamer's theory are an example of
the latter, but taking into account that Benner (1984)
and Benner et al (1996) are calling upon them -
especially on Heidegger - in contrasting ways (as
mentioned in relation with the inconsistencies above), I
have decided to discuss their non-cognitive views with
another theorist, namely, Derrida.
That is, my study of Benner et al's research in Expertise
in Nursing Practice accepts the claim of theories of
knowledge which presuppose a cognitive principle, such as
the ego of Descartes, that a correspondence between
person and object is certain. This position is opposed to
theories of knowledge which presuppose a non-cognitive
principle, such as Derrida's differance, as the condition
of interpreting the person's perception of objects in the
world. In non-cognitive theories, the person's
recognition of objects is uncertain.
My main aim was to show how the nurse's certainty about a
correspondence excludes the patient's recognition from
her recognition. The effect is the creation of a social
distance between nurse and patient. Another aim was to
show how the nurse's uncertainty about a correspondence
allows nurse and patient to exchange their recognitions.
Such exchange, understood as the possibility of
accomplishing a kind of correspondence, decreases a
social distance between nurse and patient.
Approaching Benner et al's study in Expertise in Nursing
Practice in terms of two claims derived from two
different theoretical positions (a cognitive and a non-
cognitive interpretation of recognition) allowed me,
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firstly, to make the inconsistencies referred to earlier
apparent in the process of accomplishing the aims of the
study; that is, leading in an unobtrusive way out of the
confusion characterizing Benner's (1984) and Benner et
al's theoretical discussion of the Dreyfus Model.
This approach to Benner et al's research allowed me,
secondly, to include conceptions of nursing like
Orlando's (1961), Johnson's (1959a), Abdellah's (1960)
and Roy's (1984) in the analysis of Benner et al's
research in Expertise and Nursing Practice and thus place
the study in the wider context of nursing theory; in
particular within that substantive tradition which seeks
to develop a science of nursing on the basis of
conceptions of nursing (Chapter Two and Three in the
thesis).
Including conceptions of nursing in the thesis entailed,
however, a special demand in as far as authors like
Orlando, Johnson, Abdellah and Roy do not explicitly
address matters of epistemology - in contrast to Benner
et al.
This demand and the fact that the approach to the study
on the basis of two claims each presenting different
theoretical positions (a cognitive and a non-cognitive
interpretation of recognition) had come about in order to
overcome Benner et al's notion of those interpretations
being descriptions and the consequences following from it
as I have indicated above, determined the way of





From Novice to Expert: Excellence and Power in Clinical
Nursing Practice is the book in which Benner (1984)
reports her study of how nurses develop practical
knowledge in everyday work. Benner asserts that the
nurses' development of practical knowledge moves in
stages. Following the concept of skill acquisition of
Dreyfus and Dreyfus, Benner identifies these stages as -
novice, advanced beginner, competency, proficiency, and
expertise.
The study of Benner (1984) about the development of
practical knowledge received, according to Benner et al
(1996), a worldwide response from nurses. They write:
No one could have predicted the response
of practicing nurses all over the world to
that account of gaining clinical
expertise, .... From Novice to Expert has
been translated into Finnish, German,
Japanese, Spanish, French and Swedish, and
a limited number of copies were translated
for Russian nurse educators. It has been
the source of many conferences and nursing
curricula, and the basis for clinical
promotion programs in many hospitals in
many parts of the world (Benner et al,
199 6:XIII).
The translation of From Novice to Expert from English into
more than six languages and its international utilization
for the education of nurses indicates an impressive
reception of Benner's research by members of the
profession. Benner obviously succeeded in expressing how
nurses who are involved in the day to day care of patients
think about the knowledge they gain through their work
with them. Because Benner et al (1996) note: "Nurses
commented that From Novice to Expert put into words what
they had always known about their clinical nursing
expertise, but had difficulty articulating" (1996:XIII).
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With Expertise in Nursing Practice Benner et al (1996)
present an extension of the research begun in From Novice
to Expert. In this second study, Benner et al postulate
that the nurse's recognition of the situation of the
patient at the advanced beginner stage is based on
theoretical knowledge, that is, the kind of knowledge
nurses learn in nursing school.
Recognizing the situation of the patient in terms of
theoretical knowledge is, for Benner et al, putting a
"preconceived set of expectations" over the situation
(1996:142). More specifically, their claim is that the
theoretical knowledge informing the advanced beginner
nurse's recognition fails to correspond with the situation
of the patient.
The nurse's recognition informed by her theoretical
knowledge at the advanced beginner stage is seen to differ
sharply from the nurse's recognition once she has moved to
the stages of proficiency and expertise. By then, the
nurse has, in the opinion of Benner et al, gained enough
"skills of seeing" and practical knowledge through her
everyday work with a particular group of patients which
enables her to "read" the situation of the patient.
Reading the situation of the patient in terms of her
"skills of seeing" and practical knowledge is, for Benner
et al, not any longer laying theoretical knowledge
("preconceived set of expectations") over the situation
characteristic of the advanced beginner nurse. Stating
that the nurse's recognition informed by her "skills of
seeing" and practical knowledge is reading the situation
of the patient "instead" of putting theoretical knowledge
over the situation in the sense that the advanced beginner
nurse's recognition is not corresponding with the
situation, Benner et al are saying that the nurse's
recognition at the proficient and expert stage is
corresponding with the situation of the patient.
To reiterate, then, the assertion of Benner et al is
twofold. First, they assert that the nurse's recognition
at the proficient and expert stage is corresponding with
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the situation of the patient because it is based on
"skills of seeing" and practical knowledge acquired in
everyday work. Second, they assert that the nurse's
recognition at the advanced beginner stage is not
corresponding with it because it is based on theoretical
knowledge from nursing school.
This dual assertion stands in stark contrast to the claim,
advanced in this thesis, that the nurse's recognition
whether informed by her theoretical knowledge learned in
nursing school or by her "skills of seeing" and practical
knowledge acquired in everyday work is not corresponding
with the situation of the patient. Moreover, it is argued
that the certainty imputed to any such correspondence is
the condition of possibility for creating a social
distance between nurse and patient in everyday work.
These arguments of the thesis are in obvious contrast to
those made by Benner et al (1996). In order to elucidate
them further, it is necessary to discuss the condition of
possibility and impossibility of the claim about a
correspondence between the nurse's recognition and the
situation of the patient.
Theories of Knowledge with a Cognitive Principle
In the tradition from Plato to the present, theories of
knowledge posit a cognitive principle, such as the ego of
Descartes, as the condition of interpreting the person's
recognition of objects in the world. For reasons which
will be discussed below, this tradition has been named
'logocentric' by Derrida. From the logocentric point of
view, the object to be recognized is first the object of a
cognitive principle which constitutes the existence and
the knowledge of the object.
Theories of knowledge with a rational precondition claim
that there is a correspondence between person and object.
For example in scientific work, knowledge of the object is
accepted as certain only if the correspondence between
predetermined principles and the object under
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consideration can be verified. It means also that the
certainty of the person's knowledge in everyday practice
depends on the correspondence between his or her knowledge
and the object recognized.
The claim of logocentrism (theories of knowledge with a
cognitive principle) about a correspondence between
recognizing person and object recognized is, as Derrida
reveals, implicit in the presuppositions of its claim.
Saying this in another way, the presuppositions of
logocentrism are the condition of possibility of asserting
a correspondence between person and object.
One of the presuppositions logocentrism holds to is the
idea of being able to formulate the condition that
explains the person's recognition as corresponding with
the object. But this very idea exists only, on the
analysis of Derrida, through the condition logocentrism
establishes in terms of cognitive principles, such as ego,
telos, or consciousness, to make such demand. That is, a
thought in the cognitive principle allows itself to be
precomprehended in terms of identifiable categories, while
the possibility of a thought in the cognitive principle is
"itself only through the logos; that is, being nothing
before the logos and outside of it" (Derrida, 1976:20;
emphasis in the original).
Another presupposition which is closely related to the one
just stated is the notion that the object gets naturally
translated to the mind. Derrida captures this assumption:
Between being and mind, things and
feelings, there would be a relationship of
translation or natural signification;
between mind and logos, a relationship of
conventional symbolization (1976:11).
Here, the idea of the mind grasping the object ("natural
signification") meets with the presupposition of
logocentrism. The presupposition is that grounding
knowledge of the object in the mind and, therefore, in a
cognitive principle ("conventional symbolization") can be
achieved.
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A third presupposition of logocentrism which Derrida
uncovers concerns the notion of a natural correspondence
between mind (cognitive principle) and voice, because of
the nearness of thought to sound:
the essence of the phone would be
immediately proximate to that which within
'thought' as logos relates to 'meaning',
produces it, receives it, speaks it,
'composes' it (Derrida, 1976:11).
The traditional assumption is that the voice "signifies
'mental experiences' which themselves reflect or mirror
things by natural resemblance" (Derrida, 1976:11). The
spoken word becomes, then, in the logocentric tradition
the "first" signifier of the mind (cognitive principle)
which itself resembles the object by natural
signification.
Since the way of signification is assumed to be from
object to mind (cognitive principle) and then to voice,
the voice is considered to produce "the first symbols"; it
has a relationship of "essential and immediate proximity
with the mind" (Derrida, 1976:11). The spoken word (sound)
is for logocentrism the "nonexterior, nonmundane therefore
nonempirical or noncontingent" signifier (Derrida, 1976:7-
8) of a primary signified, the mind (cognitive principle).
In the context of elucidating that these presuppositions
of theories of knowledge with a cognitive principle
(logocentrism) are the condition of possibility of
claiming a correspondence between person and object,
Derrida turns to linguistics, in particular to the
linguistics of Saussure, in order to show that they are
also the condition of impossibility of raising such claim.
I now turn to present Saussure's (1960) thesis of the
arbitrariness of the sign and the thesis of difference.
The point of presenting these twin theses is to indicate
how Derrida (1982), in radicalizing these theses,
conceptualizes a non-cognitive principle, diffFrance, as
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the condition of interpreting the person's recognition of
objects in the world.
Saussure's Theses
Saussure distinguishes between speech (la parole), the
spoken word and the system of its form which he calls la
langue. The latter is the cognitive principle according to
which the words of languages are structured in such a way
that they can be recognized and controlled as the
components of a particular type of language, for example,
of English rather than of French.
This structuring involves differentiating and associating
words in terms of a linguistic sign which itself is not
manifest. Such a sign consists of a sound image and a
concept (Saussure, 1960:66). These two elements of the
sign become intimately united, whereby each is seen to
recall the other. This linking of sound and concept is
not, however, straightforward, as Saussure explains.
The way concept and sound image recall each other is,
according to Saussure, "arbitrary" (1960:67). The
arbitrary bond between concept and sound image of the sign
becomes apparent when one thinks of the difficulty a
person has when repeating the same succession of sounds of
a particular word a second time; which is to say, that
thought and sound are not linked by a natural
relationship. For Saussure, there exist "neither ideas nor
sounds" before speech (1960:120).
Rather, the unity of the sign: sound image and concept
recalling each other, is considered to effect, at the same
time, thought (signified) and sound (signifier). The
thesis that the sign is arbitrary (thought and sound unite
in speech) breaks with the presupposition of logocentrism
that the spoken word (sound) is the signifier of a primary
signified (cognitive principle); that there is thought
before sound.
Any sign, understood as the unity of concept and sound
image, implies, for Saussure, difference. A sign can be
6
differentiated from another sign when its sound image can
be differentiated from that of another sign. The sound
image can be differentiated from another sound image (and
thus a sign from another sign), when the sound image
combines with a concept. This combination is effected by
the system of la langue. So Saussure can write that the
combination of sound image and concept "produces a form,
not substance"(Saussure, 1960:113).
Language as a system of differences has no substance. It
is not a repository of positive signs that exist prior to
its linguistic system (la langue). In language, Saussure
claims, "there are only differences without positive
terms" (Saussure, 1960:120; emphasis in the original). A
term is seen to derive its "value" only from what it is
not with respect to other terms: "The idea or phonic
substance that a sign contains is of less importance than
the other signs that surround it" (Saussure, 1960:120).
A Non-coanitive Principle
Derrida, who is interested to show how a cognitive
principle which logocentrism presupposes as the condition
of possibility of claiming a correspondence between person
and object is also its condition of impossibility, teases
out the consequences of Saussure's thesis of the
arbitrariness of the sign and the thesis of difference.
One consequence is, according to Derrida, that even the
sign itself is not corresponding with itself: "the
signified concept is never present in and of itself, in a
sufficient presence that would refer only to itself"
(1982:11). This 'being not present to itself' of a concept
comes about, because every concept is seen to be inscribed
"in a system within which it refers to another concept by
means of the systematic play of differences" (Derrida,
1982:11; emphasis mine).
The upshot of a "systematic play of differences" is that
the condition of how the concept becomes inscribed in a
system cannot be thought any more. Derrida captures this
impossibility with the artifical term of diffdrance.
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This term of diffFrance is derived from the French verb
diffdrer which carries two senses. One is to put a
distance between two conditions of the same thing (to
delay, but also in the sense of to defer), the other is to
differ. In diffdrance both senses are thought together
(Derrida, 1982).
In particular, the interval (distance) that separates one
concept from the other and thus determines it is, at the
same time, the deferral of "presence", on the 'basis' of
which the concept is not corresponding with itself. In
this way is diffdrance "no longer simply a concept", but a
"possibility of conceptuality" (Derrida, 1982:11).
Diffdrance conceptualizes, for Derrida, the impossibility
of formulating the condition of interpreting the person's
recognition.
Diffdrance, understood in this way, is a non-cognitive
principle and implies that the claim about a
correspondence between person and object 'based' on such
non-cognitive principle cannot be considered to be
certain, since the condition of such possibility (claim),
a cognitive principle, is not any longer presupposed. To
the contrary, it can be assumed to have been revealed as
an impossibility.
Two Claims Illustrated
The above account allows to conclude that theorizing the
person's recognition of objects in the world has moved
from theories of knowledge presupposing a cognitive
principle, for example, the ego of Descartes, to those
positing a non-cognitive principle, for example, Derrida's
diffdrance.
Theories of knowledge with a cognitive principle (in
short, cognitive theories of knowlege) claim a
correspondence between person and object upon such
rational precondition to be possible and, therefore, to be
certain. This claim of cognitive theories of knowledge is
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stated, I suggest, by Benner et al in Expertise in Nursing
Practice. They write: "The common sense of our
discipline", that is, the discipline of nursing, "and of
the Western tradition is that in order to perceive and
relate to things, we have some content in our minds that
corresponds to our knowledge of them" (Benner et al,
1996:8; emphasis mine). That is, the person's, for
example, the nurse's recognition as informed by the
knowledge she has in her mind of "things", such as, the
situation of the patient, is by the Western tradition and
the nursing discipline assumed to correspond with the
situation of the patient recognized.
Theories with a non-cognitive principle (in short, non-
cognitive theories of knowledge) assume to have revealed
that such rational precondition is an impossibility and
claim, thus, a correspondence between person and object to
be uncertain.
The following example can help to bring out the claims as
raised by a cognitive and a non-cognitive interpretation
of recognition:
Three times, a nurse saw a patient lifting
his right leg up into the air and down
again. Approximately half an hour later
the nurse saw this identical behaviour
repeated. The nurse asked, "For the past
half hour you look as though you've been
exercising your leg. Have you?" The
patient replied, gritting his teeth, "No,
nurse, it just helps a little. I have a
sharp pain in my back and it's killing me"
(in Orlando, 1961:38).
This nurse tells the patient about her recognition of his
situation as if the patient had been "exercising" his leg
for the "past half hour". But the patient is not
confirming the nurse's recognition. He says "No, nurse"
and tells her about his back pain and that 'exercising'
his leg helps him a bit to ease his pain. The patient
discloses to the nurse that her recognition is not
corresponding with his recognition of his situation.
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From the view of a cognitive theory of knowledge, the
nurse's recognition informed by her knowledge establishes
a correspondence with the situation of the patient ("For
the past half hour you look as though you've been
exercising your leg").
The nurse who holds to a cognitive interpretation of her
recognition can assume to be certain that her observation
of the patient "exercising" his leg for the "past half
hour" is corresponding with the situation of the patient,
that is, "exercising" his leg for the "past half hour".
After all, she has seen the performance of the patient at
least "three times".
From the view of a non-cognitive theory of knowledge, the
nurse's recognition informed by her knowledge is claimed
to establish a correspondence with the situation of the
patient ("For the past half hour you look as though you've
been exercising your leg") and to produce, at the same
time, the recognition of the patient of his situation
("No, nurse, it just helps a little. I have a sharp pain
in my back and it's killing me"). The patient's
recognition is considered to be effected through the
nurse's recognition.
This can be underlined, if one considers that the nurse
could have made another observation. Supposing, for a
moment, she would have said 'I see you are having those
pains in your leg again, because you are exercising your
leg', this patient would very likely have answered 'No,
nurse, it's my back this time and exercising my leg does
help a little, it's killing me' rather than: "No, nurse,
it just helps a little. I have a sharp pain in my back and
it's killing me".
The nurse's recognition produces, in achieving a
correspondence with the situation of the patient, the
recognition of the patient in relation to it. As an effect
of the nurse's recognition, the patient's recognition of
his situation is absent from the nurse's recognition of
the situation of the patient. The nurse cannot assume to
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know the recognition the patient has of his situation
which she produces through her recognition.
A nurse who adopts a non-cognitive interpretation of her
recognition will, therefore, be uncertain about a
correspondence between her recognition and the situation
of the patient. The nurse in the example illustrates the
point. She leaves her statement about the patient
"exercising" his leg for the "past half hour" open by
asking the patient "Have you?"
Since the patient answered her question, the exchange of
recognitions between nurse and patient about the situation
of the patient indicates that such exchange would be the
condition of possibility of accomplishing a kind of
correspondence between nurse and patient about the
situation of the patient in everyday work.
A non-cognitive interpretation of recognition reveals, on
the other hand, how the nurse who is certain that her
recognition corresponds with the situation of the patient
excludes the patient's recognition of his situation (which
she produced through her recognition in the first place)
from her recognition. This exclusion of the patient's
recognition of his situation from the nurse's recognition
of it as effected through her certainty is the social
distance the nurse creates between herself and the
patient.
Repeating the Claim of a Cognitive Interpretation
Theories of knowledge which have a cognitive principle as
the condition of interpreting the person's recognition, I
have outlined above, claim that a correspondence between
the nurse's recognition and the situation of the patient
is certain.
This view contradicts Benner et al (1996) who assert that
the nurse's recognition at the proficient and expert stage
corresponds with the situation of the patient because it
is informed by her "skills of seeing" and practical
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knowledge instead of her theoretical knowledge from
nursing school. Benner et al are of the opinion that the
certainty about a correspondence depends on the kind of
knowledge the nurse develops in her everyday work with a
particular group of patients.
This opinion of Benner et al can be highlighted with the
following quote by Benner and Wrubel (1989) which is based
on Benner's (1984) study From Novice to Expert. They
write:
Nursing theorists have been overly
constrained by the stringent requirements
of the received view of formal theories
and have found it difficult to capture the
embodied, relational, configurational,
skillful, meaningful, and contextual human
issues that are central to expert nursing
care (Benner 1984) (Benner and Wrubel,
1989:6; emphasis mine).
Benner and Wrubel are implying here that the nurse's
recognition informed by conceptions of nursing
(theoretical knowledge) of nursing theorists who are,
according to Benner and Wrubel, "constrained" by the
"received view of formal theories" is not capturing, that
is, not corresponding with the various "human issues" in
the situation of the patient.
Noting, however, that various "human issues" are important
to the care of patients by nurses at the expert stage
("central to expert care"), Benner and Wrubel are saying
that the nurse's recognition at the expert stage, since it
is informed by practical knowledge is picking up those
various "human issues" and is, therefore, corresponding
with the situation of the patient.
If one accepts that the claim about the certainty of the
nurse's recognition is raised on account of an
interpretation which presupposes a cognitive principle and
not on a particular kind of knowledge, then Benner and
Wrubel (1989), who are of the opinion that the nurse's
recognition at the expert stage corresponds with the
situation of the patient repeat the claim of cognitive
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theories of knowledge. It means also that Benner et al's
(1996) assertion that the nurse's recognition at the
proficient and expert stage corresponds with the situation
of the patient repeats the claim of cognitive theories of
knowledge; that is, Benner et al reiterate their notion -
referred to earlier - concerning the "common sense" of the
Western tradition and the discipline of nursing for the
nurse at the proficient and expert stage, namely: that her
recognition as informed by the knowledge in her mind
"corresponds" with the situation of the patient.
If one accepts a cognitive interpretation of recognition
then it can also be said that Benner and her colleagues
fail to notice the implicit claim about a correspondence
between the nurse's recognition when informed by her
practical as well as her theoretical knowledge and the
situation of the patient as made by nursing theorists, for
example, Johnson (1959a).
Contemplating the kind of contribution nursing offers to
the care of patients as opposed to the contributions made
by other professions, for example, medicine, Johnson notes
that what nursing has been offering so far "depends upon
the individual nurse concerned" (1959a:199). The nurse's
contribution is described as:
largely experientially derived, frequently
technical in character, often based on
trial and error approaches, and even
intuitive in nature (Johnson, 1959a:199).
Experientially and even intuitively gained knowledge,
which is precisely the kind of knowledge Benner et al
(1996) call practical (as will be discussed in Chapters
Four to Eight) informing the nurse's recognition is
considered by Johnson, I suggest, to correspond with the
situation of the patient in the sense of being "helpful".
She writes:
That our contributions have so often been
helpful is probably because our
experientially derived methods have been
tested for many years (Johnson,
1959a:199).
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Johnson takes it for granted that the nurse's practice
informed by her practical knowledge ("experientially
derived") which she describes as having been "helpful" has
been recognized also by the patient as being 'helpful',
that there is a correspondence of the nurse's recognition
in terms of 'helpful' with the situation of the patient.
Importantly, Johnson is of the opinion that the nurse's
contribution to the care of the patient can be increased
when based on a "science of nursing". She writes:
We can increase our knowledge and
understanding of people: biologically,
intrapersonally, interpersonally, and as
members of society. We can use that
knowledge to sharpen our observations of
their requirements for nursing care. We
can increase our skills in perception
We can seek to base our approaches
to patients on firmer foundations by
clarifying in our own minds what we are
trying to do, why, and what scientific
knowledge is involved (Johnson, 1959a: 199;
emphasis mine).
In effect, Johnson is saying that a "science of nursing"
will "sharpen" and "increase" the nurse's "skills" of
recognizing the situtation ("requirements") of the
patient. Johnson is suggesting that the nurse's
recognition of the situation of the patient founded on
theoretical knowledge ("science of nursing") will be more
effective than her practical knowledge in being helpful in
observing the patient's "requirements for nursing care".
That is, Johnson is implicitly claiming that the nurse's
recognition informed by her theoretical knowledge
("science of nursing") is more certain to correspond with
the situation ("requirements") of the patient than her
recognition informed by her practical knowledge.
Implicitly asserting that the nurse's recognition when
informed by her practical knowledge as well as by her
theoretical knowledge ("science of nursing") to correspond
with the situation of the patient, whereby the latter is
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apparently more certain than the former, Johnson repeats
the claim of cognitive theories of knowledge.
While Benner and her colleagues and Johnson are seen to
repeat the claim of cognitive theories of knowledge, they
do so by exchanging, as will be discussed in this thesis,
one cognitive principle (for example, the ego of
Descartes) with another cognitive principle, such as
conceptions of nursing as conceived by nursing theorists
(Johnson); or the development of "skills of seeing" and
practical knowledge of the nurse in everyday work (Benner
et al) .
My interest is to show how the nurse's certainty,
understood as the achievement of claims raised by
Johnson's and Benner et al's cognitive interpretations of
the nurse's recognition, creates a social distance between
nurse and patient by excluding the patient's recognition
as produced through her recognition from her recognition.
Repeating the Claim of a Non-cognitive Interpretation
Theories of knowledge which have a non-cognitive principle
as their condition of interpreting the person's
recognition, such as Derrida's diffFrance, claim, I have
shown above, that a correspondence between the nurse's
recognition and the situation of the patient is uncertain.
This view contrasts with Benner et al (1996) who assert
that the recognition of nurses at the advanced beginner
stage is not corresponding with the situation of the
patient because it is based on theoretical knowledge from
nursing school. The assertion about the uncertainty of a
correspondence between nurses at the advanced beginner
stage and the patient depends, in the opinion of Benner et
al, on the kind of knowledge informing their recognition:
theoretical knowledge from nursing school.
However, if one accepts that the uncertainty of the
nurse's recognition is based on an interpretation of
recognition which presupposes a non-cognitive principle
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rather than on a particular kind of knowledge, then it can
be said: the assertion of Benner et al about the
uncertainty of a correspondence between the nurse's
recognition at the advanced beginner stage informed by her
theoretical knowledge from nursing school and the
situation of the patient is repeating the claim of non-
cognitive theories of knowledge.
If one accepts a non-cognitive interpretation of
recognition, then it can be said further that Benner and
Wrubel underline the impossibility of raising the claim
about a correspondence between the nurse's recognition and
the situation of the patient when they emphasize that:
Nursing theorists have been overly
constrained by the stringent requirements
of the received view of formal theories
and have found it difficult to capture the
embodied, relational, configurational,
skillful, meaningful, and contextual human
issues (1989:6).
Benner and Wrubel are implying here, as I have noted
earlier, that the nurse's recognition informed by
conceptions of nursing (theoretical knowledge) of nursing
theorists is not capturing, that is, not corresponding
with the various "human issues" in the situation of the
patient.
If one accepts a non-cognitive interpretion of
recognition, then it is possible to suggest that Benner
and Wrubel (1989) and Benner et al (1996) overlook that
conceptions of nursing of nursing theorists are concerned
that "scientific knowledge", which is to say theoretical
knowledge, does not fit the "individual" situation of the
patient.
This is pointed out, for example, by Levine (1966). She
stresses that the nurse's practice based on scientific
knowledge requires the recognition of the individual
situation of the patient: "Nursing intervention must be
founded not only on scientific knowledge, but specifically
on recognition of the individual's behavioural responses"
(Levine, 1966:2452; emphasis mine). Levine implies that
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the nurse's practice based on scientific knowledge is not
corresponding with the individual situation of the patient
and, therefore, the nurse must "specifically" observe how
the "individual" patient responds to her practice.
The uncertainty about a correspondence between the nurse's
recognition informed by her theoretical knowledge learned
in nursing school and the "specific" situation of the
patient is, moreover, the focus in The Dynamic Nurse-
Patient Relationship by Orlando (1961).
Orlando notes that the nurse in "a minimum of two and a
maximum of five years ... must assimilate and apply to
practice a wide range of principles from the basic and
applied sciences, and all the medical specialities as well
as mental health and public health concepts" (1961:1).
On the other hand, the nurse "must", according to Orlando,
deal with the "specific" situation. Demanding that the
nurse "must" discover the "meaning" in the "immediate
nursing situation in order to help the patient" (1961:1;
emphasis mine), Orlando implies that the nurse's
recognition informed by all the theoretical knowledge she
acquired in nursing school is not corresponding with the
particular situation of the patient.
Orlando (1961) and Levine (1966), I suggest, implicitly
reject the claim of cognitive theories of knowledge about
a correspondence between person and object and implicitly
support the claim of a non-cognitive theory of knowledge
about the uncertainty of a correspondence between the
nurse's recognition and the situation of the patient.
Moreover, Orlando (1961) presents, in considering the
nurse's uncertainty of recognizing the "meaning" in the
particular situation of the patient, as this thesis will
show, a non-cognitive interpretation of the nurse's
recognition. She offers, on the other hand, a minimal
cognitive interpretation of the nurse's recognition as the
'solution' to the uncertainty of the nurse's recognition.
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Orlando's 'solution' (a minimal cognitive interpretation)
to the uncertainty of the nurse's recognition, as will be
discussed, differs in a crucial sense from the one Benner
et al conceptualize. Benner et al's 'solution' concerning
the uncertainty of the advanced beginner nurse's
recognition of the situation of the patient is a cognitive
interpretation of the nurse's recognition at the
proficient and expert stage.
Overview
In the last two sections I have highlighted how the work
of nursing theorists can be considered to repeat the
claims of cognitive theories of knowledge (correspondence
between person and object) and non-cognitive theories of
knowledge (uncertainty about that correspondence). This
sets the stage for subsequent chapters.
The next one - Chapter Two - analyses Orlando's (1961)
idea of "exploration" to be a non-cognitive and a minimal
cognitive interpretation of the nurse's recognition.
Chapter Three deals with Johnson's (1974) work in order to
elucidate how the development of conceptions of nursing
imply a cognitive interpretation of the nurse's
recognition. And I exemplify how the nurse's recognition
when based on Abdellah's (1960) or Roy's (1984)
conceptions of nursing of 'the whole patient' is not
corresponding with 'the whole patient'.
Benner et al's work (1996) is examined in Chapter Four by
discussing the difference between the principles Benner et
al and Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1996) presuppose in order to
explain the nurse's skill acquisition as a move through
stages from novice or advanced beginner to competency and
then to proficiency and expertise. Chapter Five considers
Benner et al's understanding of theories of knowledge to
be descriptions rather than interpretations. In Chapter
Six Benner et al's idea of the nurse's development of
"skills of seeing" and practical knowledge is shown to
constitute a cognitive conception of the nurse's
recognition at the proficient and expert stage. Chapter
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Seven explores how Benner et al add the nurse's emotions
to their cognitive conception about the nurse's
progression from the stage of advanced beginner to expert.
Chapter Eight analyses Benner et al's claim about an
"intuitive link" between the expert nurse's recognition
and subsequent action to denote an automatic action of the
nurse. Chapter Nine shows how Benner et al add the notion
of caring to their cognitive conception about an advance
in the nurse's recognition from the advanced beginner to
the expert stage. Chapter Ten turns to Benner et al's
claims about the expert nurse's recognition of the
"patient as a person". Chapter Eleven brings out the
difference between Orlando's 'solution' and Benner et al's
'solution' to the uncertainty of the nurse's recognition





In Dynamic Nurse-Patient Relationship Orlando (1961)
reports part of the findings of a research project carried
out between 1954 and 1959. The book does not contain a
research report. Orlando only states that the research was
carried out "by observing and participating in experiences
with patients, students, nurses, service and instructional
personnel" (1961:VII).
But Orlando informs the reader that the purpose of the
study was to find out how a particular nursing practice
could be integrated which "helps patients maintain or
restore their sense of adequacy or well-being in stressful
situations associated with their illness" (1961:VII).
Orlando's hypothesis is that the physician's diagnosis of
an illness and concomitant treatment affect the "physical
and mental comfort" of the patient (1961:5).
The patient's "physical and mental comfort" being affected
as a result of medical diagnosis and treatment, Orlando
circumscribes with "needs" the patient has. A need is
first defined as a "requirement" of a patient in a
situation of illness which, when supplied, is seen to
improve the "well-being" of the patient (Orlando, 1961:5).
Later, this definition is augmented, when Orlando asserts
that the fulfillment of the patient's requirement or need
in a situation of illness contributes "simultaneously to
the mental and physical health" of the patient (1961:9).
Supplying "the help a patient requires in order for his
needs to be met" (1961:8) is, in the opinion of Orlando,
the responsibility of the nurse. But before the nurse is
able to meet the needs of the patient it is necessary,
according to Orlando, that the patient's needs for help
have been perceived by the nurse. In this context Orlando
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draws the distinction between the nurse's "understanding
of general principles" and the "meanings which she must
discover in the immediate nursing situation in order to
help the patient" (1961:1).
This distinction has some consequences. In particular, it
entails that the nurse "first attempts to understand the
meaning to the patient" (Orlando, 1961:1). She should do
this in order to find out whether her perception of the
"immediate nursing situation" of the patient constitutes a
need from the patient's perspective; that is, whether the
nurse's perception of the patient's need corresponds with
the patient's perception of it.
In relation with Orlando's definition of a "nursing
situation", I elucidate, first, how the nurse's perception
is informed by her knowledge of general principles and
feelings. Second, I will show how her idea of an
exploration as an exchange of perceptions between nurse
and patient is, on one hand, a non-cognitive
interpretation of perception; on the other hand, a minimal
cognitive interpretation of perception. Third, I discuss
how her notion of a nursing action decided upon
"deliberatively" is the enactment of claims in everyday
work as put forward by her interpretations of perception
and how her notion of "automatic activities" can be
considered as the enactment of a claim in everyday work as
raised by a cognitive interpretation of perception.
Perception Based on General Principles and Feelings
A "nursing situation" consists, for Orlando, of three
elements: the "behaviour" of the patient, the "reaction"
of the nurse to the behaviour of the patient and, thirdly,
the actions of the nurse "designed for the patient's
benefit" (1961:36).
Orlando divides, in turn, the nurse's "reaction" to the
behaviour of the patient into three aspects: the nurse's
"perception" of the patient's behaviour; the nurse's
"thoughts stimulated by the perceptions"; and the nurse's
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"feelings in response to these perceptions and thoughts"
(1961:40). Orlando appears to separate the nurse's
perception from thought, that is, from her knowledge of
general principles of 'the sciences'; and she seems to
separate the nurse's feelings from her knowledge of
general principles and thus from her perception.
The issue to be clarified is whether Orlando thinks it
possible that the nurse is able to perceive the behaviour
of the patient apart from her knowledge of general
principles and her feelings. I will discuss different
statements of Orlando which imply such 'separation' in
order to show how the nurse's perception is, for Orlando,
based on her knowledge of general principles and feelings.
Orlando expresses the possibility that the nurse perceives
the behaviour of the patient apart from her knowledge in
the following quote: "When the nurse perceives a patient,
the thoughts which automatically occur to her reflect the
meaning or interpretation she attaches to her perception"
(1961:40; emphasis mine). As if the nurse is seen to apply
her knowledge to her perception after the act.
Here is another statement which implies that the nurse
perceives the behaviour of the patient apart from her
knowledge of general principles. Orlando writes: "it might
be suggested that the nurse explore perceptions first"
(1961:44). Orlando is suggesting here that the nurse tells
the patient about her perception before she attaches her
knowledge of general principles (thought) and feelings to
it. Because, in her opinion, the nurse "may waste much
time in exploring thoughts as they occur to her, only to
find out each time that they are incorrect" (Orlando,
1961:44; emphasis mine).
Orlando makes it rather clear that she does not assume a
correspondence between the nurse's perception once her
"thoughts" (knowledge of general principles) have been
applied to it and the behaviour of the patient. Each time
the nurse would attach her knowledge to her perception and
then explore her knowledge with the patient, she may find
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that it is "incorrect"; that is, not corresponding with
the "meaning" the patient has of his behaviour.
If the nurse's perception of the behaviour of the patient
is obviously not considered to correspond with the
behaviour of the patient once her knowledge of general
principles have been applied to it, then it follows that
there would be no need for the nurse to explore her
perception with the patient "first", that is, before she
has applied her knowledge to her perception. The nurse
could be certain that she perceives the "meaning" the
patient has about his behaviour rather than her knowledge
of general principles. She could, for example, be certain
that her perception, apart from her knowledge of general
principles and feelings, grasped the behaviour of the
patient as it is.
But Orlando precludes such possibility as the following
two quotes show. She states: "What the nurse automatically
perceives or thinks cannot ordinarily be controlled
(1961:41; emphasis mine). And, again, the "nurse's
perceptions, thoughts and feelings are experienced almost
simultaneously" (1961:48; emphasis mine). In other words,
the nurse cannot but perceive the situation of the patient
informed by her knowledge of general principles and
feelings.
Still another reference seems to indicate that Orlando's
interest is to separate the nurse's perception from
knowledge and feelings for the sake of analysis only. She
writes: "Although it is extremely difficult to separate
perceptions from thoughts and feelings, it is worth trying
to do so in order to focus attention on how one aspect of
the nurse's reaction may affect the other aspects"
(Orlando, 1961:40).
But even her attempt of separating those aspects for the
sake of analysis, Orlando succeeds to undermine, because
she states: "What the nurse perceives, thinks, and feels
about the behaviour of the patient will, of course,
reflect her individuality" (1961:40).
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If the nurse's "individuality", which I take to be
constituted by her knowledge and feelings, are reflected
by the nurse's perception, thoughts (knowledge of general
principles) and feelings, then Orlando undermines her
attempt of separating perception, knowledge and feelings
for the purpose of an analysis.
This account allows to conclude, then, that, for Orlando,
the nurse's perception of the behaviour of the patient is
informed by her knowledge of general principles and
feelings.
Perception not Corresponding
The insight Orlando gained about the nurse's perception
through her research is formulated in a "nursing
principle". According to this principle:
The nurse does not assume that any aspect
of her reaction to the patient, (that is,
the nurse's perception informed by her
knowledge of general principles and
feelings, I.V.) is correct, helpful or
appropriate until she checks the validity
of it in exploration with the patient
(Orlando, 1961:56; emphasis mine).
Stating that the nurse cannot be certain that her
perception informed by her knowledge of general principles
and feelings is "correct, helpful or appropriate", that
is, not corresponding with the behaviour of the patient,
unless verified with the patient, Orlando implicitly
rejects the claim of cognitive theories of knowledge about
a correspondence between person and object.
Furthermore, in drawing out the consequences from her
insight about the nurse's perception, Orlando presents a
non-cognitive interpretation of the nurse's perception.
She writes: "What the nurse automatically perceives or
thinks cannot ordinarily be controlled, but she can learn"
to formulate her "perceptions or thoughts", that is, her
perceptions informed by her knowledge of general
principles and feelings, "by questioning and wondering
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about the meaning of them to the patient" (Orlando,
1961:41). She continues:
This kind of exploration enables the
patient, in turn, to respond by expressing
the meaning the nurse's perception or
thought has to him (Orlando, 1961:41).
Orlando's idea of the nurse's "exploration" in that the
nurse articulates her perception ("meaning") of the
behaviour of the patient to the patient so that the
patient can articulate his perception ("meaning") of it to
the nurse, in short, an exchange of perceptions between
nurse and patient, implies that the nurse's perception of
the behaviour of the patient effects the perception the
patient has about his behaviour.
Orlando's insight (claim) that the nurse's perception of
the behaviour of the patient is not corresponding with it
unless verified with the patient can be thought of as a
non-cognitive interpretation in as far as her idea of
exploration: exchange of recognitions between nurse and
patient, does not presuppose the nurse's knowledge of the
object (patient) as its condition of interpretation, that
is, of claiming a correspondence between person and
object.
To put it differently, Orlando's idea of "exploration",
understood as an exchange of recognitions between nurse
and patient, is a non-cognitive conception of recognition
because it implies that the nurse's knowledge of general
principles and feelings is uncertain to correspond with
the patient.
Correspondence Accomplished
While Orlando's idea of "exploration" as an exchange of
perceptions between nurse and patient about the behaviour
of the patient can be considered as a non-cognitive
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interpretation of perception, it conceptualizes, at the
same time, the condition of accomplishing a correspondence
between nurse and patient: exchange of perceptions between
nurse and patient about the behaviour of the patient.
But since this accomplishment of a correspondence
presupposes 'only' an exchange of recognitions between
nurse and patient her 'solution' to the uncertainty of the
nurse's recognition informed by her knowledge of general
principles is, I suggest, a minimal cognitive conception.
That is, the rational precondition of claiming a kind of
correspondence is the exchange of knowledge (recognitions)
between nurse and patient, rather than the nurse's
knowledge.
If this is so, then the nurse's failure, for one reason or
another, of articulating her perception of the behaviour
of the patient to the patient so that the patient can
articulate his perception of his behaviour in relation to
it entails that the perception of the patient remains
absent from the nurse's perception. That is, a kind of
correspondence between nurse and patient about the
behaviour of the patient is not accomplished.
On the other hand, the patient who is, for one reason or
another, not articulating his perception of his behaviour
in relation to the nurse's perception of it, withholds his
perception from the nurse's perception of his behaviour.
This means that the patient participates in not
accomplishing a kind of correspondence between himself and
the nurse about his behaviour.
With the following example presented by Orlando, I want to
illustrate the failure as well as the success of
accomplishing a kind of correspondence between nurse and
patient about the behaviour of the patient and the
implication of either achievement with regard to the
social distance between nurse and patient.
This is the description given by Orlando:
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Two days previously, a patient had been
transferred from a locked to an open ward.
On this particular day he was walking down
the hall when the head nurse said to him,
"Your dental appoinment is at 10.00 a.m."
The patient looked startled but he did not
speak, blinked his eyes and then squinted.
The head nurse asked, "What's the matter?"
but did not pursue her questioning and
allowed the patient to walk away. At 10.30
a.m. the dental clinic notified the nurse
that the patient had not kept his
appointment. At 3.00 p.m., when the
patient returned, the head nurse asked,
"Where have you been?" The patient did not
answer. Later the nurse said to the
doctor, "This patient is very confused
today, and I'm really concerned about him.
He left the ward at 9.45 a.m. to go to the
dental clinic, but he didn't get there. He
wouldn't tell me where he had been when he
returned at 3.00 p.m. I'm not sure it's
safe to keep him on the open ward."
Arrangements were made for the patient to
be transferred back to the locked ward.
When the patient arrived, he said to the
nurse whom he knew, "I don't belong here,
I was getting better." "Can you tell me
why you think you don't belong?" The
patient did not answer. The nurse then
said, "Since I don't know why you think
you don't belong, I'll tell you what I
know. They were concerned about you
because they thought you were confused
again. You left the ward for the dentist's
office but you got lost somewhere, and, to
be sure you are protected, they
transferred you here. Does any of this
make sense to you?" "It makes sense, but I
didn't get lost and I wasn't confused. I
was scared - afraid of that damn drilling!
I was shaking all over and I just couldn't
get up nerve enough to go. I sat in the
corner of the coffee shop for hours hoping
I'd find the courage to go. Finally, about
2.30, I felt better and went to the
clinic, but they couldn't take me. They
told me they would make another
appointment (in Orlando, 1961:53).
Here is a patient who is told by the head nurse about his
appointment with the dentist in the morning (10.00 am).
The head nurse establishes a correspondence with the
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patient in terms of a particular information; in doing so,
she produces the patient's perception of this information
and thus his behaviour.
The head nurse seems to be aware that her information
affected the patient somehow, because she asks "What's the
matter?" The patient does not respond; he keeps the
perception of his behaviour as produced through the head
nurse's information, which he reveals later as being
"scared - afraid of that damn drilling", from the head
nurse's perception of his behaviour. The patient is not
helping to accomplish a correspondence between himself and
the head nurse about his behaviour, creating his own
social distance to her: he walks away and sits in the
coffee shop for hours in order to work up enough courage
to go to the dentist.
When the patient returns in the afternoon (3.00 pm) to the
ward, the head nurse, who had been notified by the dental
office that the patient did not get there in time for his
appointment, asks the patient "Where have you been?"
Again, the patient is not articulating his perception of
his behaviour in relation to the head nurse's question;
nor does he take the opportunity to tell her his reaction
concerning the information she gave to him about the
appointment with the dentist at 10.00 am. Keeping silence
about his perceptions, the patient only further distances
himself from the head nurse.
The social distance between the patient and the head nurse
is even more enhanced when the head nurse, who appears to
be concerned about the patient, articulates her perception
of the patient's behaviour to the physician rather than to
the patient that he is "very confused today".
After the patient has been returned to the "locked" ward,
the nurse there relays the perception of the head nurse
from the "open" ward of the patient's behaviour to the
patient. The patient now discloses his perception as
produced through the head nurse's information about the
appointment with the dentist to the nurse. This exchange
of perceptions accomplishes a kind of correspondence
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between the two about the behaviour of the patient as
effected by the head nurse's information and can be
considered as decreasing the social distance between
patient and nurse.
Nursing Actions
As noted earlier, the third element in Orlando's
definition of a "nursing situation" are the "nursing
actions which are designed for the patient's benefit"
(1961:36). Nursing actions are more likely to benefit or
help the patient, in the opinion of Orlando, when the
nurse explores her perception of the situation of the
patient "with the patient before deciding on which action
to follow" (1961:61; emphasis mine).
On the view that Orlando's idea of an "exploration"
(exchange of perceptions between nurse and patient) is a
non-cognitive interpretation of perception which claims
that the nurse's perception informed by her knowledge of
general principles and feelings is not corresponding with
the behaviour of the patient, Orlando is implying here
that a kind of correspondence between nurse and patient
about the situation of the patient has to be reached
before a decision about the nursing action is made.
Which is to say, whether the behaviour of the patient as
perceived by the nurse constitutes a need from the
perspective of the patient before a decision about the
nursing action meeting that need of the patient is made. A
nursing action decided upon in this way, Orlando describes
as an action decided upon "deliberatively".
Deliberation, understood as an exploration in terms of an
exchange of perceptions between nurse and patient about
the nursing action to be followed, continues throughout
and after the performance of that action. Orlando notes:
"Whether the nurse tries to find out what is happening to
the patient before, during, or after the activity, she
should permit the patient to react; in order to know how
the patient anticipates, experiences or is affected by the
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activity" (1961:62); or: "A deliberative nursing process
has elements of continuous reflection as the nurse tries
to understand the meaning to the patient of the behaviour
she observes and what he needs from her in order to be
helped" (Orlando, 1961:67).
Nursing actions decided upon and carried out
deliberatively, that is, as a continuous process of
exchanging perceptions between nurse and patient, are
considered to be "more likely" to "help the patient"
(1961:61). Since an exchange of perceptions is, for
Orlando, the condition of accomplishing a correspondence,
Orlando equates the idea of nursing actions helping the
patient with the claim of accomplishing a correspondence
between nurse and patient about the need of the patient
and the nursing action chosen to meet that need including
its performance.
The notion of a nursing action decided upon deliberatively
can be considered, then, as the achievement in everyday
work of the claim that the nurse's perception is not
corresponding with the behaviour of the patient as put
forward by Orlando's non-cognitive interpretation. A
nursing action decided upon deliberatively can be seen, on
the other hand, as the enactment in everyday work of the
claim that a kind of correspondence can be accomplished
between nurse and patient about the action as suggested by
Orlando's minimal cognitive interpretation of perception.
Nursing actions decided upon and carried out
deliberatively, Orlando distinguishes from "automatic
activities". An activity is defined as automatic, when the
nurse acts on "any" perception of the situation of the
patient without exploring her perception with the patient,
that is, without accomplishing a kind of correspondence
about the need of the patient before a decision about the
nursing action to meet that need is taken. This, of
course, implies that there may be no correspondence
between nursing action and need of the patient. Indeed,
any correspondence is likely to be purely fortuitous.
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Since Orlando states that an automatic activity "may very
well be ineffective" in helping the patient (1961:61), it
can be surmised on the foregoing discussion that she
connects the idea about ineffective nursing actions with
the failure of accomplishing a kind of correspondence
between nurse and patient about the need of the patient
and subsequent nursing action to meet such need and its
performance.
However, since theories of knowledge can be distinguished
depending on the claims they raise in accordance with
their presuppositions in terms of a cognitive or a non-
cognitive principle, the notion of an automatic nursing
action can be seen as the enactment in everyday work of
the claim as made by a cognitive interpretation of
perception: that the nurse's perception is corresponding
with the behaviour of the patient.
In everyday work there may be many factors influencing the
way a nurse acts, automatic or deliberatively (in both
senses). Ultimately, I think, however, that the action
chosen by the nurse will reflect, implicitly or
explicitly, her epistemological assumption about
perception.
Orlando elaborates on the distinction between a nursing
action decided upon in a deliberative or automatic way
with an example. My interest, in connection with her
comment about this example is to explicate how these
activities illustrate the achievement of claims raised by
Orlando's non-cognitive and minimal cognitive
interpretation and a cognitive interpretation of
recognition.
This is the example presented by Orlando:
Mrs. D. occupied the bed her nurse was
making. Her eyes were focused on the
abdomen of a patient in the next bed where
another nurse was applying an abdominal
binder. Suddenly, Mrs. D. pointed to the
binder and said, "Can I please have a
binder like hers?" Mrs. D.'s nurse was
gathering the soiled bedclothes when a
doctor appeared and asked her, "Did that
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report come back?" "Isn't it on the desk?
I'll be right there," replied Mrs. D.'s
nurse. The doctor left as the nurse
answered Mrs. D., "You don't need one -
you didn't have an operation like hers."
Mrs. D. stared at the bedclothes as the
nurse hastily left the room. Two seconds
later a third nurse entered. As she handed
Mrs. D. a medication cup, Mrs. D. asked,
"Nurse, can I have a binder on my belly?"
As the third nurse replied, "You had a
normal, spontaneous delivery - you don't
need one," the first nurse returned with
clean towels and interjected, "I told you,
you didn't need one." Suddenly Mrs. D.'s
eyes dropped as she rubbed her lips
together and picked at the nail of her
little finger with her thumb. Both nurses
who explained that the patient didn't need
a binder left the room.
The nurse who applied the binder to the
other patient was now free. As she
approached Mrs. D.'s bedside, she said, "I
hear you ask for a binder. Can you tell me
why, because we usually don't use them
unless you've had an operation?" "Well,
when my breasts were all swollen and the
nurse wrapped them up tight, it helped
them go down. I don't like this big belly
I have now after the baby, and I figured
if I wrapped it up tight it would go down
too".
The nurse understood what the request
meant and the explanation the patient
needed. The nurse explained the
differences in the "swelling." In order
for the nurse to measure the effect of the
explanation, she asked, "Do you still
think the binder will help?" "Oh, no, I
understand you - it won't help. Isn't
there something that will make this belly
go down?" The patient was taught
postpartum exercises and did them
successfully (in Orlando, 1961, 62-63).
Orlando begins her comment by indicating that all three
nurses, the one making the bed of Mrs. D., the nurse
("third" one) entering the room and handing Mrs D. her
medication, and the one applying an abdominal binder to
another patient, perceived the request of the patient
("Can I please have a binder like hers?", and "Nurse, can
I have a binder on my belly?") as informed by their
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knowledge of general principles. She writes: "All three
nurses had similar data. They heard the patient's request,
knew their response to it and knew that the patient did
not have a Caesarian section. The nurses correctly-
understood the routine use of abdominal binders" (Orlando,
1961:63; emphasis mine).
From the view of a cognitive interpretation of perception,
these three nurses established a correspondence
("correctly understood") between their knowledge of
"abdominal binders", Caesarian section, the 'routine'
situation of this particular patient and the request of
this particular patient.
Orlando, then, undertakes to describe how the nurses
perceived the patient's request of 'a binder for her
belly' and their subsequent nursing action based on their
perception of that request: "The automatic thoughts of all
three had to do with the routine use of abdominal binders.
Presumably the purpose of their verbal activity was also
the same - to have the patient understand that she did not
need a binder" (1961:63).
According to Orlando, one nurse achieved her "purpose",
that is, her nursing action decided upon her perception of
the patient's request ("that she did not need a binder"),
by "explaining that the patient did not have an
operation", another nurse by "explaining that the patient
had a normal spontaneous delivery" (1961:63).
Putting it another way, the explanation (nursing action)
of both nurses based on their perception ("that she did
not need a binder") is setting up a correspondence in
terms of the patient not having had "an operation" and in
terms of having had a "spontenous delivery" with the
request of the patient: "Can I please have a binder like
hers?" and "Nurse, can I have a binder on my belly?"
It seems rather obvious that the explanations of these two
nurses are not corresponding with the request of the
patient. Yet, from the point of view of a cognitive
interpretation of recognition, each of the two nurses can
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be certain that her explanation corresponds with the
request of the patient.
Orlando hints at such certainty about a correspondence
between the explanation of these two nurses and the
request of the patient, because she states: "When the two
nurses told the patient she did not need a binder, they
thought they were correct, and, strictly speaking, they
were" (1961:64). From the point of view of a cognitive
interpretation of perception, Orlando emphasizes the
possibility of assuming that their explanation based on
their perception as informed by their knowledge of general
principles and feelings is corresponding ("they thought
they were correct") with the request of the patient. On
this view, thinking that "they were correct" is 'strictly
speaking' achieving the claim of a cognitive
interpretation about a correspondence between person and
object.
But Orlando continues and asserts that the refusal of
these two nurses to supply the patient with an abdominal
binder "did not meet the patient's need" (1961:64). How
can Orlando make such an assertion, when she just stated
that the refusal of the two nurses to give the patient
what she requested: 'a binder for her belly', was correct?
I have discussed that Orlando links the claim of nursing
actions not helping the patient with the notion of
automatic activities and these two nurses demonstrate, for
Orlando, an automatic activity. In her opinion, they
decided not to supply an abdominal binder without "first
exploring for the meaning" of the patient's request
(1961:64, emphasis mine).
Demanding that they should have explored "first", that is,
exchanged perceptions with Mrs. D. about the request in
order to find out whether her request constitutes, in her
opinion, a need requiring a nursing action or not, Orlando
rejects the claim of a cognitive interpretation about a
correspondence between the perception and subsequent
nursing actions of these two nurses and the request of the
patient.
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Instead, following Orlando's non-cognitive interpretation
of perception, the nurse's perception produces, in setting
up a correspondence with the request of the patient, the
perception of the patient. Mrs. D. illustrates how her
perception came about through the perceptions and
automatic nursing actions (explanations) of the two nurses
when she is approached by the nurse who applied the binder
to another patient. This nurse asks Mrs. D. "why" she was
asking for a binder. The patient says: "Well, when my
breasts were all swollen and the nurse wrapped them up
tight, it helped them go down. I don't like this big belly
I have after the baby, and I figured if I wrapped it up
tight it would go down too".
The articulation of the patient's perception shows how the
perception of the two nurses of Mrs. D's request ("that
she did not need a binder") is not corresponding with her
need ("I don't like this big belly") and, consequently,
their nursing actions ("that she did not need a binder")
are not corresponding with her need ("I don't like this
big belly").
Orlando's notion of nursing actions decided upon
deliberatively, understood as the enactment of the claim
that the nurse's perception is not corresponding with the
behaviour of the patient, reveals an illusion; namely,
that automatic nursing actions, understood as the
enactment of the claim of a cognitive interpretation,
correspond with the behaviour of the patient.
Orlando's notion of nursing actions decided upon
deliberatively, (enacting the claim of her non-congitive
interpretation) discloses, moreover, how automatic
activities (enacting the claim of cognitive
interpretations), exclude the perception of the patient as
produced through the nurse's perception and nursing
actions from the nurse's perception of the behaviour of
the patient. Since Orlando connects automatic activities
with being ineffective in meeting the need of the patient
it can be concluded that they are ineffective in as far as
they exclude the perception of the patient from the
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nurse's perception and thus creating a social distance
between the two.
On the other hand, the notion of nursing actions decided
upon deliberatively, understood as the enactment of the
claim that a correspondence between nurse and patient
about the behaviour of the patient can be accomplished as
put forward by Orlando's minimal cognitive interpretation
of perception is illustrated by the nurse who asked the
patient "why" she wanted a binder. According to Orlando,
this nurse "explained why it was not indicated, but added
a question which explored the request" (1961:63; emphasis
mine).
A nurse who would assume that her perception is not
corresponding with the request (behaviour) of the patient
is likely to add a question as the condition of
possibility that the patient can articulate her perception
in relation to her perception of the request and so on.
Concerning this nurse, Orlando asserts that she: "found
out the specific explanation the patient needed in order
to understand that a binder was not indicated. Explaining
the difference in the "swelling" enabled the nurse to
achieve her purpose and thus to help the patient"
(1961:63) .
In other words, an exchange of perceptions between nurse
and patient about the request of the patient helped to
accomplish a kind of correspondence between the two about
the request. Since Orlando links actions decided upon
deliberatively with being helpful in meeting the need of
the patient, it is reasonable to say that they are
helpful, because they include the perception of the
patient with regard to a particular activity and reduce,
in this way, the social distance between nurse and
patient.
Summary
In relation with Orlando's definition of a nursing
situation (behaviour of the patient, the nurse's reaction
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to that behaviour, and nursing actions), I have clarified
that the nurse's reaction to the behaviour of the patient
which Orlando separates in turn into three aspects (the
nurse's perception, "thoughts stimulated by the
perceptions", and "feelings in response to these
perceptions and thoughts") is the nurse's perception of
the behaviour of the patient as informed by her knowledge
of general principles from 'the sciences' and feelings.
I have pointed out that Orlando's idea of "exploration" as
an exchange of perceptions between nurse and patient about
the behaviour of the patient as the consequence of her
insight (claim) that the nurse's perception informed by
her knowledge of general principles and feelings is not
corresponding with the behaviour of the patient unless
verified with the patient, implies a non-cognitive
interpretation of perception, since it is not presupposing
the nurse's knowledge as the condition of interpreting,
that is, of claiming a correspondence between nurse and
patient.
I have suggested that Orlando's idea of "exploration" as
an exchange of perceptions between nurse and patient is a
minimal cognitive interpretation of perception, since it
conceptualizes the condition of accomplishing a
correspondence between nurse and patient as an exchange of
perceptions between nurse and patient rather than the
nurse's knowledge. I have explicated the claim of her
minimal cognitive interpretation of perception in relation
with an example and noted the implication concerning the
creation of social distance between nurse and patient in
case that a correspondence about the behaviour of the
patient is accomplished or not.
I have outlined Orlando's notions of automatic actions and
actions decided upon deliberatively. In relation with an
example, I have explicated the former as the enactment in
everyday work of the claim raised by cognitive
interpretations of perception and the latter as the
enactment of the claims raised by her non-cognitive and





I have stated in the Introduction that Johnson's (1959a)
position appears to imply that the nurse's recognition
informed by her practical knowledge as well as her
theoretical knowledge (a "science of nursing") corresponds
with the situation of the patient. If this is so, she is
repeating the claim of cognitive theories of knowledge.
In order to develop a "science of nursing", Johnson
suggests, however, that concepts of 'other' sciences need
to be reformulated: "the science of nursing is conceived
as developing through the reformulation of concepts drawn
from the basic sciences and certain other applied
sciences" (1959b:294; emphasis mine).
In a later paper, Johnson refers to the notion of concepts
from 'other' sciences as "borrowed" theory: the kind of
knowledge developed "in the main by other disciplines and
which is drawn upon by nursing" (1968:206; emphasis mine).
The idea of reformulating concepts from 'other' sciences,
that is, "borrowed" theory, seems to be contained in the
notion of "unique" theory.
Unique theory is, in the opinion of Johnson, the kind of
knowledge "derived from the observation of phenomena and
the asking of questions unlike those which characterize
other disciplines" (1968:206-207; emphasis mine). Johnson
seems to be saying that knowledge of "borrowed" theory
reformulated through observing phenomena and asking
questions in a way other than "borrowed" theory (observes
phenomena and asks questions) turns that knowledge into a
science (theory) unique to nursing.
Johnson, obviously, distinguishes between a science unique
to nursing and "borrowed" theory, whereby the former is
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derived through reformulating the latter. If this is so,
then, I argue, that Johnson's implicit assertion that the
nurse's recognition informed by a "science of nursing"
corresponds with the situation of the patient, requires a
cognitive principle 'unique' to a science of nursing in
order to make such assertion.
My aim in this chapter is, first, to show how Johnson's
idea of developing a science unique to nursing can be seen
as an attempt of reformulating "borrowed" theory in the
sense of exchanging cognitive principles of "borrowed"
theories of knowledge with conceptions of nursing as the
condition of making the claim about a correspondence
between the nurse's recognition based on a science of
nursing and the situation of the patient.
Second, I present how Abdellah's (1960) conception of
nursing illustrates Johnson's idea of reformulating
"borrowed" theory into a science unique to nursing. Third,
I outline Roy's (1984) conception of nursing as another
example of Johnson's idea of 'reformulation'. I explicate,
respectively, how the nurse's recognition when informed by
Abdellah's or by Roy's conception of the 'whole' patient
is not corresponding with the 'whole' patient; and how
those conceptions increase the nurse's knowledge as the
condition of producing and excluding the recognition of
the patient, that is, the possibility of increasing the
social distance between nurse and patient.
Conceptions of Nursing as Cognitive Principles
In her attempt to elucidate how a science of nursing can
be generated, Johnson conceives the kind of knowledge
required for "practice in nursing" as consisting of three
parts, "each composed of a general type of knowledge":
knowledge of order, knowledge of disorder, and knowledge
of control (1968:207-208).
With one part, knowledge of order, I wish to exemplify how
Johnson utilizes "borrowed" theory to identify the kind of
knowledge nursing needs, and then reformulates that
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knowledge into knowledge unique to nursing, that is, into
conceptions of nursing as the foundation of a science of
nursing.
Johnson describes knowledge of order as the kind of
knowledge the "basic sciences" which are also referred to
as the "biological and behavioural sciences" have brought
forth "through the scientific method about man and his
universe" (1968:207). She notes further that the
biological and the behavioural sciences have provided
knowledge each from their "perspective" and through their
"focus" on particular objects and events "which helps us
to understand biological man, psychological man, and
social man" (Johnson, 1968:207).
Then Johnson claims that since nursing is dealing with
"man", knowledge of order is the kind of knowledge nursing
needs. But she goes on and implies that nursing theorists
who are developing knowledge from the "perspective" and
through the "focus" of the biological and behavioural
sciences contribute to "borrowed" theory; which is to say,
they are not building a science of nursing:
I believe that nursing is concerned with
man as an organized and integrated whole
and this is the specific knowledge of
order we require While nurse
scientists may, and some undoubtedly will,
contribute to the general knowledge of
order in man, it seems to me this is now,
and will continue to be borrowed knowledge
(Johnson, 1968:207).
Johnson makes it rather clear that nursing theorists who
develop knowledge about "behaviour", that is, behaviour of
man according to the perspective of the behavioural or the
biological sciences are, in her opinion, serving the
"cause of science" but not the "cause of nursing" when she
further states:
If we continue to observe behavior from
the perspective of sociology,
anthropology, or psychology; or if we
continue to study disease with the aim of
elucidating etiologies, properties, or
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life cycle; or if we continue to inquire
into biological functioning or
malfunction, we will be serving the cause
of science, but not necessarily the cause
of nursing" (Johnson, 1968:209).
But how are nursing theorists to find a perspective of
nursing with regard to man so that they can stop employing
the perspective of sociology, for example? Johnson
suggests that such perspective is developed through
"research". According to Johnson: "theory development
unique to nursing will evolve only through the study of
phenomena and the asking of questions in a way that is not
characteristic of any other discipline" (1968:208;
emphasis mine).
Yet she immediately concedes that the "determination of
what phenomena to study and what questions to ask", that
is, finding a perspective of nursing with regard to man,
"will not be easy" (Johnson, 1968:208). Nonetheless,
Johnson indicates how to determine such perspective of
nursing. It is, for Johnson, a "fresh and creative
approach" made possible through the "originality" of
nursing theorists. She states:
It will require a fresh and creative
approach to the consideration of
alternatives, and an originality expected
only of the most outstanding scientists in
other disciplines. Obviously, originality
must be tempered by reason, and reason by
the objective characteristics of the world
of practice; but only originality will
take us away from the well-worn paths we
have been following (Johnson, 1968:208-
209; emphasis mine).
Proposing the "originality" of nursing theorists as the
source of determining a perspective of nursing concerning
man, Johnson seems to have found, at last, a starting
point for the development of a science unique to nursing.
On the other hand, she admits that she does not know how
the "originality" of nursing theorists is going to achieve
the task of finding a perspective of nursing. She writes:
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"While my faith is strong, my ability to isolate and
articulate what I consider to be the proper phenomena and
perspective is limited" (Johnson; 1968:209).
Yet, Johnson is underrating herself here, because, by
claiming that nursing is, as noted earlier, dealing with
"man", Johnson has named the focus of nursing: man. What
needs to be developed now is the perspective of nursing on
man which is distinct from the "borrowed" perspective of
the biological and the behavioural sciences on man so that
a science of nursing is getting itself away from the "well
worn paths" of the biological and the behavioural
sciences.
Moreover, Johnson has already stated in 1959 that the
perspective of nursing with regard to man is "health". She
writes that the development of a "science of nursing" is
given "direction" by "recognition of nursing's specific
goal and contribution to the ultimate goal of optimum
health for all the individuals and groups" (Johnson,
1959b:294; emphasis mine).
In 1974 Johnson refines nursing's perspective on health of
man as: "concern" and help for the person to prevent
illness or to recover from it. She writes:
Within the organization of relationships
and the way of life found especially in
today's society, patients require
precisely that which nursing, by heritage
and current interest, seems uniquely
qualified to offer: concern for the person
and assistance in living and coping with
his circumstances and his environment in
such a way that illness may be prevented
or recovery may be facilitated (Johnson,
1974:375; emphasis mine).
Having defined the perspective of nursing (Johnson (1974)
speaks of "nursing's general purpose") with regard to
nursing's focus: man, Johnson takes her consideration
about the development of a science of nursing this time a
step further, because she says:
There remains the necessity of building a
focused and cohesive conceptual system of
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the person to be served and of deriving
from that system an abstract model for
practice that will allow such a purpose to
be fulfilled (1974:375; emphasis mine).
In other words, a "conceptual system" of nursing's
perspective (concern and help to prevent illness or to
recover from it) of man ("the person to be served") is the
condition of developing an "abstract model", that is, a
conception of nursing informing nurses in their everyday
work.
Johnson further points out that: "Most, if not all, of
these individual efforts", that is, of individual nursing
theorists, "to conceptualize the consumer of nursing
service appear to have started from about the same point
of view of nursing's general purpose (1974:375), that is,
to view man ("consumer of nursing care") in terms of
'concern and help to prevent illness or to recover from
it' and to conceptualize that concern and help.
Conceptualizations of nursing's perspective, that is, of
concern and help for the patient, in short, conceptions of
nursing are, for Johnson, the foundation of developing a
science of nursing.
In this way, Johnson establishes, I suggest, conceptions
of nursing as the condition upon which the assertion can
be raised that the nurse's recognition when informed by
those conceptions of nursing, that is, by a science of
nursing rather than by "borrowed" theory, corresponds with
the situation of the patient. The point is, however, that
Johnson only exchanges a cognitive principle (for example,
the ego of Descartes) of "borrowed" theories of knowledge
with another cognitive principle, such as, a conception of
nursing.
Next I turn to Abdellah's (1960) conception of nursing in
order to exemplify Johnson's idea of reformulating
"borrowed" theory into a science unique to nursing and to
explicate how the nurse's recognition, when informed by
Abdellah's conception of the 'whole' patient, is not
corresponding with the 'whole' patient.
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Abdellah's Typology of Nursing Problems
In Patient-centered Approaches to Nursing Abdellah (1960)
presents a typology of "nursing problems" and "nursing
treatment". These typologies have been developed on the
basis of three studies conducted by Abdellah (and possibly
others) between 1953 and 1958.
One aim guiding the first research project was to find "a
classification of common nursing problems" (Abdellah,
1960:12). This study resulted in a typology "comprising 58
groups of common nursing problems" (Abdellah, 1960:12).
The second study, it is noted by Abdellah (1960), was more
concerned with the steps nurses most frequently use in
their everyday work to identify nursing problems, while
the third study refined the typology by compressing the
'original' 58 groups of nursing problems to 21 (Abdellah,
1960:16).
Nursing problems of the final version of 21 nursing
problems are described in the following way, for example:
"1. To maintain good hygiene and physical comfort"; "2. To
promote optimal activity; exercise, rest, and sleep"; or,
"12. To identify and accept positive and negative
expressions, feelings, and reactions"; or, "15. To promote
the development of productive interpersonal relationships"
(Abdellah, 1960:16-17).
In addition, a list of 12 "nursing skills" for the
development of a "nursing treatment typology" was
established of the kind, for example: "1. Observation of
health status" in relation with a "well person", a
"patient with physical health problem", and one "with
emotional health problem" (Abdellah, 1960:16-17).
The assumption Abdellah makes about these typologies of
nursing problems and nursing treatment is that they are
the "principles of nursing practice and constitute the
unique body of knowledge that is nursing (1960:12;
emphasis mine). The development of such knowledge unique
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to nursing involves, for Abdellah, "converting the laws
derived from the physical, biological, and social sciences
into principles of nursing practice" (1960:2; emphasis
mine).
How Abdellah converted the "laws" of the "physical,
biological, and social sciences" into principles unique to
nursing is not further explained. One can only assume that
she thinks to have achieved such conversion, because she
claims that the typology of nursing problems "focuses on
the physical, biological, social-psychological needs of
the patient and provides a more meaningful basis for
organization than the categories of systems of the body"
(Abdellah, 1960:27; emphasis mine). Abdellah seems to be
indicating here that, at least, the "categories of the
body", if one takes them to stand for the "laws" of the
physical and biological sciences, have been
'reformulated', to use Johnson's term, into "physical,
biological" needs, that is, nursing problems, of the
patient.
Adding the "patient as a person" to the Disease
In noting that the "physical, biological, social-
psychological" nursing problems ("needs") of the patient
are a "more meaningful" basis of "organization", Abdellah
refers to the kind of knowledge on the basis of which a
curriculum in schools of nursing and nursing practice in
hospitals is considered to be organized.
Her point being that curricula in nursing schools (in the
United States) up to the 1950s stressed "predominantly the
physical aspects" of the patient (1960:3). Nurses learned,
according to Abdellah, about the "disease condition" of
the patient, but little about the "patient as a person"
(1960:3).
On analogy with her assessment that nurses acquire
knowledge about the physical and disease condition of the
patient rather than about the "patient as a person",
Abdellah claims that nursing practice puts the emphasis on
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"physical aspects of nursing and medical care"; which is
to say, little emphasis on the "patient as a person";
nurses are not seen to achieve a "comprehensive care of
the 'patient as a whole'" (Abdellah, 1960:5).
Stating that the typology of nursing problems is a "more
meaningful" basis of organizing a curriculum and nursing
practice than "categories of the body", Abdellah is saying
that the nurse's recognition informed by her typology
grasps the physical and disease condition of the patient
in her everyday work in terms of "physical, biological"
nursing problems as well as the "patient as a person" in
terms of "social-psychological" nursing problems. In
short, the "patient as a whole".
Abdellah describes the "physical, biological, social-
psychological" nursing problems also as "overt" and
"covert" nursing problems. In relation with her notion of
overt and covert nursing problems I want to explicate how
the nurse's recognition informed by Abdellah's typology of
"physical, biological, social-psychological" nursing
problems is not corresponding with the "patient as a
whole".
Increasing the Production of Social Distance
An overt nursing problem is, for Abdellah et al, an
"apparent" condition of the patient in the sense of a
physical disease condition, because she illustrates an
overt nursing problem with an example of "a patient with a
decubitus ulcer" (1960:6).
In contrast to an overt nursing problem, Abdellah states
that a covert nursing problem is a "concealed or hidden"
conditon the patient faces (1960:6). Such covert problem
is linked with the social and the psychological condition
of the patient. This comes out when she notes that covert
problems "such as emotional, sociological, and
interpersonal problems are often missed or perceived
incorrectly" (Abdellah, 1960:7).
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Abdellah illustrates both: overt and covert nursing
problems with the following example:
keeping a patient in bed with a heart
condition will not achieve complete rest
for his heart by slowing his pulse rate
(overt nursing problem) if he is worried
about the support of his family (covert
nursing problem) (1960:7).
This example of the patient with a heart condition (overt
nursing problem) underlines how the patient's physical
disease condition and concomitant treatment (bed rest) may
affect the patient in more than one way. That is, the
bedrest may lead to his puis rate slowing down, but it may
lead also to concerns (covert nursing problem) of the
patient. One concern might be that he is worried about the
"support of his family", another might be that he is
worried about his job, and so'on.
From a slightly different perspective, Orlando underlines
this point when she says that the fulfillment of the
patient's requirements contribute "simultaneously to the
mental and physical health" of the patient (1961:9;
emphasis mine).
More specifically, this example and Orlando's insight
indicate that a division of the patient, for example, into
a physical disease condition of the patient and the
"patient as a person", is epistemologically secondary.
That is, the nurse's recognition informed by her knowledge
of Abdellah's typology of nursing problems produces, in
establishing a correspondence with a "physical,
biological" problem of the patient, the recognition of the
patient in relation to it as well as the recognition of
the patient of his "social-psychological" problem(s).
Since the recognition of the patient of his "physical,
biological" problem as well as of his "social-
psychological" problem are effected by the nurse's
recognition of his "physical, biological" nursing problem,
the patient's recogniton is, as an effect, "hidden or
concealed" from the nurse's recognition. The nurse's
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recognition based on Abdellah's typology of nursing
problems is not corresponding with the "patient as a
whole".
On the contrary, the nurse who would assert that her
recognition informed by Abdellah's typology of nursing
problems corresponds with a "physical, biological" nursing
problem recognized, excludes the recognitions of the
patient ("physical, biological" and "social-psychological"
problems) as produced through the nurse's recognition of a
particular "physical, biological" nursing problem from her
recognition of that problem - effecting a social distance
between herself and the patient.
Conversely, the nurse's recognition informed by Abdellah's
nursing problems produces, in setting up a correspondence
with a "social-psychological" nursing problem of the
patient, the recognition of the patient in relation to it
and the recognition of the patient of his "physical,
biological" problem(s).
The nurse who is certain that her recognition informed by
Abdellah's nursing problems corresponds with a "social-
psychological" nursing problem recognized, excludes the
recognition of the patient ("social-psychological" and
"physical, biological" problems), as produced through the
nurse's recognition of a particular "social-psychological"
nursing problem from her recognition of that problem, also
resulting in a social distance between hurse and patient.
Abdellah's conception of nursing shows how adding
knowledge about the "patient as a person" in terms of
"social-psychological" nursing problems to the nurse's
knowledge about the physical disease condition of the
patient ("physical, biological" nursing problems),
increases the nurse's knowledge as the condition of
producing (and excluding) the recognitions of the patient
in relation to her recognition.
Next I turn to Roy's (1984) conception of nursing which is
rather complex and warrants a comprehensive presentation
(which also serves a discussion in the Appendix that
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problematizes the development of a science unique to
nursing).
Rov's Conception of Nursing
According to Roy (1984), nursing "is dealing with the
person, not only as a biological organism, but as a
holistic adaptive system". On this assumption, Roy
proposes "to describe adaptation as a process involving
holistic functioning to affect health positively"
(1984:36; emphasis mine).
In order to define the person as an adaptive system
"functioning holistically to affect health positively",
Roy explains first a "general notion" of a system and
coping mechanisms which are then reformulated as a
conception of nursing. This is how Roy explains a system:
A system is a whole that functions as a
whole by virtue of the interdependence of
its parts. In addition to having wholeness
and related parts, systems also have
inputs, outputs, and control and feedback
processes" (Roy, 1984:29; emphasis in the
original).
Parts such as input, output, control mechanism, and
feedback processes of mechanical systems may, in Roy's
opinion, also be utilised to describe a living system "as
a whole made up of parts that function as a unity for some
purpose" (1984:30).
On this view, inputs or "stimuli" of a living system such
as a person are taken to arise from the "environment
outside the person and internally from the self". A pool
of such stimuli constitutes, according to Roy, the
person's "adaptation level" which represents the person's
"own standard of the range of stimuli that can be
tolerated with ordinary efforts (1984:30). The processes
that control the persons's adaptation level are considered
by Roy in terms of "coping mechanisms":
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We know that people have biological and
psychological abilities to cope with a
changing environment. Some biologic
mechanisms are genetically determined,
such as the amount of antihemophilic
factor in the blood, a substance necessary
for blood clotting. Other innate
mechanisms are common to the species and
include such factors as the self-sealing
mechanism of the blood vessels. When it is
disrupted, the cut end of a blood vessel
constricts, thus helping to prevent
excessive bleeding. Mechanisms may also be
acquired through such processes as
learning. For example, every student nurse
learns how to apply pressure to the site
to control local bleeding. Psychological
defense mechanisms act in a similar way.
If a fact is too anxiety-provoking, one
can block it out by the use of mechanisms
of denial. Whatever the change in the
environment, be it a direct assault that
causes injury or a subtle variation in
psychological climate, the person has
mechanisms to cope with the changing world
(1984:30-31; emphasis mine).
In effect Roy states that biological, "other innate"
processes, learning processes, and psychological processes
enable the person to cope with changes affecting the
person's level of adaptation.
From such a "general notion" of coping mechanisms Roy
claims to develop a "nursing science perspective of these
adaptive processes". She describes these as a system with
two basic internal processes: "the regulator and the
cognator subsystems" (Roy, 1984:31).
Roy presents the regulator subsystem as receiving "input
from the external environment and from changes in the
person's internal state" and as processing "the changes
through neural-chemical-endocrine channels to produce
responses" (1984:31). I quote Roy's explanation of how the
regulator subsystem is seen to function at length:
the internal and external stimuli are
basically chemical or neural and act as
inputs to the central nervous system. The
chemical stimuli travel through the
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circulatory system and may be transduced
into neural inputs. The spinal cord, brain
stem, and autonomic reflexes act through
effectors to produce automatic,
unconscious effects on the body responses.
The chemical stimuli in the circulation
influence the endocrine glands to produce
the appropriate hormone. The
responsiveness of target organs or tissues
then effects body responses. By some
unknown process, the neural inputs are
transformed into conscious perceptions in
the brain. Eventually, this perception
leads to psychomotor choices of response
which activate a body response. These
bodily responses, brought about through
the chemical-neural-endocrine channels,
are fed back as additional stimuli to the
regulator system (1984:31; emphasis mine).
The regulator subsystem involves physiological processes
such as chemical, neurological, and endocrine responses
which are seen to enable the body to cope with inputs from
the environment.
The maintenance of cellular nutrition which involves the
interrelation between hunger and blood sugar is, for Roy,
an example that illustrates the regulator subsystem.
But nutrition can also, according to Roy, be examined as
"another regulator process", since it is influenced by
factors such "as culture, emotional state, appearance of
food, and so forth. The regulator mechanisms seldom act
alone, but are most often interactive with other human
control processes" (Roy, 1984:33). Roy's point is that:
"Developing nursing knowledge will continue to explore
this interrelationship, rather than focusing solely on the
physiology involved (1984:33; emphasis mine).
The second subsystem of the person's internal processes,
the cognator, is considered to receive inputs involving:
psychological and social factors as well
as physical and physiological ones,
including those that are the output of the
regulator mechanisms (Roy, 1984:33).
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The psychological, social, physical, and physiological
stimuli, as well as the stimuli emitted from the regulator
subsystem Roy designs to proceed "through various
cognitive/emotive pathways". That is, to "trigger off four
kinds of processes: perceptual/information processing,
learning, judgment, and emotion" and to produce responses
(1984:33) .
Within each of these four processes, Roy states, "we can
place knowledge that is currently known about these human
abilities" (1984:33). In detail:
Under perceptual/information processing,
we may consider the person's internal
activity of selective attention, coding,
and memory. Learning involves such
processes as imitation, reinforcement, and
insight. The judgment process includes
problem solving and decision making.
Through the emotional pathways, the person
uses defenses to seek relief and affective
appraisal and attachment (1984:33;
emphasis mine).
Roy further designs the four processes (in which she
places current knowledge about particular processes just
stated) to process input stimuli, for example,
psychological ones, to produce responses. These responses
are in turn designed to be carried through four "effector
modes: physiologic, self-concept, role function, and
interdependence" (Roy, 1984:33; emphasis mine). Each one
of these modes presents, according to Roy, a particular
"adaptive behavior" (1984:45).
Roy gives an example of how a cognator process might
become manifest in "behaviour". With this example I want
to show how a person informed by Roy's conception of the
person as a holistic adaptive system will fail to
recognize the person as a holistic adaptive system.
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Creating an Almost Total Social Distance
Roy describes a teacher who presents an outline of a
course to students in the first class of the semester. The
teacher is then approached by a student who perceived that
outline to entail "an unusual amount and quality of work"
and wants to drop the course.
This is the example as given by Roy:
A student comes to the teacher after the
first class of the semester and tells the
teacher that she wants to drop the course.
As the teacher talks with the student, she
learns that the student perceived an
unusual amount and quality of work being
demanded as the outline of the course was
presented by the teacher. The student has
focused attention on this one aspect of
the situation and ignored other aspects,
such as her abilities, interests, and
future goals in this field. Although
selective attention is an appropriate
mechanism in some situations, in this case
it has led to a constricted view of the
situation so that the student acts hastily
based only on the information to which she
is attending (1984:33 and 35).
The teacher, informed by her knowledge of the person as a
holistic adaptive system as defined by Roy, recognizes the
student's perception of the outline of the course
("unusual amount and quality of work") as "selective
attention" (or as a "constricted view"), since the
student's perception ("unusual amount and quality of
work") is seen to make other aspects of herself as an
holistic adaptive system, such as, "abilities, interests,
and future goals in the field", absent from her perception
of the course outline.
However, while the teacher points out that the student
perceives the course outline in terms of "selective
attention", the teacher enacts the same gesture of
selective attention, namely, recognizing the perception of
the student of the course outline as "selective attention"
and "ignoring" other aspects of Roy's holistic adaptive
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system. This is hinted at by Roy in her footnote to the
example which states:
This interpretation of the situation is
oversimplified for use as an example.
Because the person functions as a whole,
all the other cognator processes, such as
memory or avoidance of anxiety, could also
be considered, as well as any regulator
influence (1984:35; emphasis mine).
Roy is saying that the teacher's recognition of the
student's perception of the course outline in terms of
"selective attention" is not considering the student's
perception in terms of "memory" or "avoidance of anxiety".
The consideration of the student's perception as
"selective attention" makes the aspects of "memory" or
"avoidance of anxiety" and all the other aspects of the
student's regulator and cognator subsystems absent from
that consideration.
In case the teacher asserts that the recognition of the
student's perception of the course outline in terms of
one aspect, like "selective attention", is certain to
correspond with the perception of the student of the
course outline as "selective attention", such assertion
would explicitly exclude the student's perception as
produced through the teacher's recognition in relation to
the aspect of "selective attention" and, since the "person
functions as a whole", all the other aspects of the
student's two subsystems from her consideration of the
student.
The example reveals that a consideration of the student in
terms of any aspect of the regulator and cognator
subsystem is selective. It is not the oversimplification
of the example that is the problem. Rather the
impossibility of a 'holistic' recognition of the person in
the sense that the teacher, informed by her knowledge of
the student as an adaptive system "functioning
holistically" in terms of two subsystems and all the
aspects of it, grasps all these aspects at once.
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Roy who claims that nursing is not dealing with the person
only as a "biological organism", adds the person's
cognator subsystem to the person's "biological organism"
(regulator subsystem) illuminates how such knowledge
increases the teacher's knowledge of the student and thus
of the possibility to produce and exclude the recognition
of the student of all the aspects of those two subsystems
creating thereby almost a holistic, that is, an almost
total social distance between herself and the student.
Social Distancing Further Illuminated
This production of an almost total social distance when
the nurse's recognition is informed by Roy's conception of
nursing, I underline with an example from Orlando's (1961)
study. I also draw on Orlando's action decided upon
"deliberatively" and automatically, understood as the
achievements of her non-cognitive and minimal cognitive
conceptions of the nurse's recognition in everyday work.
This is the example as presented by Orlando:
The nurse entered with an intravenous
tray. Abruptly, the patient sat up and
yelled, "Get out of here! Nobody, but
nobody is going to put that needle in me
today. You people will drive me nuts." The
nurse said, "I'm sorry, but it's ordered
daily." The patient replied, "I don't give
a damn - get it out of here." The nurse
placed the tray on the bedside table, left
the room, approached the head nurse and
said, "The patient refuses her infusion
and she really sounds like she means it."
The head nurse responded, "I'll go in and
talk with her."
The head nurse said to the patient, "You
have to have the intravenous - it's
ordered daily .. there isn't enough fluid
in your body.. " The patient interrupted,
"I'm not listening. If you don't get that
tray out of here, I'll throw it through
the window." The headnurse bit her lip and
said, "O.K., I'll see what the doctor
says. "
Another nurse immediately approached the
patient and said, "You really look upset.
Can you tell me why?" The patient started
to cry, then said, "Wouldn't you be upset
if the doctor promised you that if you
drank all night you wouldn't get the
intravenous? I stayed awake drinking all
night. I'm floating now. What more do they
want from me?"
The fluid intake notes confirmed the
patient's achievement. The doctor was
notified and the order for intravenous was
discontinued (in Orlando, 1961:79-80).
In this description, the nurse who enters with an
"intravenous tray" tells the patient in terms of the
'tray' that she is going to get an "intravenous" infusion
today. It is fair to assume that the patient knew about
the "intravenous" being "ordered daily", since, as the
patient later reveals to another nurse at the very end of
the description, the physician had promised her that if
she would drink "all night" she would not "get the
intravenous" today. The nurse with her 'tray'
(representing the "daily" order of the "intravenous")
establishes, therefore, a correspondence with the 'fluid
aspect' of the patient in the sense of "there isn't enough
fluid in your body" (the explanation given to the patient
by the head nurse).
If one accepts that the patient is a holistic adaptive
system with a regulator and a cognator subsystem and their
various aspects (Roy, 1984), then the nurse's 'tray'
produces, in establishing a correspondence with one aspect
of the patient: 'not enough fluid in your body', the
recognition of the patient with regard to that aspect:
"I'm floating", but also with regard to all the other
aspects of her two subsystems.
Since the recognition of the patient is an effect of the
nurse entering with the 'tray', the nurse can neither know
the recognition of the patient concerning the aspect 'not
enough fluid in your body' nor concerning all the other
aspects.
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On this view, the patient's outburst when the nurse enters
with the 'tray': "Get out of here! Nobody, but nobody is
going to put that needle in me today. You people will
drive me nuts" (emphasis mine), is not telling the nurse
how she recognizes the aspect 'not enough fluid in your
body' as "I'm floating" and all the other aspects of her
regulator and cognator subsystems so that a correspondence
between herself and the nurse about that particular aspect
and all the other aspects of her two subsystems can be
accomplished before the 'order' about the "intravenous" is
enacted by the nurse today.
On the other hand, if the recognition of the patient is an
effect of the nurse entering with the 'tray', and if this
effect concerns the aspect 'not enough fluid in your body'
and all the other aspects of her two subsystems, then the
patient's outburst: "Get out of here" and so on, while
rather impolite and not informing the nurse about her
recognition, can hardly be considered to be exaggerated,
precisely because the nurse's 'tray' makes her recognition
of the aspect 'not enough fluid in your body' as "I'm
floating" and of all the other aspects of her two
subsystems absent.
The patient who wants to articulate her recognition in
relation to the 'tray' faces, however, a difficulty like
that of the teacher discussed above. That is, she can
articulate only one aspect at a time, for example, with
regard to the aspect 'not enough fluid in your body' as
"I'm floating". Articulating her recognition as "I'm
floating" is not articulating her recognition of any other
aspect of her regulator and cognator subsystems, although
all these other aspects, since they constitute, according
to Roy, the patient as a holistic adaptive system, are
present for the patient. The patient's recognition of one
aspect 'fluid' as "I'm floating" seems to capture
something of a 'holistic' recognition of herself and
seems, in this way, to support Roy's idea of the person as
a holistic adaptive system.
The nurse's response to the patient's outburst: "Get out
of here" and so on, in terms of "I'm sorry, but it", that
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is, the "intravenous" has "been ordered daily" confirms
explicitly that she assumes a correspondence between her
'tray' and the aspect 'not enough fluid in your body' and
excludes, thereby, the recognition of the patient
concerning that aspect and all the other aspects of the
two subsystems which she produced with her 'tray' and her
statement that the "intravenous" is "ordered daily" from
her recognition.
The nurse is about to act, following Orlando (1961),
automatically, since she fails to explore the outburst of
the patient with the patient before deciding to enact the
physician's order "daily" today. The nurse's activity as
signalled by her 'tray' and confirmed by her statement may
not be, in Orlando's words, very helpful, since it is not
seen as a need by the patient; there is no correspondence
accomplished through an exchange of recognitions between
nurse and patient about the situation of the patient as
the condition of an action decided upon "deliberatively".
Instead, the nurse calls on the authority of the head
nurse who reiterates that the "intravenous" is "ordered
daily". Her confirmation of a correspondence between the
'order' and the aspect of the patient that there is 'not
enough fluid in your body' today, enhances the exclusion
of the patient's recognition of it as "I'm floating" today
and of all the other aspects of her regulator and cognator
subsystems from the nurses' recognition.
If the person as an adaptive system is "functioning
holistically", according to Roy's conception of nursing,
then the exclusion of the patient's 'holistic'
recognition "I'm floating", that is, of all the aspects of
her two subsystems, is almost totally distancing the
patient from the head nurse's and the nurse's recognition
of the patient's aspect 'not enough fluid in your body'.
In other words, the only correspondence between the two
nurses and the patient in that particular situation is the
aspect of the patient's 'fluid of the body' as such.
The patient's reaction when she interrupts the head nurse
is not overstating her case when she says:"I'm not
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listening. If you don't get that tray out of here, I'll
throw it through the window". The patient apparently
attempts to stop the head nurse from further distancing
her, that is, from putting "the needle in me today". So
she will remove the tray (with the needle) which is
already precariously near her body (the nurse "placed the
tray on the bedside table") as far as possible: "through
the window".
Summary
In this chapter I have pointed out that Johnson's idea of
developing a science unique to nursing involves a
cognitive principle 'unique' to a science of nursing in
order to assert a correspondence between the nurse's
recognition informed by a science unique to nursing and
the situation of the patient.
Since conceptions of nursing are, for Johnson, the
foundation of a science of nursing, I have suggested that
these conceptions provide the condition upon which a
correspondence between the nurse's recognition informed by
those conceptions and the situation of the patient can be
made.
I have pointed out, on the other hand, that the
establishment of such condition implies an exchange of
general cognitive principles of "borrowed" theories of
knowledge, such as the ego of Descartes, with the
conception of nursing of the individual nursing theorist.
I have presented the conceptions of nursing of Abdellah
(1960) and Roy (1984) as an illustration of Johnson's idea
of developing a science unique to nursing through
reformulating "borrowed" theory.
I have shown how the nurse's recognition informed by these
conceptions of nursing is not corresponding with the
"patient as a whole" (Abdellah) or with the patient as a
"holistic adaptive system" (Roy). Instead, I have
explicated that 'adding on' the "patient as a person" in
terms of "social-psychological" nursing problems to the
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physical disease condition of the patient ("biological,
physical" nursing problems) (Abdellah) and the person as a
cognator subsystem to the "biological organism" of the
person (regulator subsystem) (Roy) increases the nurse's
knowledge informing her recognition of the patient and
thus the condition of the nurse's production and exclusion
of the patient's recognition of his situation leading to
an increase in social distance between nurse and patient.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FROM A PHYSIOLOGICAL TO A COGNITIVE PRINCIPLE
Introduction
In the Introduction to the thesis I have stated that if
the claim about the uncertainty of a correspondence
between the nurse's recognition and the situation of the
patient is derived from theories of knowledge which
presuppose a non-cognitive principle instead of connecting
this claim with a particular kind of knowledge, then the
assertion of Benner et al (1996) about the uncertainty of
the nurse's recognition at the advanced beginner stage as
informed by her theoretical knowledge from nursing school
can be taken to repeat the claim of non-cognitive theories
of knowledge.
Since theorizing about the person's recognition of objects
has apparently moved from a cognitive to a non-cognitive
interpretation, repeating the claim of the latter would
constitute a break with implicit assertions about a
correspondence between conceptions of nursing and the
situation of the patient of nursing theorists like
Johnson, Abdellah, or Roy.
But I noted also in the Introduction that Benner and
Wrubel (1989) and, particularly, Benner et al (1996)
associate the claim about the certainty of the nurse's
recognition with the development of practical knowledge.
If the claim about the certainty of recognition is raised,
however, on account of cognitive theories of knowledge,
then the assertion of Benner et al (1996) that the nurse's
recognition at the proficient and expert stage when
informed by her "skills of seeing" and practical knowledge
corresponds with the situation of the patient only repeats
the claim of cognitive theories of knowledge.
To put it in another way, the attempt to solve the
uncertainty of the nurse's recognition at the advanced
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beginner stage which has been noticed by Benner et al
(1996), re-constitutes the gesture of cognitive theories
of knowledge: presupposing a principle as the condition of
interpreting recognition and thus of the possibility to
assert a correspondence between the nurse's recognition at
the proficient and expert stage and the situation of the
patient.
The cognitive principle Benner et al presuppose is, in
'essence', the development of the nurse's "skills of
seeing" and practical knowledge in her everyday work with
a particular group of patients over a number of years. The
idea about the nurse's development of "skills of seeing"
and practical knowledge is, according to Benner et al,
derived from the "Dreyfus Model of Skill Acquisition".
In this chapter I elucidate, first, how the concept of
skill acquisition, as presented by Dreyfus and Dreyfus in
Expertise in Nursing Practice (Benner et al, 1996),
presupposes a physiological principle in terms of the
person's brain processes. Second, I reveal how the brain
processes Dreyfus and Dreyfus presuppose as the condition
of explaining the nurse's skill acquisition, are also the
condition of impossibility of explaining the nurse's
acquisition of skill.
I will argue, third, that a study of the nurse's skill
acquisition which draws on Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1996),
requires physiological accounts of the nurse's brain
processes from novice through to expert in order to
validate the acquisition of her skill. Fourth, I show how
Benner et al's study of the nurse's skill acquisition is
based on cognitive accounts of the nurse's 'brain
processes' and that their explanation of the nurse's skill
acquisition constitutes a cognitive (as opposed to a non-
cognitive) conception of the nurse's recognition.
The Nurse's Acquisition of Intuitive Skill
In the chapter Dreyfus and Dreyfus contribute to Expertise
in Nursing Practice they claim, following Aristotle, that
professionals such as physicians and nurses need
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"intuitive skill" for the application of theory to
particular situations. For example, they write concerning
medicine that: "The two areas where theory impinges on the
concrete case, diagnosis, and treatment, are areas which
would require experience and intuition" (Dreyfus and
Dreyfus, 1996:33). Dreyfus and Dreyfus are indicating here
that the physician or the nurse cannot be certain that
their recognition as informed by "theory" is corresponding
with the particular situation of the patient in space and
time.
This uncertainty of the physician's or the nurse's
recognition when informed by "theory" and the particular
situation of the patient which Dreyfus and Dreyfus are
noting here, Orlando (1961) already called attention to
almost 40 years ago when she distinguishes between the
nurse's knowledge of general principles of 'the sciences'
she learned in nursing school and the "meanings" the nurse
"must discover in the immediate nursing situation in order
to help the patient" (1961:1).
Orlando solved this uncertainty of the nurse's
recognition. She did so, as has been discussed in Chapter
Two, with her idea of "exploration" which entails an
exchange of recognitions between nurse and patient as the
condition of accomplishing a kind of correspondence
between the nurse and patient about his situation (minimal
cognitive conception).
In contrast to Orlando, Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1996)
postulate the nurse's acquisition of intuitive skill. In
other words, Dreyfus and Dreyfus distinguish between two
kinds of knowledge of the physician and nurse: "theory"
and intuitive skill. With regard to nursing, they describe
the difference as one between "theory of nursing" which
includes "both the medical and nursing scientific
knowledge that has been imparted to the trainee, mostly in
nursing school", that is, her theoretical knowledge, and
"the 'rules of thumb' that are largely acquired during on-
the-job-training and experience", that is, intuitive skill
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1996:29; emphasis in the original).
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This acquisition of the nurse's intuitive skill through
"concrete experience in real situations" (Dreyfus and
Dreyfus, 1996:36) is seen as a progression in five stages,
from the stage of the novice nurse, advanced beginner
nurse, to the stages of competent, proficient, and expert
nurse. According to Dreyfus and Dreyfus, the novice nurse
is one who knows theoretical knowledge from nursing school
but lacks concrete experience in real situations and
follows therefore rules in her everyday work.
The novice nurse can be distinguished from the advanced
beginner who is able, since she has gained some concrete
experience, to recognize "situational" objects of which
she has no prior knowledge: "Through practical experience
in concrete situations with meaningful elements which
neither the instructor nor student can define in terms of
objective features, the advanced beginner starts
intuitively to recognize these elements when they are
present" (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1996:38).
The point Dreyfus and Dreyfus make is while everyday work
encourages the advanced beginner nurse to think of more
rules, it "teaches" the advanced beginner also an
"enlarged conception of what is relevant to the skill"
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1996:38). The ability of the person,
for example, the nurse, to enlarge her conception through
the recognition of situational objects is seen to have its
condition of possibility in the person's intuition: "the
sort of ability, ..., that we use all the time as we go
about our everyday tasks" (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1996:38).
Yet the advanced beginner nurse recognizes still less
situational objects than the competent nurse (third
stage). The recognition of situational objects becomes for
the competent nurse, however, "overwhelming". In her
everyday work there are "more situations than can be named
or precisely defined, so no one can prepare for the
learner a list of what to do in each possible situation"
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1996:39). The difficulty of the
competent nurse is, in the view of Dreyfus and Dreyfus,
that she cannot any longer fall back on her theoretical
knowledge from nursing school. She has to decide for
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herself what action to take, "without being sure that it
will be appropriate in the particular situation" (Dreyfus
and Dreyfus, 1996:39; emphasis mine); which is to say,
that the nurse has to recognize whether her theoretical
knowledge corresponds with the situation of the patient.
This constellation between the "necessity" of recognizing
which knowledge will be corresponding with the particular
situation and the "uncertainty" of the competent nurse
about it introduces, following Dreyfus and Dreyfus, an
important "new type" of relationship between the nurse and
the particular situation. The competent performer becomes
"more and more emotionally involved in his or her task, it
becomes increasingly difficult to draw back and to adopt
the detached rule-following stance of the beginner"
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1996:40).
The significant claim Dreyfus and Dreyfus propose
concerning the nurse's emotional involvement at the
competent level is that it leads to a "replacement" of her
rule-following stance which, if it occurs, sets in turn
the stage for the nurse's progression to the proficient
and, finally, to the expert level, that stage where the
nurse intuitively "sees" a correspondence with the
situation of the patient and the action needed.
This acquisition of the nurse's intuitive skill is, for
Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "explainable in terms of brain
processes, but not in terms of rule-based reasoning"
(1996:38; emphasis mine). Dreyfus and Dreyfus ground their
assertion that the nurse's recognition at the proficient
and expert stage "sees" intuitively, that is, corresponds
with the situation of the patient and the action needed,
on a "physiological" principle.
Brain Processes as Effects
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1996) describe their physiological
principle when they illustrate the replacement of the
nurse's rule-following stance with an involved stance at
the competent stage (third stage in their concept of
intuitive skill acquisition) with an example from driving.
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In their account, a competent driver passes another car
dangerously, so that only a quick response by the other
driver prevents an accident. According to Dreyfus and
Dreyfus, the competent driver "can respond to this
experience in one of two qualitatively different ways"
(1996:41; emphasis mine). Here is the first way:
One response would be for the driver to
consciously decide that one should hardly
ever rush, and modify the rule used to
decide to hurry. Or, perhaps, the rule for
conditions for safe passing might be
modified so that the driver only passes
under exceedingly safe circumstances.
These would be the approaches of the
driver doomed to timidity and fear, and,
by our definition, to competence (Dreyfus
and Dreyfus, 1996:40; emphasis in the
original).
Dreyfus and Dreyfus present the driver's response to his
experience of the near accident with regard to the
modification of his driving rules as a decision he can
consciously make. Yet, this conscious decision making
process about which rules to change or not is seen to
restrain the driver to get past the competent stage on to
the proficient stage. A second, qualitatively different,
way of responding is described as follows:
one could accept the deeply felt
consequences of the act without detachedly
asking oneself what went wrong and,
especially, why. If one does this, it is
likely that one won't be quite so likely
to hurry in the future or to pass in
similar situations, but one has a much
better chance of ultimately becoming, with
enough frightening or, preferably,
rewarding experiences, a relaxed and
expert driver. As we indicated ... it is
innate and natural for driving behavior to
be unconsciously enhanced through
experience by synaptic brain changes
without these changes taking the form of
conscious or even unconscious rule-
modification (Dreyfus and Dreyfus,
1996:40-41) .
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In effect, the driver's response "to" the felt
consequences of his experience of the near accident
affects, due to "synaptic brain changes", an unconscious,
that is, a bio-chemical enhancement of his driving
behaviour. For Dreyfus and Dreyfus, the qualitative
difference between the two responses of the driver to the
experience of the near accident is one between an
unconscious enhancing response and a conscious rule-
modifying response.
Contrary to Dreyfus and Dreyfus, I wish to argue, that if
the qualitative difference between an unconscious
enhancing-response and a conscious rule-modifying-response
of the driver "to" his experience of the near accident
would be complete in the sense that they are separate
responses, then the driver would be unable to recognize
those unconsciously felt responses as an enhancement of
his driving behaviour. The driver would not be able to
know whether his driving behaviour has changed after the
near accident or not; or, he would not even recognize that
he had prevented an accident. Indeed, he would not
recognize that he is driving.
So instead of accepting the claim that the driver can
respond in one way or the other, it seems more plausible
to me to suggest that the driver's response "to" his
experience of the near accident is simultaneously
unconscious (which may or may not be enhancing, the latter
possibly because of a "frightening" experience) and
conscious (which may or may not result in rule-
modification) . (See also discussion on the mutuality of
the nurse's knowledge and emotions in Chapter Seven).
But more significantly, the driver's unconscious response
"to" the experience of the near accident comes 'too late'
in order to be the source (condition) of explaining the
driver's experience, that is, his recognition of the near
accident. Or, more specifically, the biochemical brain
changes leading to an unconscious response "to" the
experience of the near accident are themselves effects of
that very experience and cannot, therefore, be the source
of explaining that experience.
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Physiological Accounts of the Person's Brain Processes
On the other hand, if one accepts, for a moment, the
possibility of explaining the nurse's recognition in terms
of a physiological principle, then claims about the
nurse's acquisition of intuitive skill would require
physiological, that is, biochemical evidence of the
nurse's brain processes in order to validate those claims.
To illustrate the point, Dreyfus and Dreyfus write
concerning the nurse's "brain" at the proficient stage:
As the brain of the performer acquires the
ability to discriminate between a variety
of situations entered into with concern
and involvement, plans are intuitively
evoked and certain aspects stand out as
important without the learner standing
back and choosing those plans or deciding
to adopt that perspective (1996:41).
They are saying that through concern and involvement in a
variety of situations the nurse's brain acquires the
ability to discriminate; that is, "important" aspects in
the situation of the patient and actions ("plans") in
relation to it are "intuitively" recognized by the nurse.
Dreyfus and Dreyfus assert here that, at the proficient
stage, the nurse has recognized the "important" aspects in
the situation of the patient; that there is a
correspondence between her recognition of "important"
aspects and the important aspects in the situation of the
patient.
But since the assertion about such "intuitively" evoked
correspondence of the nurse's recognition with the
situation of the patient is, for Dreyfus and Dreyfus, only
explainable in terms of "brain processes" (1996:38),
biochemical accounts of those processes are needed to
confirm that assertion; that is, to give physiological
evidence that the nurse's brain at the proficient stage
acquired an ability which it did not have at the stage of
novice. This in turn would call for a longitudinal study
of the nurse's biochemical brain processes from novice
through to expert.
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The upshot of this argument is that a study about the
nurse's skill acquisition which draws on Dreyfus and
Dreyfus (1996), but is not based on physiological accounts
of the nurse's brain processes from novice to expert,
offers an interpretation which replaces a physiological
principle with another principle in order to explain the
nurse's skill acquisition.
I will now show how Benner et al's study of the nurse's
skill acquisition, following Dreyfus and Dreyfus, gives
cognitive rather than physiological accounts of the
nurse's skill acquisition.
Cognitive Accounts of the Nurse's 'Brain Processes'
Benner et al (1996) present a study of the nurse's skill
acquisition that is based on accounts of nurses which were
drawn from their interviews with nurses working in
"critical care nursing".
Nurses participating in those interviews had been
"selected for their expected level of practice (advanced
beginner through expert) by supervisors who were asked to
consider years of experience" (Benner et al, 1996:XVII;
emphasis mine). Which means that Benner et al predetermine
their study of the nurse's skill acquisition by
correlating the stages of skill acquisition from advanced
beginner to expertise, following Dreyfus and Dreyfus, with
the number of years nurses have been working in critical
care nursing.
In more detail, accounts of nurses considered to be at the
advanced beginner stage have been practicing critical care
nursing for less than six months after their training.
Accounts which are thought to exhibit competent and
proficient practice come from nurses who have worked at
least between two and three years in critical care
nursing. These nurses may or may not have worked in other
areas of nursing. Overall this sample of nurses has
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practiced nursing less than five years after finishing
their nursing training.
Accounts which are supposed to exemplify expert practice
come from a sample of nurses who have worked in critical
care nursing for more than five years, not counting the
time of their training. The correlation between the stage
of the nurse's skill acquisition and her years of practice
is augmented concerning this particular sample, because
these nurses were already considered to be "superb" nurses
by their head nurse or supervisor (Benner et al,
1996:XVII).
Benner et al, then, study the nurse's acquisition of skill
in terms of cognitive (instead of physiological) accounts
of the nurse's 'brain processes'.
Explaining the nurse's skill acquisition in relation with
those accounts as a progression from the advanced beginner
stage to competency and then to proficiency and expertise,
Benner et al's study constitutes a cognitive conception of
the nurse's recognition at the proficient and expert
stage. This statment is further supported, for example, in
Chapter Six.
In the following one - Chapter Five - I discuss Benner et
al's understanding of theories of knowledge to be






As I have pointed out in the Introduction and as I have
re-stated in the previous chapter: Benner et al notice an
uncertainty of the advanced beginner nurse's recognition
when informed by her theoretical knowledge from nursing
school. In noticing this uncertainty, Benner et al, I have
suggested, repeat the claim of non-cognitive theories of
knowledge.
Benner et al's solution to the advanced beginner nurse's
uncertainty, I have shown in the previous chapter, is the
nurse's skill acquisition from the stage of advanced
beginner to expertise. Their explanation of the nurse's
recognition at different stages in the course of acquiring
her skill constitutes, I have pointed out, a cognitive
principle. It is the rational precondition upon which
Benner et al found their assertion that the nurse's
recognition at the proficient and expert stage corresponds
with the situation of the patient.
However, if theorizing about the person's recognition has
moved from a cognitive interpretation which claims a
correspondence between person and object to be certain to
a non-cognitive interpretation which claims a
correspondence to be uncertain, then Benner et al's
solution to the uncertainty of the advanced beginner
nurse's recognition in terms of constituting a cognitive
principle (and thus the condition of asserting that the
nurse's recognition at the proficient and expert stage is
certain) moves 'backwards'. How is this move possible?
In order to grasp how Benner et al come to move
'backwards', it is necessary to know that, for them,
theories of knowledge are descriptions instead of
interpretations of recognition.
7 1
In order to elucidate this statement, I will show, first,
how, for Benner and colleagues, a non-cognitive theory of
knowledge and a cognitive theory of knowledge describe,
respectively, a "narrative" mode and a "logico-scientific"
mode of obtaining accounts from nurses; that is, accounts
of the nurse's recognition of situations of patients in
everyday work.
I highlight, second, how Benner et al's understanding of
theories of knowledge to be descriptions instead of
interpretations of recognition entails an inversion of
claims. Benner and colleagues associate a non-cognitive
theory of knowledge with the nurse's recognition that is
'corresponding' and a cognitive theory of knowledge with
the nurse's recognition that is 'not corresponding'.
I point out, third, how Benner et al's understanding of
theories of knowledge to be descriptions rather than
interpretations is the raison d'etre of their conception
about an advance in the nurse's recognition as a move
through stages from advanced beginner to expertise.
Interpretations rather than Descriptions
Benner et al's study of the nurse's skill acquisition in
terms of nurses' accounts is based on a certain
"preunderstanding of human action and engagement" (Benner
et al, 1996:351). One of the assumptions of their
"preunderstanding" is that "the basic way that humans live
in the world is in engaged, practical activity" (Benner et
al, 1996:352).
And because that is so, Benner et al are of the opinion
that "the method of study must try to access" such engaged
practical activity. One way of accessing it is a
"narrative form of expression" and involves asking:
nurses for full narratives about care of
particular patients, which includes the
context and history of the episode, the
ways in which the situation presented
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itself and how it evolved over time, and
the nurse's concerns and actions
throughout the episode (Benner et al,
1996:353; emphasis mine).
Benner et al here indicate their assumption that nurses'
narratives (accounts) of particular situations of patients
are seen to fully narrate the situation as it "presented
itself"; that there is a correspondence between the
situation including aspects, such as, its history,
evolvement, and so on and the nurse's narrative account of
it; that is, the nurse's recognition of the situation of
the patient at a particular point in time and space which
she talks about to the researchers at another point in
time and space, possibly days, weeks, months, even years
later, is taken to correspond with, for example, the
history and evolvement of the situation of the patient
nurses once observed.
Importantly, Benner et al distinguish this "narrative"
mode of inquiry from a "logico-scientific" mode of inquiry
(1996:354). The latter is characterized as a method that
specifies "the terms up front" and constrains "the
storying within the investigation to those terms defined a
priori" (Benner et al, 1996:354).
Defining terms "up front" or "a priori", that is, the
"logico-scientific" mode of inquiry, implies, for Benner
et al, that the "complexity" of a narrative account may
get lost: "Setting out the terms in advance reduces the
complexity of the possible narrative" (1996:354). That is,
researchers who are setting up questions in "advance" ("up
front" or "a priori") are seen to determine the nurse's
account and thus hindering the nurse to give a full
account of the patient's situation in the sense of missing
its history, evolvement, and so on; that is, an account of
the nurse's recognition of the patient's situation
obtained in this way, is not assumed, by Benner et al, to
correspond with the full situation of the patient.
This distinction between a "logico-scientific" and a
"narrative" mode of inquiry hints, I argue, at the
difference between theories of knowledge presupposing a
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cognitive or a non-cognitive principle as the condition of
interpreting recognition. This argument I will support
with the way Benner and Wrubel (1989) differentiate
Husserl from Heidegger.
Husserl's "view of the person" contains "still", in the
opinion of Benner and Wrubel, "Cartesian elements"
(1989:42). They specify the "Cartesian elements" of
Husserl's view as follows:
Husserl's noema (an abstract mental
structure that accounts for the mind's
directedness towards objects) is a
cognitive, representational view of the
mind (Benner and Wrubel, 1989:42; emphasis
mine).
Benner and Wrubel are implying here, I suggest, that
Husserl "still" presupposes a cognitive principle as the
condition of interpreting the person's recognition of
objects, for example, a person, and retains, in this way,
"Cartesian elements".
Significantly, Husserl is distinguished from Heidegger,
according to whom Benner and Wrubel write: "the person
grasps the situation directly in terms of its meaning for
the self" (1989:42). The meaning the situation has for the
person is directly recognized. So how is this direct grasp
accomplished?
Benner and Wrubel explain further: "The person does not
assign meanings to the situation once it is apprehended
because the very act of apprehension is based on taken-
for-granted meanings embedded in skills, practices and
language" (1989:42; emphasis mine). The person's
apprehension of the situation is understood to be direct,
because the person's apprehension 'in the act' is based on
the person's "taken-for-granted meanings embedded in
skills, practices and language".
In this context it is crucial to know that Heidegger seeks
a view of knowledge that is different from the logocentric
tradition. His investigation of knowledge no longer has a
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cognitive principle as the precondition of explaining the
person's recognition. The origin of the person's knowledge
remains, for Heidegger (1968), a "mystery". In this sense,
Heidegger's theory of knowledge can be considered as a
non-cognitive interpretation of recognition.
On this account, it can be said that Benner and Wrubel
connect a direct grasp of the person's recognition with
Heidegger's non-cognitive theory of knowledge. It seems
that, for them, the 'loss' of a cognitive principle
enables the person to recognize the situation directly in
the sense of corresponding with the situation recognized.
In Expertise in Nursing Practice Benner et al note that
the "particular hermeneutic tradition within which we
worked derives from the phenomenological work of Heidegger
(1926/1962) and Kierkegaard (1843/1985)" (1996:351;
emphasis mine). Since Benner et al connect the "narrative"
mode of inquiry as one that enables the nurses to give a
full account of the situation, that is, one that is
corresponding with the situation talked about, I argue,
that Benner et al equate their "narrative" mode of inquiry
with a non-cognitive theory of knowledge, such as
Heidegger's.
I argue, moreover, that Benner et al link cognitive
theories of knowledge with the "logico-scientific" mode of
inquiry. This mode, as noted earlier, is not seen, by
them, to enable the nurse to give a full account; that is,
one that is not corresponding with the situation of the
patient.
Benner et al appear to take cognitive principles ("logico-
scientif ic" mode of inquiry) to come between the nurse's
account and the situation of the patient talked about and,
therefore, the nurse's account is not considered to grasp
the situation of the patient directly in the sense of
corresponding with it; while a non-cognitive principle (a
"narrative" mode of inquiry) is seen, I think, to somehow
enable the nurse to narrate the situation of the patient
fully and, therefore, the nurse's account is considered to
correspond with it.
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The nub of this discussion is that I propose that Benner
et al (1996) are of the opinion that the nurse's narrative
account ("narrative" mode of inquiry), that is, the
nurse's account of her recognition of a situation, is seen
to enact a non-cognitive theory of knowledge; while the
nurse's account given in response to terms set up in
"advance" ("logico-scientific" mode of inquiry), that is,
her recognition of the situation of the patient of which
she gives account of by responding, for example, to
particular questions (terms set up in "advance"), enacts a
cognitive theory of knowledge. In short, Benner et al
consider cognitive and non-cognitive theories of knowledge
to be descriptions of the nurse's recognition.
Inversion of Claims
On the view that theories of knowledge are interpretations
rather than descriptions of the person's recognition of
objects in the world which raise particular claims about
them means that Benner et al invert those claims.
Benner et al are not accepting the claim about a
correspondence between the person's recognition and the
object recognized as put forward by cognitive theories of
knowledge with regard to a "logico-scientific" way of
inquiry which is, for Benner et al, the nurse's account
given in response to terms set up in "advance".
This means that Benner et al are not acknowledging the
claim about the uncertainty of that correspondence as non-
cognitive interpretations, like Heidegger's and, following
him, Derrida's, assume to have revealed with regard to
their "narrative" way of inquiry which is, for them, the
nurse's narrative account that is apparently corresponding
with the situation of the patient narrated.
If one accepts that theories of knowledge are
interpretations rather than descriptions, Benner et al's
study of the nurse's skill acquisition involves the
contradiction that their study of advanced beginner
nurses' narrative accounts, which assumes that those
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accounts correspond with the situation of the patient
narrated, is considered to reveal that the advanced
beginner nurse's recognition informed by her theoretical
knowledge from nursing school is not corresponding with
the situation of the patient.
Benner et al's raison d'etre
However, since Benner et al assert that the advanced
beginner nurse's recognition informed by her theoretical
knowledge is not corresponding with the situation of the
patient, and since, for them, cognitive theories of
knowledge describe the nurse's recognition as 'not
corresponding', Benner et al imply that, from their point
of view, cognitive theories of knowledge describe the
advanced beginner nurse's recognition and theoretical
knowledge from nursing school in a concrete sense.
This understanding of theories of knowledge as
descriptions rather than interpretations is their raison
d'etre for rejecting the claim about a correspondence
between person and object as raised by cognitive
interpretations of recognition with regard to the advanced
beginner nurse's recognition and theoretical knowledge.
This rejection is in turn the raison d'etre for their
conception about an advance in the nurse's recognition
from the advanced beginner stage to expertise.
On the other hand, a view that holds theories of knowledge
to be interpretations instead of descriptions, discloses
how Benner et al's conception about a progression in the
nurse's recognition from advanced beginner stage to
expertise presupposes a cognitive principle. That is,
Benner et al exchange one cognitive principle, for
example, Husserl's noema (Benner and Wrubel, 1989) for
another cognitive principle: the development of the
nurse's "skills of seeing" and practical knowledge. This
assertion I will discuss next.
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CHAPTER SIX
DEVELOPMENT OF PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE
Introduction
Benner et al demonstrate with their rendering of a
"Cartesian view" how theories of knowledge which have a
cognitive principle as the condition of interpreting
recognition are, for them, descriptions of the person's
recognition. Benner et al take the subject (cognitive
principle) to be separate from the world, whereby this
separate subject establishes "similarities and
differences" with the world upon an "objective disengaged
criterial" recognition. They write:
A Cartesian view of the subject as a
private separate subject representing and
interpreting an objective world seeks to
establish similarities and differences
based upon objective disengaged criterial
reasoning (Benner & Wrubel, 1989; Dreyfus,
1979, 1991) (Benner et al, 1996:115-116;
emphasis mine).
Benner et al, I argue, connect an "objective disengaged
criterial" recognition with theories of knowledge with a
cognitive principle. These cognitive theories of knowledge
are circumscribed by Benner et al as a "Cartesian view".
Benner et al's idea is that a "Cartesian view" literally
characterizes the person's recognition as "objective
disengaged criterial". The implication of this
recognition, Benner et al bring out in their presentation
of the nurse's recognition by "cognitivists".
According to Benner et al, cognitivists regard the nurse's
recognition as an "intellectual process" in which the
nurse matches "internal representations" with "external
events" (1996). In relation with a particular example,
Benner et al describe the process of an intellectual
recognition. They write that "a cognitivist would claim
that the nurse carried around in her head internal
7 8
representations of 'fragileness,' and simply matched the
cues present in the external situation with the features
of the internal representation" (Benner et al, 1996:9).
Nota bene: in their explanation of a "claim" by a
cognitivist, the nurse's intellectual process of matching
her knowledge of "fragileness" with an entity begins ex
post facto with a recognition of an entity in the
situation as "cues".
The "claim" of a cognitivist, Benner et al define, I
argue, according to their rendering of a "Cartesian view"
(cognitive theories of knowledge) which describes the
person's recognition to be "objective, disengaged,
criterial". That is, the nurse who "simply" matches the
"features" of her "internal representation" of 'cues' with
the "cues" she has observed in the "external situation",
recognizes the "cues" in that situation of the patient in
an "objective, disengaged, criterial" way.
The trouble with the "interpretation" of the person's
recognition by a cognitivist (that is, the
"interpretation" as defined by Benner et al's
understanding of a "Cartesian view" as just indicated) is
that "it does not account for what shows up as salient in
the particular situation, how the nurse even notices
relevant aspects" (Benner et al, 1996:9). The nurse's
recognition of what is important in the situation of the
patient is not seen to correspond with what is important
in the situation of the patient. That is, the nurse's
"objective disengaged criterial" recognition is not
picking up what is important in the particular situation
of the patient; or, the "features" of the nurse's
"internal representation" of 'cues' which she "simply"
matches with the "cues" in the situation of the patient
she has recognized are not considered to correspond with
the "cues" in the situation of the patient.
The implication of the nurse's "objective disengaged
criterial" recognition of the situation of the patient in
her everyday work, then, is that, for Benner et al, there
is no correspondence between the nurse's recognition and
the situation of the patient recognized.
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That there is no correspondence between the nurse's
recognition and the situation of the patient, Benner et al
associate also with theoretical knowledge, in particular
with the theoretical knowledge of advanced beginner
nurses. Benner et al indicate the uncertainty of the
advanced beginner nurse's recognition informed by her
theoretical knowledge from nursing school and entities she
recognizes in everyday work as follows:
Much of the perceptual work of advanced
beginners is recognizing the concrete
manifestations of clinical signs and
symptoms. They strive to 'see' and
recognize clinical entities that they have
studied only theoretically. The concrete
reality of conditions like dyspnea, blood
reactions, and hypotensive crises become
apparent, but recognizing these conditions
requires effort of the advanced beginner,
particularly when first encountered
(1996:51; emphasis mine).
Benner et al, I suggest, equate theoretical knowledge with
an "objective disengaged criterial" recognition. That is,
they take a "Cartesian view" (cognitive theories of
knowledge) to describe the advanced beginner nurse's
recognition and theoretical knowledge in a concrete sense.
For them, the advanced beginner nurse's recognition is
informed by theoretical knowledge from nursing school. The
implication is that their recognition and knowledge will
fail to adequately correspond with the situation of the
patient.
And because this is so, advanced beginner nurses are, in
the opinion of Benner et al, preoccupied with trying to
identify what they see which hinders them to notice that
realities, such as "dyspnea" or "blood reactions", appear
in different ways and alter their appearance. Benner et al
continue the above text: "Engaged as they are by this work
of recognition, beginners have less attention available
for understanding the ways in which these states vary in
their presentation or change over time" (1996:51).
80
However, if theories of knowledge are interpretations
rather than descriptions of recognition, then Benner et
al's notion of an "objective disengaged criterial"
recognition does not literally describe the advanced
beginner nurse's recognition and theoretical knowledge,
but the claim cognitive theories of knowledge (a
"Cartesian view") raise.
Indeed, their understanding of a "Cartesian view" as a
description rather than an interpretation of recognition
rejects the claim of cognitive theories of knowledge;
namely, that the nurse, in matching the "features" of her
"internal representation" of 'cues' with the "cues" in the
situation of the patient corresponds with the "cues" she
had picked up in the situation. Benner et al decline to
acknowledge the claim of cognitive theories of knowledge
("Cartesian view") that the person, in their words, "seeks
to establish similarities", that is, a correspondence,
with objects in the world (1996:116). In particular,
Benner et al reject that the advanced beginner nurse's
recognition sets up "similarities" with the situation of
the patient upon her theoretical knowledge from nursing
school.
Benner et al refuse to accept what they call the "common
sense" of the Western tradition and the discipline of
nursing with regard to the advanced beginner nurse's
recognition and theoretical knowledge: "that in order to
perceive and relate to things, we have some content in our
minds that corresponds to our knowledge of them" (1996:8;
emphasis mine).
Benner et al (1996) seem to have forgotten that the
"content" in the mind of nurses is, for Benner (1984), in
From Novice to Expert, the "precondition" of the nurse's
recognition: "The precondition for perceiving a situation
is a foreknowledge or set, and in clinical practice this
foreknowledge is often well formed by theory, principles,
and prior experience" (1984:8). Significantly, Benner does
not distinguish in this particular statement between
theoretical knowledge, such as "theory" or "principles",
and practical knowledge, such as "prior experience", that
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is, the nurse's previous recognition of patients as the
precondition of the nurse's recognition in her everyday
work.
Benner et al's understanding of theories of knowledge to
be descriptions instead of interpretations allows them to
ignore, I suggest further, that Benner (1984) explains in
From Novice to Expert the uncertainty of the nurse's
recognition as informed by her knowledge. She writes:
"Heidegger (1962) and Gadamer (1975) define experience as
the turning around of preconceptions that are not
confirmed by the actual situation" (Benner, 1984:8;
emphasis mine). The person's experience, that is, the
person's recognition of the actual situation is for
Heidegger (and Gadamer, but I am not concerned with his
particular interpretation here) uncertain in that the
person's preconceptions, for example, "theory",
"principles", or "prior experience" (Benner, 1984:8) are
turned around.
The nurse's recognition of the situation of the patient in
her everyday work on the basis of her knowledge whether
acquired in nursing school or developed in her everyday
work is not "confirmed by the actual situation" (Benner,
1984), because Heidegger posits not any longer a cognitive
principle as a precondition of claiming a correspondence
("similarities") between the nurse's knowledge and the
actual situation (see Chapter Five).
Benner et al (1996) have a point, however, when they state
that according to a "Cartesian view" (cognitive theories
of knowledge) the person seeks to establish "similarities"
and "differences" with objects in the world. Or, when they
demand that the nurse "must" understand "commonalities"
and "distinctions" with the situation of the patient
(Benner et al, 1996:116).
It is only necessary to understand that Benner et al's
rendering of a "Cartesian view" according to which the
person attempts to recognize "similarities" and
"differences" with objects in the world; or, their demand
that the nurse "must" recognize "commonalities" and
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"distinctions" with the situation of the patient, denotes
an interpretation of recognition as put forward by non-
cognitive theories of knowledge. A non-cognitive theory of
knowledge, for example, Heidegger's or Derrida's, explains
how the nurse's recognition, in establishing a
correspondence, that is, "commonalities" with the
situation of the patient upon her knowledge, effects
"distinctions"; that is, as will be explained below, the
nurse's practical knowledge in her everyday work.
On this account, I want to show, first, how Benner et al
reject the claim of cognitive theories of knowledge about
a correspondence ("commonalities") between the advanced
beginner nurse's recognition and the situation of the
patient.
I elucidate, second, how Benner et al's explanation of the
nurse's development of "skills of seeing" and practical
knowledge constitutes a cognitive principle from which
their assertion about a correspondence ("commonalities")
between the nurse's recognition and the situation of the
patient at the proficient and expert stage is derived.
Third, I illustrate Benner et al's assertion concerning
the certainty of the nurse's recognition at those stages.
I discuss, fourth, how the nurse's recognition produces,
in establishing "commonalities" (correspondence) with the
situation of the patient, "distinctions", that is, the
nurse's practical knowledge in her everyday work. I point
out that a non-cognitive interpretation of recognition
undermines the very idea of the nurse's development of
practical knowledge as the condition of an advance from an
"objective, disengaged, criterial" (not corresponding) to
an "engaged" (corresponding) recognition.
Correspondence Rejected
Here is an example where Benner et al imply a
correspondence ("commonalities") between the advanced
beginner nurse's knowledge of "norms and procedures" as
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the precondition of her recognition of the situation of
patients in her everyday work:
Seen through the perceptual net of norms
and procedures of care, patients actually
appear to advanced beginners as perplexing
collections of problems and conditions for
action (1996:49; emphasis mine).
The advanced beginner nurse's recognition informed by
"norms and procedures" establishes "commonalities"
(correspondence) with the situation as "norms and
procedures".
Yet in the opinion of Benner et al, seeing the patient in
terms of "norms and procedures" means not attending to the
"patient as a person", that is, the advanced beginner
nurse's recognition based on "norms and procedure" does
not correspond with the "patient as a person". They
continue the above quote: "Particularly when the clinical
situation is complex, beginners have minimal capacity to
attend to the patient as a person" (Benner et al,
1996:49). (See Chapters Nine and Ten for discussion on
"patient as a person").
And here is an example where Benner et al state implicitly
a correspondence between the knowledge of advanced
beginner nurses and their practice. They write: "It seems
that the system demands for monitoring standards sets the
standard of care for many advanced beginners" (1996:61).
Benner et al are saying that the standards for monitoring
the patient which require the nurse, for example, "to note
on a flow sheet hourly vital signs, medication flow rates,
IV flow rates and so on" (Benner et al, 1996:61) are the
standards of nursing for many advanced beginners. They
note a connection between the advanced beginner nurse's
knowledge of standards such as reading hourly vital signs
and her practice of reading hourly the vital signs of the
patient in her everyday work.
However, the advanced beginner nurse's practice based on
her knowledge of standards is not taken to correspond with
the particular situation of the patient: "Advanced
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beginners organize their work and structure their days
according to the demands and requirements that are
external to the immediate patient care situation" (Benner
et al, 1996:61; emphasis mine). The advanced beginner
nurse who follows requirements, for example, of reading
the patient's vital signs hourly structures her work, in
the view of Benner et al, in terms of knowledge that is
not corresponding ("external") with the situation of the
patient.
Another example comes from their comment about an account
of an advanced beginner nurse. This example is of
importance for two reasons. It illustrates, first, how an
advanced beginner nurse, in contrast to Benner et al's
observation that "beginners have less attention available
for understanding the ways" in which realities "change
over time" (1996:51; emphasis mine), does recognizes such
changes in the situation of the patient; second, how
Benner et al make the nurse's theoretical knowledge as the
precondition of her recognition of "commonalities"
(correspondence) with the situation of the patient absent
by noting what this nurse "learned" from the situation.
Benner et al point out that the nurse had "consistently"
cared for the patient after a bone marrow transplant and
knew that the patient "turned to his family for support"
(1996:53). They note further that the patient was rather
ill at the time of the nurse's report. For example, he was
running a temperature between "40 and 41 degrees" (Benner
et al, 1996:53).
This is the account of an advanced beginner nurse:
I was real concerned about what was
happening psychosocially. Here we have
this kid in this isolated room and he was
just turning inward more and more and
more, and what we were doing was making
him pull more and more inward. And what
were we going to do so we didn't have this
psychotic kid on our hands that we
created? So that's what I was trying to
figure out (quoted in Benner et al,
1996:53) .
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Clearly, this nurse has observed changes in the way the
child communicates with others and attempts to think of
what could be done about it. The nurse links what they
"were doing", for example, treating the child under
conditions of isolation with the conduct of the child of
turning "more and more and more" to himself. For her, it
seems to be rather obvious that 'they' were constituting
the changing behaviour of the child with a bone marrow
transplant in one way or another.
This nurse observes how professional procedures guided by
particular knowledge (for example, 'treatment under
conditions of isolation') produces the situation of the
patient over a period of time. From a cognitive
interpretation of recognition, the nurse recognizes
"commonalities" between particular knowledge informing
professional procedures and the situation of the patient.
This is how Benner et al begin their comment: "Five days
later, when the child's fever subsided and he was much
less ill, she noted a remarkable improvement in his
pattern of relating to staff" (1996:53). Benner et al are
noting that the nurse observed changes in the situation of
this particular patient. For example, that his temperature
went down and that he began to communicate with the staff.
They continue: "From this, the nurse learned that
physiologic as well as psychologic issues must be taken
into account when examining a child's status, and that
these can change dramatically in a matter of days" (Benner
et al, 1996:53; emphasis mine). On what grounds Benner et
al think that the nurse learned from her observation of
"what was happening psychosocially" that it is necessary
to observe "psychologic" as well as "physiologic" issues
is not quite clear to me.
The opposite is the case, I think. The nurse's "concern
about what was happening psychosocially" already expresses
that she knows how to take the psychosocial and the
physiological situation of the patient into account. This
in turn would imply that the nurse possesses some
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knowledge of psychosocial and physiological issues as the
precondition of her observation. The nurse's knowledge of
psychosocial issues helped her, I suggest, to recognize,
for example, that what 'they' "were doing was making him
pull more and more inward". The nurse, it can be said,
assumes to establish "commonalities" (correspondence)
between her knowledge of psychosocial issues and the
psychosocial situation of the child.
Next I show how Benner et al explain that the nurse's
recognition at the proficient and expert stage corresponds
with the situation of the patient.
Re-constitutina a Cognitive Principle
The nurse's development of practical knowledge depends, in
the words of Benner et al, on "concrete first-person
experience" (1996:120). It means that the nurse develops
her practical knowledge through seeing the patient in
everyday practice. Seeing many patients of a specific
group, for example, in a surgical intensive care unit, is
required for the nurse's "skills of seeing" (Benner et al,
1996:115).
By the time the nurse has reached the proficient level,
she has, in the opinion of Benner et al, acquired the
"perceptual ability to read the situation and respond
appropriately" (1996:114; emphasis mine). Reading the
situation of the patient 'perceptually' and responding
appropriately is: "seeing a clinical situation in terms of
a past clinical situation" (Benner et al, 1996:113); that
is, in terms of her "practical" knowledge.
The nurse's "practical knowledge about patient
populations" is what, according to Benner et al, "sets up
the possibility for a perceptual grasp and for responding
to rapidly changing situations" (1996:26; emphasis mine).
The nurse's recognition ("skills of seeing") of the
patient in relation with her practical knowledge is now
considered to be "engaged" in the sense of capturing
changes in the situation of the patient as they unfold.
For example, Benner et al write: "the proficient nurse now
87
has enough direct observation and experience", that is,
enough "skills of seeing" and practical knowledge from her
observation (experience) of specific groups of patients in
everyday practice, "to recognize trends and have strong
convictions about whether a patient is deteriorating,
improving, or on the road to recovery" (1996:120).
The nurse's practical knowledge, Benner et al claim
further, enables the nurse to know what is important in
the situation of the patient: "With experience the nurse
notices a shift in his or her ability to notice what is
important" (1996:129; emphasis mine). This "emerging
sense" of the nurse in recognizing what is important in
the situation on the basis of her practical knowledge is
not "infallible", but, in the view of Benner et al, it is
still "a real advance over the earlier undifferentiated
dread or worry that a nebulous 'something important' will
be missed" (1996:129).
So the nurse's recognition advances from an "objective
disengaged criterial" (not corresponding) recognition.
Rather than recognition being based on theoretical
knowledge, which misses changes in the situation of the
patient, an "engaged" (corresponding) recognition emerges
which is based on practical knowledge. This enables the
nurse to notice changes in the patient's situation. Or,
the advance can be described as a progression from the
nurse's intellectual recognition which does not tell her
what is important in the situation of the patient to
"skills of seeing" which notices what is important in the
situation of the patient.
Explaining the nurse's recognition at the proficient and
expert stage in terms of the nurse's development of
"skills of seeing" and practical knowledge, Benner et al
conceptualize the condition of how the nurse comes to see
changes and what is important in the situation of the
patient. Benner et al establish a cognitive principle in
order to interpret the nurse's recognition at those
stages.
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This cognitive principle is the condition of their
assertion that the nurse's recognition at those stages is
"engaged", that is, establishing a correspondence
("commonalities") with the situation of the patient.
Asserting that the nurse's recognition at the proficient
and expert stage corresponds with the situation of the
patient, Benner et al repeat the claim of cognitive
theories of knowledge (a "Cartesian view"). This is now
explicated.
Correspondence Accepted
The first example I have chosen is an account by a nurse
at the expert level. This particular nurse works
apparently in an intensive care unit for patients after
open heart surgery. She meets the patient's "family"
before the patient has been transferred from the operating
room to the unit:
We had a patient that was in the OR
(operating room) and I'd gotten word that
he had been, I think he'd been in the CCU
(cardiac care unit, addition mine)
beforehand, had a really poor heart, had a
lot of M.I.'s (heart attacks), poor
ejection fraction ... I was coming on to
work that evening and had received word
that his familiy was sitting and waiting
in our waiting room ... So I thought I'll
go out and meet them which I try to do
when it works out that way ... They were
like stressed to the max because the
minute I walked out they jumped off the
chair and - they knew I was coming to talk
to them - "How are things going?" So I
just introduced myself and explained that
we really don't hear much until they (the
patient) actually get up to the unit and
just talked about what to expect and that
they could come in after an hour or so.
Anyway, they proceeded to tell me this
whole story about what this poor man had
gone through and how it was so rough on
him, and how he'd been in CCU and was so
sick ... I went back into the unit, the
patient came up and sure enough was sick
as anything on every drip known to man,
ballooned, (heart assist device) had a
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real hard time coming off bypass. And as I
listened to report and I went into the
room and looked at him, I'm thinking 'it's
going to be a miracle if this man leaves
this hospital alive.' That was the sense I
had. So anyway, after I got settled, I
went out and had the family come and just
tried to give them a sense of what to
expect, explained that it sounded like
he'd been really sick before surgery and
that his recovery was probably going to be
very slow, might have difficulty weaning
(from the ventilator), not to expect
things to go too quickly, and know that
there was a possibility for complications
and that kind of thing. And we just sort
of clicked ... we just hit it off or
something. It was like they needed - when
I went out to talk to them in the lobby
before, it was like they were just looking
for this release valve and I gave it to
them and they seemed to appreciate that,
and I think at that point we kind of
clicked (quoted in Benner et al, 1996:146-
147) .
This is a report of a nurse who meets with the family of
the patient who is about to be received to her unit after
surgery on his heart. The nurse tells the family "what to
expect" after the operation while the family talks to her
about the situation of the patient before the operation.
After this exchange, the nurse returns to the unit, admits
the patient, and lets the family come into the unit. The
nurse, once more, talks to the family about "what to
expect" in the situation of the patient.
Benner et al start their comment as follows: "Here the
nurse's clinical grasp includes her understanding of the
family's situation" (Benner et al, 1996:147). By claiming
that the nurse's "clinical grasp" includes her
understanding of the situation of the family, Benner et al
take a correspondence of the nurse's understanding
(recognition) with the family's situation for granted.
This means, for example, that the nurse, when going out to
speak to the family of the patient and asserts that the
family "were like stressed to the max because the minute I
walked out they jumped off the chair" (emphasis mine)
90
grasped, in the opinion of Benner et al, what the family
was really feeling, namely, "like stressed to the max".
From the view of a cognitive interpretation, the nurse's
recognition is informed by her knowledge. The nurse,
according to her own report, intended ("So I thought I'll
go out and meet them") to talk to the family of the
patient she had heard to be "sitting and waiting in our
waiting room". She had also information about the
condition of this patient's heart, that it was "really
poor", had had "a lot of M.I.'s (heart attack)", and a
"poor ejection fraction". She had also learned that the
patient, in her words, "I think he'd been in the CCU"
(cardiac care unit) before the operation.
Considering her knowledge about the patient's heart and
his stay in the cardiac care unit prior to the operation,
it would only be reasonable on her part to expect that his
family is to some degree under stress. So going out to
meet them, she recognizes people, she very likely had not
seen before, getting on their feet. This gesture is
interpreted by her as the familiy "were like stressed to
the max". She expects them to be stressed so she sees them
to be stressed and, therefore, she knows that they are
stressed. Her recognition of the family corresponds with
her expectation.
Similarly, the nurse's assertion that the family "knew I
was coming to talk to them" the moment she walked into the
waiting room, can be considered as a statement that
corresponds with the the nurse's intention. She intended
to talk to the family. Seeing the family getting on their
feet, she is apparently of the opinion that the family
"knew" that she intended to talk to them; as if she had
read their thoughts about her intention.
From a cognitive interpretation of recognition, the nurse
can be certain about her interpretation of the family's
gesture getting up from "the chair", since it corresponds
with her expectation and intention. But can this view be
sustained? Has the nurse no reasons to doubt. For example,
might the family not have been expecting one of the
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surgeons come through the door and answer their question
"How are things going?"
At the end of her report she appears to be less certain
about her understanding of the situation of the family.
This is indicated by statements such as "It was like they
needed", "it was like they were just looking" for a
release valve, or, "they seemed to appreciate" that she
was giving this release valve to them.
Benner et al explain the nurse's "clinical grasp" further.
They write: "Through experience, she knows what to expect
in this patient's recovery" (Benner et al, 1996:147). On
the basis of her knowledge, the nurse knows the
perspective of the situation of "this" patient after the
operation. The nurse's knowledge defines the perspective
of this patient, consequently, the perspective of this
patient corresponds with the nurse's knowledge.
When the family asks the nurse, "How are things going?",
she replies that they really do not hear "much" until the
patient arrives at the unit. Having admitted that she does
not receive a lot of information about the patient while
still in the operating room, the nurse, nonetheless, goes
on and tells the family "what to expect". The nurse does
not need to have seen the patient nor does she need to
have heard about the patient in the operating room in
order to know what to expect and share her expectations
about the patient with the family.
The nurse's knowledge, for example, from nursing school
and the knowledge she has gained from more than five years
of practicing nursing including what she did hear about
this patient's "really poor heart", is the precondition of
talking to the family about the perspective of this
patient after the operation. As Benner et al note, the
nurse gives "this projection", that is, what she knows to
expect on the basis of her knowledge, "to the family so
they can have a sense of what the patient will look like
and what the likely events will be" (1996:147).
92
Benner et al are underlining here the importance of
knowledge as the precondition of recognition. Without
information from the nurse, the family would not quite
know what they are looking at when they get the chance to
see the patient with "every drip known to man" and
"ballooned", that is, connected to a pump assisting the
patient's heart function.
The information the nurse receives during "report"
includes the patient's situation before surgery, because
the nurse tells the family later "that it sounded like
he's been really sick before surgery". The nurse also
hears, for example, that the patient had "had a real hard
time coming off bypass".
After the nurse has listened "to report", she recognizes
the situation of the patient in terms of her 'total'
knowledge. She says: "I went into the room and looked at
him, I'm thinking 'it's going to be a miracle if this man
leaves this hospital alive'". The nurse establishes a
correspondence between her knowledge about a seriously ill
patient and the situation of the patient as seriously ill.
This nurse, I suggest, assumes her assessment of the
patient to represent the situation of the patient.
Concerning the possibility of this patient to recover and
leave the hospital "alive", the nurse invokes a "miracle".
To put it differently, the nurse is rather certain that
the patient is going to die.
Nurses who have advanced, in the opinion of Benner et al,
from the earlier stages of advanced beginner and
competency to proficiency are seen to have "strong
convictions" about "trends" in the situation of the
patient (Benner et al, 1996:120). Benner et al describe
these strong convictions of nurses about trends in the
situation of the patient past the competent stage also as
a "new confidence" (1996:121).
My aim is to show with an example that Benner et al's
assertion about a "new confidence" nurses have with regard
to trends in the situation of the patient is the old
93
certainty about a correspondence between the person's
knowledge and the object as claimed by cognitive theories
of knowledge. The example comes from a "neonatal ICU
nurse" (nurse working in an intensive care unit for new
born babies; addition mine) at the proficient stage.
This is the nurse's account:
Oh, of course he's going to make it. He's
getting better every day. He's gaining
weight. His heart and lungs do not sound
as good as they should. He has to have the
facial CPAP every 4 hours to open up the
alveoli because they clamp down because he
doesn't have any surfactants to keep them
open, but he's strong. He'll probably be
okay (quoted in Benner et al, 1996:121).
This nurse has observed that the baby is "gaining weight".
The nurse appears to be certain that her knowledge of
'gaining weight of babies' corresponds with how this baby
is picking up "weight".
This certainty about a correspondence ("commonalities")
between her knowledge and the situation of the patient
implies, for Benner et al, I suggest, that the nurse is
able to sustain this correspondence, that is, that the
baby is "gaining weight" over a period of time. This is
evident in their statement about the nurse's "confidence"
about this baby's recovery; that is, the trend in his
situation. They write: "This level of confidence is
possible because the nurse has seen other babies with this
degree of illness recover" (Benner et al, 1996:121;
emphasis mine). The implication being that the nurse who
sustains a correspondence between her knowledge of
'gaining weight of babies' and this baby's "weight" over a
period of time, determines the recovery (trend) of the
baby.
How the nurse's knowledge determines the trend in the
situation of the patient is emphasized by Benner et al in
the last sentence of their comment: "Recognizing trends is
the harbinger of the expert level of performance where
current actions are guided by the perspective about the
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patient's future trajectory" (1996:121). The nurse's
knowledge at the expert level determines her
"perspective", that is, the trend ("future trajectory") of
the patient's situation, in that the nurse's knowledge
informs her recognition of the situation of the patient
and "current actions".
For example, in the above account, the nurse fails to
establish a correspondence between her knowledge of how
'good heart and lungs of babies should sound' and the
'sounds' of this baby. So the nurse's knowledge of how
'good heart and lungs of babies should sound', I argue,
informs her current action. She names a particular
procedure ("he has to have the facial CPAP every 4 hours")
in order to achieve a correspondence ("commonalities")
between her knowledge of how 'good heart and lungs of
babies should sound' and the sounds of this baby's heart
and lungs. That is, the nurse's knowledge informing her
recognition and subsequent action determines the trend of
this baby (that his heart and lungs sound as "good as they
should"). She appears to have strong convictions
("confidence") about it. She says: "he's strong. He'll
probably be okay".
The "harbinger" of the nurse's practice at the proficient
and expert stage is her certainty about being able to
achieve a correspondence between her recognition and the
situation of the patient and between her action and the
situation of the patient over time, thereby determining
the trend in the situation of the patient. That is, the
"new confidence" Benner et al ascribe to nurses at the
proficient and expert stage about trends in the situation
of the patient is the old certainty of the claim raised by
cognitive theories of knowledge about a correspondence
between person and object.
The Nurse's Recognition Effecting "distinctions"
On the other hand, the nurse's recognition that the baby's
heart and lungs do not sound as "good as they should"
exemplifies, I suggest, the claim of non-cognitive
95
theories of knowledge. The nurse's recognition informed by
her knowledge of how 'good heart and lungs of babies
should sound' produces, in establishing "commonalities"
with the sounds of the baby's heart and lungs,
"distinctions" (the baby's heart and lungs are not
sounding as "good as they should"), that is, her practical
knowledge.
A non-cognitive interpretation explains, then, how the
nurse's recognition in everyday work produces practical
knowledge ("distinctions"). But, importantly, the nurse's
practical knowledge, understood as an effect of her
recognition, is only added to the knowledge in the nurse's
mind as the precondition of her next recognition.
This is brought out by an account of a nurse who
practices, according to Benner et al (1996), at the
competent stage (between the stage of advanced beginner
and proficiency). The nurse is asked by the interviewer
about the "usefulness" of a checklist from "the heart
course" (Benner et al, 1996:100). The nurse responds:
They do present it in the heart course,
but it's still, different things happen
with different patients, so it's not
exactly as the heart course presents it.
Every patient is a little bit different.
So, it's not always, as easy as going down
the list and saying this and this and
this, no, you have to sometimes consider
other factors. But they did present a
list. A sort of list, but it's not always
that easy. Plus, understanding the
concepts of preload and afterload, that
doesn't come from - you don't understand
that for a while (quoted in Benner et al,
1996:100; emphasis mine).
The nurse's knowledge such as the "checklist" from the
heart course fails to set up an exact correspondence
("commonalities") with the actual situation of the
patient, because, in her opinion, with every patient
"different things happen". It means for this nurse that
sometimes "other" aspects than those mentioned on the
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checklist from the heart course must be taken into
account.
The other aspects ("distinctions") which are different
from the nurse's knowledge, such as the "checklist" from
the heart course, are produced through the nurse's
recognition while establishing a correspondence with the
actual situation of the patient. These "distinctions"
(practical knowledge) extend her knowledge about patients
with 'heart conditions'. But the nurse's next recognition
of a patient with a heart condition effects again
"distinctions" (practical knowledge). Indeed, every
recognition of the actual situation of the patient by the
nurse produces practical knowledge ("distinctions").
A non-cognitive interpretation of recognition would
contradict any notion of the nurse's practical knowledge
being "accumulated" over time, or to be a "form of
knowledge in its own right" (Benner et al, 1996:XV).
Instead, it undermines Benner et al's conception of the
nurse's development of "skills of seeing" and practical
knowledge. It dissolves practical knowledge as the
condition of asserting an advance in the nurse's
recognition from an "objective disengaged criterial" (not
corresponding) way to an "engaged" (corresponding) way of




MUTUALITY OF EMOTIONS AND KNOWLEDGE
Introduction
In the previous chapter I have discussed the understanding
Benner et al have of a "Cartesian view". They take
theories of knowledge with a cognitive principle to
describe the person's recognition to be "objective,
disengaged, criterial". In particular, the advanced
beginner nurse's recognition informed by her theoretical
knowledge from nursing school is considered to be
"objective, disengaged, criterial". The implication is
that their recognition does not correspond with the
situation of the patient.
On their understanding that theories of knowledge are
descriptions rather than interpretations of the person's
recognition, Benner et al are, moreover, of the opinion
that theories of knowledge with a cognitive principle
separate the person's emotions and knowledge in a concrete
sense and that this separation entails, for them, a
distrust in "emotional language". Benner et al write that:
"Emotional language is distrusted in our Cartesian legacy
of separating emotion from thinking and knowing (Benner &
Wrubel, 1989; Vetlesen, 1994)" (1996:119; emphasis mine).
Benner et al are, in particular, of the opinion that "our
Cartesian legacy" (cognitive theories of knowledge)
separates the advanced beginner nurses emotions and
theoretical knowledge in a concrete way. This can be
illustrated with their statement that the "Cartesian
perspective" (that is, a "Cartesian view"; that is,
cognitive theories of knowledge) is not so "inaccurate"
for advanced beginner nurses, "whose emotional responses
are likely to reflect a pervasive mood of fear and anxiety
about the unknown or their awkward performance
capacity"(Benner et al, 1996:119). Advanced beginner
nurses' emotions, defined as general fear and anxiety, are
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seen to interfere with their practice: "advanced
beginners' practice can be impeded by their considerable
anxiety about knowledge or performance" (Benner et al,
1996:88).
Claiming, moreover, that advanced beginner nurses'
emotions in terms of anxiety are a "perceptual impediment"
(1996:89), that is, a hindrance to their recognition,
emotions and theoretical knowledge of advanced beginner
nurses are, in the opinion of Benner et al, I suggest, not
mutually constitutive. That is, Benner et al separate, in
accordance with their rendering of "our Cartesian legacy",
the advanced beginner nurse's emotions from her
theoretical knowledge.
Against "our Cartesian legacy" of separating emotion from
knowledge, Benner et al hold that "knowledge and emotion
are mutually constitutive" (1996:8). Behind this claim
about a mutuality of knowledge and emotion is their
conception about an advance in the nurse's recognition
from the stages of advanced beginner and competency to
proficiency and expertise. The nurse's recognition of the
situation of the patient at the former stages,
particularly at the advanced beginner stage, is, for
Benner et al, based on her theoretical knowledge. At the
stages of proficiency and expertise, the nurse's
recognition is her "skills of seeing" based on her
practical knowledge.
Integral to the development of the nurse's "skills of
seeing" and her practical knowledge in everyday work are,
according to Benner et al, the nurse's emotions. The
nurse's emotions are seen to become one "source" of the
nurse's "perceptual awareness" from the competent stage
onwards (Benner et al, 1996:89). The nurse's emotions are
considered to sharpen the nurse's recognition and to guide
the development of practical knowledge until she has
'sufficient' "skills of seeing" and practical knowledge to
make a "qualitative leap" from competency to proficiency.
When Benner et al, therefore, state that "knowledge and
emotion are mutually constitutive" (1996:8), it means
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that, in their conception about an advance in the nurse's
recognition, the nurse's emotions and practical knowledge
become mutually constitutive, that is, the mutuality of
the nurse's practical knowledge and emotions becomes the
condition of the development of her recognition as "skills
of seeing" and practical knowledge.
Explaining the condition of an advance in the nurse's
recognition in terms of the nurse's practical knowledge
and emotions coming together over time, Benner et al view
their own conception to represent, in a concrete sense,
the advance in the nurse's recognition. Benner et al
believe that the nurse's emotions as they begin to 'kick
in' after the advanced beginner stage add some quality to
the nurse's recognition of the situation of the patient
and, this being so, turn her recognition into "skills of
seeing" and her theoretical knowledge into practical
knowledge that is "qualitatively" different than her
recognition based on theoretical knowledge.
To recapture the discussion at this point: "our Cartesian
legacy" describes, for Benner et al, a separation between
the person's emotions and knowledge in a concrete sense.
This rendering has, I argue, two implications. One, Benner
et al consider the advanced beginner nurse's emotions to
be separate from her theoretical knowledge. Two, they view
their conception about an advance in the nurse's
recognition to explain the coming together of the nurse's
emotions and practical knowledge as the condition of her
recognition at the proficient and expert stage in a
concrete sense.
The statement of Benner et al about "our Cartesian legacy"
of separating emotion from knowledge is referenced with
Vetlesen (1994). In order to support the view that
theories of knowledge are interpretations instead of
descriptions, I wish in this chapter to scrutinize, first,
the validity of this reference to Vetlesen. I want to
clarify that the understanding of Benner et al of "our
Cartesian legacy" is not Vetlesen's. In particular, that
Benner et al's separating of emotions from knowledge in a
concrete sense and, therefore, the need for emotions and
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knowledge having to come together through recognitions in
everyday life is absent from Vetlesen's theory of moral
perception. Instead, I will suggest that Vetlesen assumes
a mutuality of the person's emotions and knowledge as a
'givenness' of human beings.
Benner et al's understanding of "our Cartesian legacy" of
separating the person's knowledge and emotions entails, as
noted at the beginning of the chapter, a distrust in
"emotional language". Since Benner et al conceive the
advanced beginner nurse's emotions and theoretical
knowledge to be separate, it is reasonable to argue that
Benner et al distrust the "emotional language" of advanced
beginner nurses. This argument I want to support by
explicating, second, how Benner et al are refusing to
acknowledge the advanced beginner nurse's mutuality of
emotions and knowledge as displayed in their language.
Third, I will show in this chapter, how Benner et al trust
the "emotional language" of nurses from the competent
stage onwards. Their language reveals, to them, the
mutuality of the nurse's emotions and practical knowledge.
I point out that Benner et al's description of the nurse's
recognition on the basis of the mutuality of her emotions
and practical knowledge adds the nurse's emotions to their
'essential' principle which explains the advance in the
nurse's recognition: the nurse's development of "skills of
seeing" and practical knowledge through her recognitions
in everyday work (see Chapter Six).
Fourth, I explicate how Benner et al assert that the
nurse's recognition of "commonalities" and "distinctions"
at the proficient and expert stage corresponds with the
situation of the patient. According to them, this
correspondence is possible because the nurse's recognition
as based on her "skills of seeing" and practical knowledge
(that is, the nurse's emotions and practical knowledge
having become mutually constitutive) at those stages is
"qualitatively" different from the nurse's recognition at
the earlier stages. On the view that their explanation is
a cognitive conception, Benner et al repeat the claim
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about a correspondence between person and object of
cognitive theories of knowledge.
I discuss, fifth, how Benner et al convert the nurse's
development of practical knowledge into the development of
her ethical knowledge by correlating the nurse's
recognition of "commonalities" and "distinctions"
respectively with notions of good and not good.
I demonstrate, finally, with an example, how the nurse's
recognition of "commonalities" effects "distinctions";
that is, how Benner et al's demand that the nurse must
recognize "commonalities" and "distinctions" with the
situation of the patient supports a non-cognitive
interpretation of recognition. In this context, I show
further how their correlation of good and not good with
the nurse's recognition of "commonalities" and
"distinctions" does not work.
Vetlesen's Theory of Moral Perception
In his discussion about moral perception, Vetlesen,
following Heidegger, speaks of the person's human
receptivity as "the primordial capacity of human beings to
be attentive to, to be alert to" (1994:162). Vetlesen
claims that empathy which lies at the "bottom" of
humankind's emotional faculty makes the person perceive a
situation as one where another person's "weal and woe" is
at stake. The faculty of empathy allows the person to
become aware of the other person who may be in a situation
of suffering "without sharing" the other's feeling in the
sense of experiencing it himself or herself.
Empathy "anchors" the person to the other's emotional
experience. The point Vetlesen wants to make is that such
receptivity/attentiveness, "is something active, not
passive"; yet it is not something the person brings
"selfconsciously" about (1994:17; emphasis in the
original). It is empathy that establishes an "emotional
bond" between the person and the other. And it is because
of this emotional bond that the person is able to put
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himself or herself "in" the place of the other by way of
"feeling-into and feeling-with" (Vetlesen, 1994:8).
Vetlesen further contends that empathy "contains" a
cognitive dimension corresponding to the faculty of
representative thinking. Representative thinking is in his
theory the "basic" cognitive faculty required for the
exercise of moral judgement. It is the mental process of
making the "standpoints of those who are absent" - present
to the person's mind (Vetlesen, 1994:105). It is by virtue
of the person's cognitive dimension that empathy "and it
alone, discloses to us something about another person -
namely, his or her emotional experience in a given
situation" (Vetlesen, 1994:204). In a word, Vetlesen
conceptualizes the person's ability to perceive
(knowledge) and to feel (emotion) as empathy containing
cognition.
Vetlesen's theory of moral perception, I suggest, assumes
a mutuality of the person's emotions and knowledge as a
'givenness' of human beings which he conceives in a
particular way. If one takes a mutuality of the person's
emotions and knowledge as a 'givenness', then, I claim,
that the nurse's "emotional language" (Benner et al, 1996)
will reveal such mutuality of emotions and knowledge.
However, since Benner et al separate the advanced beginner
nurse's emotions from her theoretical knowledge in
accordance with their understanding of "our Cartesian
legacy" which entails, for them, a distrust in "emotional
language", it implies, I suggest, that Benner et al
distrust the "emotional language" of advanced beginner
nurses; that is, the mutuality of advanced beginner
nurses' emotions and theoretical knowledge as articulated
in their language.
Emotional Language of Advanced Beginner Nurses
With a number of examples from advanced beginner nurses in
Expertise in Nursing Practice I wish to support my claim
about a 'givenness' of a mutuality of emotions and
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knowledge of human beings. I will begin by showing how
Benner et al refuse to acknowledge the mutuality of their
emotions and knowledge as expressed in their accounts.
Advanced beginner nurses in the study of Benner et al
(1996), it is recalled here, have practiced less than a
year after their nursing training in critical care
nursing:
Nurse 1: We had Mr. M., this guy who was
in liver failure and he was essentially a
one-to-one patient. I had him and I had
two other patients. And I was like oh,
there's that panic thing when I come in
and they're saying all about the different
labs and this IV and that IV, this tube
and that tube.
Nurse 2: You get a major rush.
Nurse 1: "WHAT!" The first thing that
happens, I feel myself going (takes a big
loud breath) like this, my whole body is
just tensing.
Nurse 2: And you haven't even opened the
cardex yet.
Nurse 1: Just tensing. And they opened
the cardex and there was so much written
on there, you can't even decipher what's
what and I was like this (all tensed up)
(quoted in Benner et al, 1996:49).
Unfortunately, neither one of the two nurses nor Benner et
al give information about the setting of this account. For
example, it is difficult to discern whether their account
captures the beginning of a shift which is possibly
indicated by the remark of Nurse 2, "you haven't' even
opened the cardex yet"; or whether Nurse 1 relates her
feelings at any time during a shift "when I come in" (to
the room of the patient) and "they're saying" (I take it
to be the physicians saying) "all about" different
laboratory tests ("labs"), intravenous drips/fluid ("IV")
and 'this and that tube'; or, whether this is an account
that highlights episodes in everyday practice, such as
nurses assessing their work load, physicians discussing
diagnostic and treatment, nurses attempting to orientate
104
themselves about patients by reading "the cardex" and
finding it difficult to "decipher what's what".
What is clear is that Nurse 1 is taking care of three
patients, one of whom is Mr. M. According to Nurse 1, Mr.
M., who is in "liver failure", already needs a nurse on
his own ("essentially a one-to-one patient"), that she
hears physicians say all about "labs", IVs, and tubes, and
that they open the cardex with "so much written" so that
it can hardly be deciphered; and she states her feelings:
"that panic thing"; "'What!' The first thing that happens;
I feel myself going (takes a big loud breath) like this;
my whole body is just tensing"; " Just tensing"; and "I
was like this (all tensed up)".
The language of Nurse 1 shows how her emotions, for
example, "that panic thing" contains her knowledge of Mr.
M. being "essentially a-one-to-one patient", and "I had
two other patients", and the physicians "saying all about
the different labs and this IV and that IV, this tube and
that tube"; while her language (knowledge), for example,
that Mr. M. is "essentially a-one-to-one patient", and "I
had two other patients", and the physicians "saying all
about the different labs and this IV and that IV, this
tube and that tube" contains her emotions: "that panic
thing". The nurse's feelings are inside her knowledge
(language) and her knowledge is inside her feelings.
While the account of this advanced beginner nurse reveals
the mutuality of the nurse's emotions and knowledge,
Benner et al comment that: "The emotional overlay of this
and many advanced beginners' narratives is one of
temporarily incapacitating anxiety" (1996:49). Benner et
al are suggesting that advanced beginner nurses' are
overreacting emotionally and that such overreaction of
emotions, described as "incapacitating" anxiety, hinders
their recognition of the situation for an undefined time.
Their "emotional overlay", Benner et al appear to be
saying here, is in the way of advanced beginner nurses in
their progressing towards a "fluid, almost seamless
performance" (1996:143) which, for Benner et al, is the
hallmark of nurses practicing at the expert stage.
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So Benner et al recommend that advanced beginner nurses
tone down their emotions of anxiety and fear for their
performance to improve: "advanced beginner performance
usually will improve by dampening anxiety and fear"
(1996:119; emphasis mine). Yet they immediately caution
such dampening of emotions with regard to the next stages:
"But it is a mistake to overgeneralize detachment from
emotional responses to subsequent" levels of competency,
proficiency, and expertise (Benner et al, 1996:119;
emphasis mine).
Benner et al are facing a difficulty. Obviously, they are
not denying that advanced beginner nurses have emotions.
They only deny that their emotions and theoretical
knowledge are mutually constitutive. This mutuality
appears to be taken for granted by advanced beginner
nurses themselves as another example by an advanced
beginner nurse suggests:
And I just talked to myself and I had a
great night because this was the first
time I did it ... I was (saying to myself)
"Okay. Just take it one step at a time.
You're only human, do one thing then go
onto the next thing. It will all get done,
it will get done easier if you're calm and
because you think better that way" ... And
the shift went great" (quoted in Benner et
al, 1996:50).
The nurse's thinking ("I just talked to myself ... 'Okay.
Just take it one step at a time'", and so on) influcences
her emotions ("if you're calm"), and her emotions
influence her thinking ("you think better that way"), and
such mutuality of thinking (knowledge) and emotions
influences her performance ("it will get done easier").
But Benner et al will not allow any mutuality of knowledge
and emotions for the advanced beginner nurses.
Acknowledging such a a mutuality would compromise their
conception about an advance in the nurse's recognition
which has a separation of their emotions and theoretical
knowledge as its raison d'etre. So Benner et al have to
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find something wrong with advanced beginner nurses'
emotions, such as an "emotional overlay", or with their
theoretical knowledge, as I will presently show, in order
to sustain their case that theoretical knowledge and
emotions are separate and become mutually constitutive
from the competent stage onwards.
The next example of an advanced beginner nurse conveys a
more positive note. Benner et al inform the reader that:
"His entire statement was delivered in an excited,
enthusiastic tone" (1996:52). Although this advanced
beginner nurse does not employ language, such as 'I was
excited', in his account, Benner et al apparently noticed
his emotions in the tone of his statement as being
"excited and enthusiastic". Benner et al, I want to
propose, while revealing a mutuality of emotions and
theoretical knowledge in this advanced beginner nurse's
account cannot bring themselves to see it:
I had learned so much. There are two
clinical nurse specialists involved right
now. There are people on the unit who are
CNIIs and CNIIIs (very likely 'Critical
Care Nurses' of different grades such as
II and III; addition mine) who are just
really knowledgeable on major GI surgery
(gastro-intestinal surgery, addition mine)
on infants. I talked to all these people
and pediatric surgery were really helpful,
and our attendings and fellows (physicians
in particular professional positions,
addition mine) were ... I mean, I just
learned so much in the last three days, I
couldn't even tell you (quoted in Benner
et al, 1996:52).
This advanced beginner nurse has evidently enjoyed
learning from "knowledgeable" professionals, for example,
nurses and physicians, about surgery on infants.
If one assumes that this advanced beginner nurse's
"excited, enthusiastic tone" in which, according to Benner
et al, his account about learning "so much" was delivered
are an indication of his emotions of excitement and
enthusiasm when he was actually learning about surgery on
infants, then it is reasonable to say that his emotions
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were inside his learning (knowledge) and his learning
(knowledge) was inside his emotions.
Indeed, Benner et al could hardly disagree with this
point. They write: "Probably only the beginner can have
this kind of pure pleasure in learning about a new
clinical disease or problem" (1996:52; emphasis mine).
They are noting here how "pure pleasure" (emotions) links
with "learning" (knowledge). So what is to be distrusted
about the "pure pleasure in learning" of this advanced
beginner nurse?
Benner et al continue: "His comment (and the exemplar that
surrounds it) demonstrated an innocence that we observed
only in advanced beginners" (1996:52; emphasis mine).
Their general point is that advanced beginner nurses'
"innocent and unqualified" learning contrasts with that of
nurses at the stages of competency, proficiency, and
expertise (Benner et al, 1996:52). Mutuality of
theoretical knowledge and emotions of advanced beginner
nurses stands no chance, I think, to be acknowledged by
Benner et al before they get to the stage of competency.
Next I want to show how Benner et al trust the "emotional
language" of nurses at the competent stage; that is, how
their accounts (language) disclose, for them, the
mutuality of the nurse's emotions and practical knowledge.
Adding the Nurse's Emotions
The more generalized feelings of anxiety and fear of
advanced beginner nurses' emotions contrast, in the
opinion of Benner et al, with the emotions of nurses at
the competent stage. At this stage nurses are seen to
"begin to talk about how they feel about a situation
(comfortable, anxious, unsure, confident) in much more
differentiated ways" (Benner et al, 1996:88). Being able
to articulate their recognition of a situation of the
patient in terms of feeling comfortable, anxious, and so
on, indicates that: "competent nurses' emotional responses
to a situation now give them a better access to what is
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happening to the patient" (Benner et al 1996:89; emphasis
mine). Or, they state further: "As competent practitioners
settle more comfortably into their roles, their emotional
responses become more informative and guiding" (Benner et
al, 1996:89; emphasis mine).
In other words, through recognitions of situations of a
particular group of patients in everyday work, the
emotions of nurses at the competent stage have become
involved so that their recognition of the patient's
situation is sharpened and starts to produce "skills of
seeing" and practical knowledge which is "qualitatively"
different than theoretical knowledge; that is, the
separation between theoretical knowledge and emotions
characteristic of advanced beginner nurses is gradually
overcome. The recognition of the competent nurse is
informed by her emerging "skills of seeing" and practical
knowledge; that is, the nurse's recognition after the
stage of advanced beginner nurse is asserted to correspond
with the situation of the patient.
Benner et al's explanation of the nurse's recognition from
the comptent stage onwards is now based on the mutuality
of the nurse's emotions and practical knowledge. Benner et
al have added, I suggest, the nurse's emotions to their
'essential' cognitive principle: the development of the
nurse's "skills of seeing" and practical knowledge which
explains an advance in the nurse's recognition.
I will now explicate how Benner et al reiterate the claim
of cognitive theories of knowledge when they assert that
the nurse's recognition of "commonalities" and
"distinctions" corresponds with the situation of the
patient because the nurse's recognition at the proficient
and expert stage is "qualitatively" different from the
nurse's recognition at the advanced beginner stage.
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Correspondence Asserted
Benner et al describe how the nurse recognizes
"commonalities" (correspondence) with the situation of the
patient at the competent stage as follows:
the nurse has gained the ability to
anticipate certain typical progressions in
the patient's recovery (1996:78).
They are saying that the nurse who has learned from
recognizing many situations of patients that, for example,
breathing regularly is a typical sign of the patient's
recovery, anticipates to establish a correspondence
("commonalities") between her recognition ("skills of
seeing") informed by that particular practical knowledge
and the situation of the patient.
However, if the nurse's practical knowledge is developed
through her recognition of many situations of patients,
how can Benner et al assert that this knowledge of many
situations of patients enables the nurse to establish a
correspondence with a particular situation of the patient?
Questioning the nurse's recognition of a particular
situation when informed by her practical knowledge of many
situations of patients would, however, meet with some
opposition from Benner et al. They would likely want to
suggest that I missed the point about the nurse's emotions
and practical knowledge having come together from the
competent stage onwards as the condition of a "qualitative
leap" in the nurse's recognition between the stages of
competency and proficiency.
Because Benner et al assert about the nurse's recognition
at the proficient stage that: "It is this ability to read
the situation instead of laying on a preconceived set of
expectations that makes expert practice possible"
(1996:142). Putting a "preconceived set of expectations"
over the situation of the patient is, for them,
recognizing the situation in terms of theoretical
knowledge. In other words, the advanced beginner nurse's
recognition based on theoretical knowledge is putting
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predetermined knowledge over the situation of the patient
(see Introduction).
This is another way in which Benner et al express the idea
that the advanced beginner nurse's recognition informed by
her theoretical knowledge is not corresponding with the
situation of the patient which implies, for them, a
separation between advanced beginner nurses' theoretical
knowledge and emotions.
But since the nurse's emotions and practical knowledge
have, according to Benner et al, become mutually
constitutive through the nurse's recognition of many
situations of a particular group of patients in her
everyday work, the expert nurse's recognition ("skills of
seeing") informed by her practical knowledge is now
"qualitatively" different and thus corresponds with the
situation of the patient.
Just in case that their notion of a "qualitative leap" in
the nurse's recognition between competent and
proficient/expert stage sounds too far fetched, Benner et
al illustrate this advance in the nurse's recognition with
an account about a resuscitation (a procedure to recover
the respiratory and heart function) of a patient by an
expert nurse. The patient in this situation was, according
to Benner et al, haemorrhaging and stopped breathing. This
is an excerpt of the nurse's report:
I looked at his heart rate and I said:
'O.K. he is bradying down. Someone want to
give me some atropine?' I just started
calling out the drugs that I needed to get
for this guy, so we started to push these
drugs in. In the meantime, I said, 'can we
have some more blood?' I was just barking
out this stuff (the things that were
needed and had to be done). I can't even
tell you the sequence. I was saying, 'We
need this.' I needed to anticipate what
was going to happen and I could do this
because I had been through this a week
before with this guy and knew what we had
done (and what had worked). The
anesthesiologist came in and did a good
intubation. He asks: 'what kind of (IV)
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lines do we have?' I said, 'We have a
triple lumen and we have blood. All (IV)
ports are taken. We need another kind of
line. He's got no veins left. He goes,
'O.K., fine, give me a cut-down tray ...
(quoted in: Benner et al, 1996:142-143).
After recognizing that the heart rate was slowing
("bradying") down of a patient who was bleeding and had
stopped breathing; that is, after the nurse's "skills of
seeing" and practical knowledge establishes a
correspondence ("commonalities") with the situation of the
patient in terms of "bradying down", the nurse asks for
"atropine" and the "stuff" which, according to Benner et
al, was "needed".
For this performance the nurse draws, according to her own
account, on knowledge from a previous performance of
resuscitating this particular patient. She reports: "I was
just barking out this stuff", for example, "drugs" and
"blood". Then she describes how she knew which "stuff" she
had to call for: "I needed to anticipate what was going to
happen and I could do this because I had been through this
a week before with this guy and knew what we had done"
(emphasis mine).
For Benner et al this nurse's ability to "anticipate",
that is, her practical knowledge informing her recognition
and actions, is not predetermined. Benner et al assure
that: "This is not just a rote repetition of the previous
resuscitation; rather, her responses are based on the
understanding gained in the previous situation" (1996:143;
emphasis mine). Benner et al are saying, since this is an
expert nurse, she has made her "qualitative leap" to
proficiency already some years ago, implying that her
emotions did 'kick in' at the competent stage turning her
theoretical knowledge into practical knowledge. For them,
her emotions and practical knowledge having become
mutually constitutive and thus the condition of developing
her "skills of seeing" and practical knowledge.
Therefore, her calling for the "stuff" needed is not a
"rote repetition" of the previous performance or putting,
like advanced beginner nurses do, a "preconceived set of
112
expectations" over the present performance. No, for Benner
et al, the expert nurse's recognition of the patient and
her subsequent actions are "qualitatively" different from
those of an advanced beginner nurse because her
recognition and actions are "based" on "understanding",
that is, on her "skills of seeing" and practical
knowledge.
Consequently, her "skills of seeing" based on her
practical knowledge developed over years including that
from the "previous situation" enable her to establish a
correspondence ("commonalities") with the situation of the
patient and because her recognition corresponds with the
situation of the patient her actions are corresponding
with the situation of the patient.
Importantly, the nurse's recognition ("skills of seeing")
informed by her practical knowledge is not only
establishing a correspondence with the situation in terms
of "commonalities", but also in terms of "distinctions".
The nurse's recognition of "distinctions" as corresponding
with the situation of the patient begins, for Benner et
al, at the competent stage. They state concerning the
nurse's recognition at this stage:
For example, not having a good grasp of
the situation, or having the situation
seem vaguely off what the nurse has
learned to expect, provides guiding and
alerting information (Benner et al,
1996:89).
When the nurse's recognition informed by what she "has
learned to expect", that is, her practical knowledge,
fails to establish a correspondence ("vaguely off") with
the situation (or has not a "good grasp" of the situation)
then her recognition of the situation "provides guiding
and alerting information" about the situation of the
patient.
In relation with nurses who have made the "qualitative
leap" to the proficient stage, Benner et al reveal more
113
clearly, how the nurse's recognition ("skills of seeing)
informed by her practical knowledge which is not
establishing a correspondence ("commonalities") with the
situation of the patient is, for Benner et al, nonetheless
corresponding with the situation. They write:
They can now trust that their loss of
practical grasp or discomfort in a
situation is meaningful, i.e., connected
to what is occurring in the situation
(Benner et al, 1996:118; emphasis mine).
The nurse who recognizes meaningful "distinctions" between
her practical knowledge informing her recognition and the
situation, can now "trust" that her recognition of
meaningful "distinctions"/discomfort is "connected" with
what is going on "in" the situation. That is, the expert
nurse's recognition (informed by her "skills of seeing"
and practical knowledge) of "distinctions" in the
situation of the patient is corresponding with the
"distinctions" in the situation of the patient.
As an aside, Benner et al are having difficulties in
expressing the mutuality of the nurse's knowledge
(recognition) and her emotions ("discomfort") they want to
convey here by speaking of a loss of a meaningful "grasp"
or "discomfort". Assuming a mutuality between the nurse's
emotions and knowledge (which Benner et al do with regard
to nurses at the proficient stage, but for the wrong
reason as I explained earlier), then the nurse's
recognition of a loss of meaningful grasp (knowledge) and
her discomfort (emotions) each include the other.
Good and Not Good Ethical Knowledge
Benner et al describe the nurse's recognition of
"distinctions" with the situation also as not having a
"good grasp". A "good grasp" of the situation of the
patient, on the other hand, is one when she recognizes
"commonalities" with the situation. Benner et al write,
for example, that nurses at the competent stage "can talk
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about feeling comfortable when they have a good grasp of a
situation" (Benner et al, 1996:89).
The importance of Benner et al's move here should not be
missed. Correlating the nurse's recognition of
"commonalities" and "distinctions" with the situation
respectively with notions of good and not good, Benner et
al convert the nurse's recognition of the situation of the
patient into an ethical recognition in the sense of good
or not good and her practical knowledge into ethical
knowledge in this sense.
Benner et al discuss the nurse's development of her
ethical knowledge by recognizing "commonalities" as good
and "distinctions" as not good with an account by a nurse
at the competent stage. This nurse illustrates, in the
opinion of Benner et al, how nurses' feelings of
"disappointment" or "success" depend on practicing not
"well" or "things" going "well" and that the nurse's
recognition of "things" going "well" encourage nurses to
be "good" nurses: "When nurses do not perform well they
feel varying degrees of disappointment, when things go
well, the success is laden with import, giving nurses hope
that they can be good nurses. For example" (Benner et al,
1996:90):
Nurse: I had a good week. I really did.
The last (interview session) I could not
think of anything good at all, it was
like: 'Oh, I hate nursing!' I want to get
out of here so badly and then this last
week I had two nights that went absolutely
perfect where I could not have - I just
feel good. I could not have done anything
better than I did. I was so perfect
(laugh). I needed those, didn't I?
Int: Save you from leaving nursing. What
does perfect mean to you?
Nurse: Yeah, well but not just where you
do all your tasks right, but where you get
the art of nursing down to where it just
feels like the night went absolutely
perfect for you; not just good, not just
the really nice night but it went great.
And I was good ... I don't know. Usually
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there are nights where you don't do
anything wrong but there's a lot of things
you could have done better. I could have
positioned the baby a little better. I
could have been brighter at the bedside,
just little tiny things that you think,
'Oh, it was good, but there were certain
things I could have done better and these
nights went perfectly'... It was a good
feeling to feel like, I'd put the baby up
on her side in a little fetal position and
she stayed there. She didn't flail all
over the bed (laugh). Just little things
really made the night go well, (quoted in
Benner et al, 1996:90; emphasis mine).
This nurse cannot help but being pleased about the way the
two night duties went for her and how "good" or "perfect"
she was. During these nights she was able to perform her
tasks more than right, indeed, perfect for her. The nurse,
it seems, has some ideas about achieving tasks perfect
rather than right, because there are nights when she
realizes a difference between her performance and the
possibility of performing just "a little bit better".
Her feelings about the two nights going "absolutely
perfect" for her indicates, I suggest, that the kind of
practice she succeeded to perform corresponds with her
ideas of 'absolutely perfect' practice. For example, for
her it "was a good feeling to feel" that the baby she put
in "a little fetal position" remained in that position
("she stayed there"). The nurse feels good about the baby
conforming to her practice by not flailing "all over the
bed" .
This is how Benner et al begin their comment:
Feeling good when performance is good and
poorly when things do not go well provides
an emotional guide that sharpens the
nurse's perceptual acuity and guides the
development of skilled clinical know-how
and ethical comportment (Benner et al,
1996:90; emphasis mine).
Stating that "Feeling good when performance is good",
Benner et al are saying that the nurse's performance, for
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example, of putting the baby in "a little fetal position"
has been recognized by the nurse as "commonalities"
(correspondence) with the situation of the baby who
remained in that particular position.
The nurse's recognition of "commonalities" between her
performance of putting the patient in a particular
position and the position of the patient is, for Benner et
al, a good recognition of her performance which brought
this position about and, therefore, the performance is
good and the nurse feels good.
Noting further that feeling "poorly when things do not go
well", Benner et al are implying that if the nurse would
have recognized "distinctions" between her performance of
putting the baby in "a little fetal position" and the
situation in terms of the baby flailing "all over the
bed", then such recognition is for Benner et al not good
("poorly") and indicates that "things do not go well". So
her performance is poor, (not good) consequently, the
nurse feels poorly (not good).
The nurse's recognitions of good "commonalities" and not
good (or "poor") "distinctions" are, in the view of Benner
et al, the development of "skilled clinical know-how",
that is, of practical knowledge "and ethical comportment"
(1996:90). The division between practical knowledge and
"ethical comportment", Benner et al are making here is, on
the foregoing discussion, I suggest, secondary. The
nurse's practical knowledge is her ethical knowledge
("ethical comportment") in terms of good and not good.
Next I want to show how the nurse's recognition of
"commonalities" with the situation of the patient as
informed by her practical (ethical) knowledge effects
"distinctions" and that, on this view, the correlation of
the nurse's recognition of "commonalities" as good and of
"distinctions" as not good does not work.
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"Distinctions" as an Effect:
Benner et al introduce the nurse's account about an infant
whose respiratory (heart) arrest was resuscitated, a
procedure which in professional parlance is also referred
to as "code" by noting that: "In the following example,
the nurse enters her first successful code with the
experience of having closely observed and recorded several
successful infant codes" (1996:81). The account comes from
a nurse who is, according to Benner et al, at the
competent stage:
Nurse: ... It would have been better if
he hadn't survived and I think in a way I
was hoping he wouldn't. So I was a little
upset when we got a heart rate back, but
at the same time, it was good. It was the
first time I had been in a code (she had
discovered the respiratory arrest and
initiated the resuscitation) and for it to
be succesful.
Int: You haven't been in the situation
where you ...
Nurse: Right. Well I've seen a couple of
baby ones that were successful .. but this
was one of those 'baptisms by fire' where
you are not absolutely sure that you can
do it until you're confronted with the
situation.
Int: What do you think helps you be
ready for it?
Nurse: I think watching. I used to stand
back and just watch and I really think
before somebody participates, being a
recorder is really good because you get to
see everything that happens. You have to
watch very closely, write it all down, and
writing it down helps you remember later
what order everything had been done. I had
done that a couple of times before and I
think that was probably the main thing and
also knowing the baby, knowing what he's
like, knowing every inch of the back of
his neck. He didn't have an IV. Just
things like that all added together. But I
really think being a recorder was the
biggest thing; much better than
participating in a mock code in nursing
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school ...(quoted in Benner et al,
1996:81) .
This nurse has observed several "successful" codes which
had been performed on babies in the past and prepared
herself a checklist about the "order" which she found to
be inherent in those performances. Through her
recognitions of "commonalities", that is, of a
correspondence between a practice intended to recover the
respiratory and heart functions of patients and those
functions being recovered, the nurse developed her
practical knowledge. To be ready for a code entails for
this nurse remembering the "order" of 'running' a code and
knowing the baby, for example, that he did not have an
"IV" (intravenous line for adminstering fluids and
medication).
In this specific situation, the nurse's recognition
informed by her practical knowledge establishes
"commonalities" with the situation of the baby in terms of
a respiratory arrest. Benner et al take it for granted
that the nurse's recognition of a "respiratory arrest"
corresponds with the situation of the patient since the
nurse's action (according to Benner et al, the nurse
"initiated the resuscitation") is seen to be "needed",
that is, corresponding with the nurse's recognition of the
'needed' action in situation of the patient. They write:
"Practical mastery of the likely sequencing, the nature of
the teamwork, and knowing a range of clinical
eventualities, in addition to knowing this particular
infant allows the nurse to anticipate and respond to the
action needed (Benner et al, 1996:81; emphasis mine).
But the nurse does not appear as certain as Benner et al
about a correspondence between her recognition of the
situation of the patient ("respiratory arrest", according
to Benner et al) and her action (initiating the
resuscitation). Following the nurse, the performance of
the resuscitation was, in her word, "good". It had been
"the first time" she had "been in a code ... for it to be
successful", that is, in establishing a correspondence
("commonalities") between the resuscitation and the
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function of the baby's heart: "we got a heart rate back".
The nurse indicates here that the baby's heart had
arrested.
However, the nurse notices that, "at the same time", she
is a "little upset" about this "good" and "successful"
resuscitation of the baby's heart function. In her
opinion: "It would have been better if he hadn't
survived".
The nurse's reflection about a "good" and "successful"
resuscitation of the baby's heart exemplifies how a
particular performance achieves, simultaneously,
"commonalities" ( "we got a heart rate back") and
"distinctions" ("It would have been better if he hadn't
survived"). She demonstrates that the demand of Benner et
al that the nurse must recognize "commonalities" and
"distinctions" in the situation of the patient points to a
non-cognitive interpretation of recognition; that the
nurse's recognition of "commonalities" produces,
inevitably, "distinctions", that is, her practical
(ethical) knowledge (see also Chapters Six and Eight).
The nurse's account illustrates also how a performance,
such as a resuscitation, which accomplishes good
"commonalities" between practical knowledge guiding that
performance and the situation of the patient effects a
situation which the nurse had hoped would not be achieved
("It would have been better if he hadn't survived"). Not
succeeding in the resuscitation of the baby's heart
function would have entailed, according to Benner et al's
correlation of the nurse's recognition of "distinctions"
with not good, this nurse's recognition of the situation
of the baby as not good "distinctions" between her
practical (ethical) knowledge guiding that performance
(recovering the patient's heart function) and the
situation of the patient as not having gotten a "heart
rate back".
Yet the possibility of recognizing "distinctions" as not
good is considered by this nurse to "have been better",
that is, good for the patient not to have survived. Her
120
account allows to suggest that she would have, in a way,
felt good if she would have recognized not good
"distinctions" between the performance of resuscitating
the baby's heart and the situation of the baby as not
having gotten a "heart rate back". The nurse illuminates
the possibility that a good performance, understood as
achieving a correspondence ("commonalities") with the
situation of the patient, effects "distinctions" which may
be, from the nurse's perspective, good or not good.
So the maxim of Benner et al that 'nurses feel good when
performance is good' and that they 'feel not good when
performance is not good' appears to be rather uncertain.
This uncertainty of the nurse's recognition of
"commonalities" as 'good' and "distinctions" as 'not good'
is captured by Benner et al who describe the nurse's





I have stated at the end of the previous chapter that
Benner et al interpret the nurse's feelings about a
"succesful" resuscitation of the baby's "heart rate" as
"mixed". Benner et al specify their interpretation of the
nurse's feelings as "mixed". They write: "She is troubled
by the infant's suffering" (Benner et al, 1996:81).
According to Benner et al, the nurse is "troubled",
because the baby is suffering after his "heart rate" has
been succesfully recovered.
The problem of the nurse being "troubled" about the baby's
suffering after the resuscitation, as Benner et al see it,
is that she "has little sense of the social power or means
to deal directly with this concern" (1996:81-82). The
"means" this nurse is lacking in order to "directly"
attend to her concern (being "troubled") about the baby's
suffering, Benner et al describe as follows: "She has not
yet developed the experiental wisdom and ability to
integrate ethical and clinical concerns" (1996:82;
emphasis mine).
Benner et al are suggesting here the possibility that the
nurse develops "experiental wisdom", that is, gaining
"wisdom" through seeing many situations of patients in
everyday work, in other words, practical knowledge, and
the ability to integrate "ethical and clinical" concerns.
That is, the nurse is seen to acquire practical knowledge
which enables her to integrate her "practical" concern:
the resuscitation of the baby, and her "ethical" concern:
the baby's suffering after that procedure. How is the
nurse to achieve this integration of her "practical"
concern (the resuscitation of the baby) and her "ethical"
concern (the baby's suffering after the performance)?
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Integrating versus Effecting
According to Benner et al, the nurse achieves the
integration of her "practical" concern and her "ethical"
concern, I will show, by preventing the resuscitation as
the 'cause' of the baby's suffering. They write about this
nurse that she had been:
ethically and legally accountable to
initiate the code since there was no
familial and medical agreement to stop
treatment. In this social context, her
actions to prevent the code would have had
to precede this particular crisis (Benner
et al, 1996:82; emphasis mine)
Benner et al are implying here that the nurse, if she
would have already acquired 'enough' practical knowledge
(she "has not yet developed"), she could have known the
suffering the baby will have to endure after a "succesful"
resuscitation. Knowing the suffering involved for the baby
after the resuscitation, the nurse could have precluded
his suffering by avoiding the 'cause' of it: the
resuscitation. For example, by turning to the physician.
That is, to obtain a medical order of 'no resuscitation'
which suspends the nurse's legal (ethical) obligation to
initiate a resuscitation in case a cardiac arrest is
recognized by a nurse.
Having prevented the prospect of a "successful"
resuscitation of the baby in this way, the nurse would
have integrated her "practical" concern and her "ethical"
concern (the baby's suffering after the resuscitation).
Benner et al underline the nurse's practical knowledge as
the condition of knowing what is involved for the patient
after a particular action has been performed and thus of
being able to integrate her "practical" and her "ethical"
concerns. They contrast this nurse at the competent stage
"to the proficient and expert nurses in the study" (Benner
et al, 1996:82). Nurses at those stages, Benner et al
write, "have a more developed sense of moral agency"
(1996:82). Their "sense of moral agency" is to "foresee
123
the ethical implications of clinical interventions"
(Benner et al, 1996:82; emphasis mine). The nurse at the
proficient and expert stage foresees, in the opinion of
Benner et al, "ethical implications", that is, her
"ethical" concern (for example, the suffering the patient
will have to endure after a particular procedure).
I have discussed in Chapters Six and Seven how the nurse's
recognition informed by her knowledge produces, in
establishing "commonalities" with the situation of the
patient, "distinctions". Here, I argue, that the nurse's
action informed by her knowledge (for example, initiating
and performing a resuscitation) produces, in establishing
"commonalities" with the situation of the patient (for
example, in terms of 'we have got a "heart rate back"'),
"distinctions", such as, the suffering of the patient
after the performance of a particular action. The
patient's suffering (the nurse's "ethical" concern) is
effected through her "practical" concern: initiating and
performing an action in order to achieve "commonalities"
with the situation of the patient.
In speaking of "ethical implications of clinical
interventions" (emphasis mine), Benner et al are implying,
I suggest, that the nurse who initiated the resuscitation
("clinical interventions") of the baby in the above
example effects "ethical implications", that is,
"distinctions", that is, her "ethical" concern (such as
the suffering of the patient after the performance).
In contrast to Benner et al's notion that the nurse will
develop 'enough' practical knowledge on the basis of which
she foresees "ethical" concerns ("distinctions", "ethical
implications") the performance of a particular action will
bring for the patient; that is, to be able to integrate
those "ethical" concerns (the patient's suffering) by
stopping the action and thus precluding the 'cause' of her
"ethical" concerns, the latter are, I suggest, effected
through her "practical" concerns, for example, initiating
and performing a particular action.
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The Patient's Recognition
In Chapter Two I have noted that Orlando's idea of
"exploration" in terms of an exchange of recognitions
between nurse and patient implies that the patient's
recognition of his situation is brought about through the
nurse's recognition of it. Or, it can be said that the
nurse's recognition, in setting up "commonalities" with
the situation of the patient, produces "distinctions" from
the patient's perspective.
The nurse in the above example who states: "I was hoping
he wouldn't" survive, produces the baby's recognition in
relation to her recognition (hope). The nurse who
recognizes the patient in terms of "I was hoping he
wouldn't survive", establishes "commonalities" with the
situation of the patient ('hoping that he is not
surviving') and effects, at the same time, "distinctions",
that is, the patient's recognition in relation to her
recognition (hope).
It has been discussed in Chapter Two that, for Orlando, an
"exploration", that is, an exchange of recognitions
between nurse and patient, is also the condition of
accomplishing a sort of correspondence about the situation
of the patient. An exchange of recognitions between nurse
and patient accomplishes, I suggest, in the light of the
discussion in the previous section, a correspondence in
the sense of integrating the nurse's perspective of the
situation and the patient's perspective of it.
The accomplishment of a correspondence between nurse and
patient about the situation is, in the opinion of Orlando,
the precondition of deciding "deliberatively" about the
action to be taken in response to the patient's situation.
This deliberating (exchanging of recognitions) between
nurse and patient continues, for Orlando, during and after
the action.
It may seem rather ridiculous to entertain the idea of the
nurse exchanging her recognition ('that he is not
surviving') with the baby so that the baby could
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articulate his recognition in relation to it in order to
deliberate about the action to be followed. But the
patient who is not yet able to articulate (for example, a
baby) or who is not any more able to articulate (for
example, a patient who has stopped breathing and whose
heart function arrested) the recognition of his situation
which the nurse's recognition produces in the first place,
is particularly vulnerable.
That is, that the nurse's certainty about her recognition
of the patient's situation to correspond with the
patient's situation, excludes the patient's recognition in
relation to it from her recognition and is, in this way,
creating a social distance between herself and the
patient.
This social distancing between nurse and patient is
increased, when the nurse acts, following Orlando,
"automatic". I have argued in Chapter Two that Orlando's
idea of an automatic action can be considered as the
enactment of the claim about a correspondence between
person and object as raised by cognitive theories of
knowledge. The nurse's certainty that her recognition
corresponds with the situation of the patient, hinders her
to exchange recognitions with the patient about his
situation. It prevents the accomplishment of a
correspondence between nurse and patient about the
situation of the patient as the precondition of deciding
the action to be followed "deliberatively".
In this chapter, I will discuss how Benner et al's notion
of an "intuitive" link between the nurse's recognition of
the patient's situation and action in response to it at
the expert stage is an automatic action. I, then,
illustrate how the nurse's automatic action obliterates
the very moment when the nurse could foresee "ethical
implications" her action could bring for the patient; or,
when the nurse could initiate an exchange of recognitions
with the patient.
Second, I discuss how the nurse's automatic actions
enhance the exclusion of the patient's recognition with
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regard to it from her recognition, when they are carried
out under conditions of "physical closeness" and "co¬
operation" (Bauman, 1989) with other actors.
Automatic Actions
Benner et al state that the performance of nurses at the
proficient stage is characterized "by an increased
capacity for recognizing whole patterns and a budding
sense of salience where relevant aspects of the situation
simply stand out without recourse to calculative reasoning
(1996:142; emphasis mine). Since Benner et al connect
"calculative reasoning" with theoretical knowledge, they
are implying that the nurse's recognition ("skills of
seeing") informed by her practical knowledge is
increasingly corresponding with the situation of the
patient (when "relevant aspects simply stand out").
Yet the distinction in the advance between the stage of
proficiency and expertise is, as Benner et al see it, that
the nurse's recognition at the proficient stage is "not
yet linked" to the nurse's action; at the proficient stage
the nurse "still has to think about what to do" (Benner et
al, 1996:142). Between the nurse's recognition of the
patient's situation and her decision about the action to
be followed there is still a moment to reflect; that is,
to consider the "ethical implications" ("distinctions")
her action will bring for the patient from her
perspective. Importantly, there would still be a moment to
initiate, following Orlando, an exchange of recognitions
between herself and the patient in order to decide upon an
action "deliberatively".
The hallmark of the nurse at the expert stage is,
according to Benner et al, when the "links" between the
nurse's recognition and her action become increasingly
"intuitive". Significantly, those links are seen to shift
the "focus" of the expert nurse from the "problem" of the
patient recognized to the action.
In stressing the "intuitive" links between the nurse's
recognition of the "problem" of the patient and decision
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to act which involves shifting the nurse's focus from
"problem" to action, Benner et al, I think, assume that
the correspondence ("commonalities") between the nurse's
recognition and the "problem" of the patient is "strong"
enough to 'cover' the actions taken and, because of such
an assumption, the nurse is seen to be able to focus her
attention on the action rather than the "problem". They
write: "The links between patient condition and action are
sufficiently strong that the focus shifts to actions taken
rather than the problems recognized" (Benner et al,
1996:142). In short, Benner et al assert a correspondence
between the nurse's recognition and the situation of the
patient and a correspondence between the action of the
nurse and the situation of the patient.
Since Benner et al assert a correspondence between the
nurse at the expert stage and the situation of the patient
that 'covers' the action decided upon, their notion of an
"intuitive" link describes an automatic action in that it
obliterates the very moment to think about possible
"ethical implications" her actions may have for the
patient from her perspective; or to
exchange recognitions with the patient in order to
accomplish a correspondence between nurse and patient
about his situation before reaching a decision concerning
the action to be followed.
Benner et al illustrate such automatic action with an
account by a nurse at the expert stage I have referred to
earlier in Chapter Seven. I restate the excerpt from the
nurse's account about a patient who had been haemorrhaging
and stopped breathing (Benner et al, 1996).
I looked at his heart rate and I said:
'O.K. he is bradying down. Someone want to
give me some atropine?' I just started
calling out the drugs that I needed to get
for this guy, so we started to push drugs
in. In the meantime, I said, 'can we have
some more blood?' I was just barking out
this stuff (the things that were needed
and had to be done). I can't even tell you
the sequence. I was saying, 'We need
this.' I needed to anticipate what was
going to happen and I could do this
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because I had been through this a week
before with this guy and knew what we had
done (and what had worked). The
anesthesiologist came in and did a good
intubation. He asks: 'what kind of (IV)
lines do we have?' I said, 'We have a
triple lumen and we have blood. All (IV)
ports are taken. We need another kind of
line. He's got no veins left. 'He goes,
'O.K., fine, give me a cut-down tray ...
(quoted in Benner et al, 1996:142-143).
The nurse establishes a correspondence between her
practical knowledge and the situation of the patient in
terms of "bradying down" and makes an automatic request if
someone wants "to give me some atropine?". The nurse's
request leads to a sequence of actions which involve at
least the application of intravenous drugs, for example,
atropine, the intubation of the patient to take
over/assist his or her breathing function, while a
surgical opening of one of the patient's veins was being
prepared for as indicated by the request of the
anesthesiologist "give me a cut down tray".
The nurse's automatic action of asking for "atropine"
excludes the very moment to think, from her perspective,
of "ethical implications" ("distinctions") of her action
for the patient, let alone of "ethical implications" of a
sequence of actions as initiated by her 'original' action
of requesting "atropine".
Considering that the nurse's recognition produces, in
establishing a correspondence ("commonalities") with the
situation of the patient ("bradying down"), also the
recognition ("distinctions") of the patient with regard to
her recognition, then the nurse's automatic action of
asking for "atropine", obliterates the moment for an
exchange of recognitions between nurse and patient in
order to accomplish a kind of correspondence between nurse
and patient about his or her situation as the precondition
of deciding the action to be followed "deliberatively".
This exclusion of the patient's recognition
("distinctions") of his situation through the nurse's
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recognition of his situation and subsequent actions
decided upon automatically by the nurse is enhanced when
the performance of those actions involve the "physical
closeness" and "co-operation" of nurses and physicians.
Physical Closeness and Co-operation
Bauman (1989), following Milgram, points out that physical
closeness and continuous co-operation of actors, even if
only over a relatively short time, tend to result in a
"group feeling". A feeling of togetherness is produced
through joint actions which are complementary in achieving
a shared goal (Bauman, 1989:156). At the same time, and
this is the point of Bauman, such feeling of togetherness
supports the exclusion of the "victim" from the group.
The exclusion of the patient's recognition as produced
through the recognition and automatic action of nurses and
physicians from their recognition through their co¬
operation with one another complete with a sense of
togetherness can be highlighted with the following account
of a "critical transport" nurse about the resuscitation of
two babies as quoted in Expertise in Nursing Practice:
Nurse 1: The residents don't do transports
very often. They are not used to doing as
much as the nurse is doing, and the nurses
work better together and get the baby
'spiffed up' faster (resuscitated and
stable) because we are just used to doing
it, and you just do whatever needs to be
done. I was working on one new baby by
myself and I got a line in, and then he
was working on the other baby and put the
line in. And he decided to let the
referring physician intubate the other
baby, and I was going to intubate my kid
and take my time to intubate because my
kid was a little more stable, so I had a
little extra time to get things ready. And
the referring physician was just watching
like a hawk. He was amazed, like 'Whoa,
the pressure's on.' He probably hadn't
done it in ages himself. And so it was
kind of fun. We would say, 'My pressure's
this, what's yours?' They go, 'Oh well, we
haven't done any of those.' It's like: 'we
haven't got the blood pressure.' It's fun,
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laughing back and forth about: 'Oh, you do
it. '
Nurse 2: Everybody has a specialized role,
and you just kind of go back and forth and
there's camaraderie. It's kind of a nice
thing (quoted in Benner et al, 1996:121-
122) .
The first nurse begins her account by drawing a
professional distinction between nurses and physicians.
According to her, nurses are usually 'better' in
resuscitating patients (do more; "work better together")
than physicians (residents). Her account of a particular
experience, however, shows how such professional
distinction breaks down when the physician who, in
resuscitating 'his' baby, appears to be learning from the
nurse's way of resuscitating 'her' baby, while the nurse,
who seems to be rather certain about the situation of
'her' baby and her skill of resuscitating it, responds by
prodding the physician in an easy going, colleagial manner
to be as fast as she is in getting the blood pressure
reading of 'his' baby.
In contrast to the exchange of recognitions going on
between nurse and physician in order to accomplish a
correspondence between their actions, the recognitions
("distinctions") of the two babies as effected through
those actions, are excluded from the recognition of the
professionals. How the two babies fare during that
procedure is outside the technical achievement of the
professionals' shared goal: establishing a correspondence
("commonalities") between their action and the situation
of the patient, and outside their enjoyment of a feeling
of togetherness as cultivated through actions which are
complementary in reaching a correspondence with the
situation of the patient from their perspective.
The second nurse captures the complementarity of actions
between nurse and physician as "you just kind of go back
and forth" and the sense of togetherness as "camaraderie",





In the chapter where Dreyfus and Dreyfus contribute to
Expertise in Nursing Practice, they present not only their
concept of skill acquisition which I have discussed
earlier. In their particular chapter, Dreyfus and Dreyfus
also note, following Benner and Wrubel (1989), a division
of the patient into disease and illness. They write that:
"to Benner and Wrubel disease is an organic dysfunction,
of which modern medicine has a theory, whereas illness is
the experience of the breakdown of one's body and thus of
one's everyday world" (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1996:45;
emphasis in the original).
Concerning the nurse's recognition of the patient's
disease and illness, Dreyfus and Dreyfus take the point
once more from Benner and Wrubel. According to them:
"Nurses are in the unique position of being able to
understand both the disease experience and the meaning
that the patient brings to that experience (Benner &
Wrubel, 1989, pp.8-9)" (quoted by Dreyfus and Dreyfus in
Benner et al, 1996:45; emphasis mine).
In relation with the division of the patient into disease
and illness by Benner and Wrubel (1989) and their claim
that the nurse is able to recognize "both", the "disease
experience" and "the meaning that the patient brings to
that experience", Dreyfus and Dreyfus indicate two
descriptions of the nurse's recognition. These apparently
different descriptions of the nurse's recognition, I will




Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1996) hint at one description of the
nurse's recognition in connection with Heidegger.
Following him, Dreyfus and Dreyfus state that "man's way
of being is care" and that such way of being "must be
understood, preserved, and enhanced by nursing as a caring
profession (1996:46). Achieving such caring of the
patient's way of being as care, nurses do not seem to
require, for Dreyfus and Dreyfus, any knowledge. They
further point out that since the human way of being is
care, "there can be no abstract, analytical theory of it"
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1996:46).
Rather, the nurse's caring of the patient's way of being
as care is defined to be a way of "understanding" that is
a "higher kind of knowledge" through "entering" the
patient's perspective of life by helping: "The best we can
come up with is that caring, as a way of helping people by
entering their world, is a higher kind of knowledge which
we can call understanding" (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1996:46;
emphasis mine).
Drawing on Heidegger for their definition of caring as
"understanding" the patient's perspective of life and such
"understanding" to be a "higher kind of knowledge",
Dreyfus and Dreyfus choose a theorist who does not
presuppose a cognitive principle for his interpretation of
recognition (see also Chapters Four and Five). I take
Dreyfus and Dreyfus to allude to Heidegger's non-cognitive
theory of knowledge when they state that "there can be no
abstract, analytical theory" of Heidegger's human way of
being as care (1996:46).
Dreyfus and Dreyfus indicate the second description of the
nurse's recognition in the following claim: "The nurse,
however, is not only involved in the activity of beginning
to bear the science and technology of medicine on a
specific body with a specific disease, but also caring"
(1996:47). Dreyfus and Dreyfus are saying that besides
"caring", the nurse is involved in recognizing the "body"
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of the patient based on theoretical knowledge ("science
and technology").
Defining caring as "understanding" the patient's
perspective of life to be a "higher kind of knowledge" on
Heidegger's non-cognitive theory and differentiating it
from the nurse's recognition of the "body" of the patient
based on her theoretical knowledge ("science and
technology"), Dreyfus and Dreyfus implicitly link, I
propose, theoretical knowledge with cognitive theories of
knowledge.
Having argued that Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1996) tie
theoretical knowledge with cognitive theories of knowledge
and caring as an "understanding" of the patient's
perspective of life as a "higher kind of knowledge" with
Heidegger's non-cognitive theory is to say that the two
descriptions of the nurse's recognition I have shown
Dreyfus and Dreyfus to indicate, stand for two different
interpretations of the nurse's recognition.
In this chapter, I show, first, how Benner et al draw on
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1996) and describe two recognitions
of the nurse after her "qualitative" leap to the stages of
proficiency and expertise in relation with two aspects of
the patient: his clinical situation and his concerns. I
illustrate, second, the apparent plausibility of two
different descriptions of the nurse's recognition in
connection with two aspects of the patient.
Third, I elucidate how Benner et al offer one cognitive
interpretation of the nurse's recognition at the stages of
proficiency and expertise in that they add the notion of
caring to the condition which explains the nurse's
recognition at those stages. I discuss, fourth, how Benner
et al divide, in analogy with Benner and Wrubel (1989),
the patient into clinical situation and concerns and how,
from a non-cognitive interpretation of recognition, the
concerns of the patient are effected through the nurse's
recognition of the clinical situation of the patient.
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Two Descriptions
Benner et al who are specifically pointing out that they
draw on the chapter of Dreyfus and Dreyfus in Expertise in
Nursing Practice write:
We have theoretically made a distinction
between medical and nursing theory related
to science and existential caring skills
(see Chapter 2) (1996:160; emphasis mine).
Stating that they distinguish "theoretically" between
theoretical knowledge ("medical and nursing theory related
to science") and "existential caring skills", Benner et al
leave it to the reader to clarify the connection between
theoretical knowledge and "existential caring skills" with
their description of recognition after her "qualitative
leap" to proficiency: "skills of seeing" informed by her
practical knowledge and "caring practices".
The description of apparently two distinct recognitions of
the nurse is indicated when Benner et al claim, for
example, that the nurse's practice at the proficient stage
is "now" guided by recognizing the current "clinical"
situation of the patient based on her recognitions of
"similarities and differences" of "past clinical
situations", that is, her practical knowledge, and by
recognizing "trends and meanings" in the situation of the
patient: "Actions are now much more structured by the
perceptual grasp of similarities and differences of the
current and past clinical situations, and with perceived
trends and meanings in the patient's situation" (Benner et
al, 1996:115; emphasis mine).
The nurse's recognition of "trends and meanings" in the
situation of the patient as distinct from the nurse's
recognition of "similarities and differences" in the
clinical situation based on her practical knowledge seems
to be, for Benner et al, the sort of "caring practices"
which help the nurse to notice what is important in the
situation of the patient.
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They describe the nurse's recognition as "caring
practices" more specifically when they write: "The nurse
proficient in caring practices connects with a particular
patient and his or her concerns" (Benner et al, 1996:116).
The nurse who connects with the concerns of the patient
through her "caring practices" is able to recognize what
is important in the situation of the patient: "It is this
connection that enables the nurse to understand and
respond to what is salient in the situation" (Benner et
al, 1996:116).
The nurse's recognition of what is important in the
situation of the patient on the basis of her recognition
of the patient's concerns by way of connection through her
"caring practices" is brought out more clearly in relation
with a particular account of a nurse, considered to be at
the proficient stage. Benner et al conclude about this
nurse that: "In fact, it is the nurse's connection and
concern for the child that enables her to judge that the
treatment has become both excessive and futile"
(1996:133). They are saying that the nurse recognizes
through her "connection and concern for the child" the
concerns of the child and that this recognition of the
child's concerns "enables her to judge that the treatment
has become both excessive and futile". In other words, the
nurse has read the thoughts of the child; she established
a correspondence between her "caring practices" and the
concerns of the child as related to his treatment and,
therefore, she is able to pass a judgement about the
treatment as having become "excessive and futile".
On account of these examples, I suggest that Benner et al
describe two recognitions of the nurse after her
"qualitative leap" to proficiency, whereby each
recognition is related with a particular aspect of the
patient: "skills of seeing" informed by practical
knowledge for recognizing the clinical situation of the
patient and "caring practices" for recognizing the
concerns of the patient, while the nurse's recognition of
the patient's concerns is seen to enable the nurse to pass
a judgement about what is important in the situation of
the patient.
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Two Descriptions and Aspects Illustrated
The description of two recognitions of the nurse in
relation with two distinct aspects of the patient is
mirrored somewhat by an advanced beginner nurse who
differentiates in her account between her "organizational
skills" as well as her practices of "more technical
things" related to the "bodies" of the patient and her
"psychosocial skills" related to the human being of the
patient (in Benner et al, 1996: 264).
I want to illustrate with the first part of her account
how Benner et al's two descriptions of the nurse's
recognition for two aspects of the patient appear to be
plausible. This is the beginning of her report:
My organizational skills are really bad.
I'm playing catch-up. The psychosocial
gets put in the backdrop. The more
technical things that would take a more
experienced nurse less time will take me
half an hour to do, because I'm more
conscious of everything that could happen.
I am always making sure that what I am
doing is the right way .. The first month
practicing alone, I hardly ever used
psychosocial skills, just the basic
questions of: How are you doing? Are you
in pain? Do you know where you are?... I
am getting better with talking to the
patient and being a little more sociable,
because ... we forget that they're human,
and we just treat them like bodies (quoted
in Benner et al, 1996:264).
This nurse notices that her practices related to matters
of organization ("organizational skills") are "really bad"
("playing catch-up"). Yet she seems to be rather
conscientious about establishing a correspondence between
her knowledge of "everything that could happen" and her
practices (the "more technical things"); or between her
ideas about the "right way" and her practices ("what I am
doing").
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She appears to be saying "because" she is using so much
time for establishing a correspondence between her
knowledge and particular practices, she hardly engages in
the practice of talking with patients ("psychosocial
skills" get "put in the backdrop"). During her "first
month of practicing alone" she only asked patients "basic
questions", for example, "How are you doing? Are you in
pain?"
Not talking to patients is, in the opinion of this nurse,
"just" treating, that is, recognizing patients only like
"bodies". Recognizing the patient as a body only is, for
her, not treating the patient, that is, not recognizing
the patient as a human being ("we forget that they're
human").
Her understanding of recognizing (treating) the patient as
a human being requires, then, the achievement of both: her
recognition of the body of the patient including
particular practices and her recognition of the human
being of the patient through the practice of talking to
the patient.
She seems to be thinking that such recognition of the
patient as a human being is possible. Once she is going to
take "less time", that is, like "a more experienced
nurse", for her recognition of the body of the patient and
practices related with it, she will also recognize the
human being of the patient, that is, be able to talk to
the patient. She points out that: "I am getting better
with talking to the patient and being a little more
sociable".
I return now to the distinction Benner et al make between
two recognitions of the nurse: her "skills of seeing" and
practical knowledge and her "caring practices" and discuss
how the notion of caring gets added to the condition which
explains the nurse's recognition after her "qualitative
leap" to proficiency.
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One Interpretation of the Nurse's Recognition
Benner et al indicate quite clearly, how the nurse's
recognition in terms of her "caring practices" is, like
her "skills of seeing" and practical knowledge, from the
competent stage onwards, developed on the basis of her
emotions. They write:
the role of emotions in developing
perceptual acuity are related to
involvement in the clinical situation
(problem engagement) and in caregiving
involvement with the patient as person
(Benner et al, 1996:90; emphasis mine).
The nurse's recognition, developed as "perceptual acuity",
that is, her "skills of seeing", on the basis of her
emotions which are the condition of developing the nurse's
practical knowledge (see Chapter Seven), recognizes
("involvement") the clinical situation of the patient and
the "patient as a person", that is, the concerns of the
patient.
Benner et al would want to assert, I suggest, that the
nurse's emotions as the condition of developing the
nurse's "skills of seeing" and practical knowledge
develops also her "caring practices" (or "caregiving").
On the view that theories of knowledge are interpretations
rather than descriptions, I argue, that Benner et al only
add the notion of caring to the condition which explains
the nurse's recognition after her "qualitative leap" to
proficiency: the nurse's development of "skills of seeing"
and practical knowledge on the basis of the nurse's
emotions. The implication is that the assertion about a
correspondence between the nurse's recognition and the
situation of the patient at the proficient and expert
stage is now based on a cognitive principle which consists
of: the nurse's development of "skills of seeing" and
practical knowledge on the basis of the nurse's emotions
and caring.
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If one accepts that Benner et al's descriptions of the
nurse's recognition as "skills of seeing" informed by
practical knowledge and "caring practices" after her
"qualitative leap" to proficiency is one interpretation of
the nurse's recognition at the stages of proficiency and
expertise, then it is reasonable to say that Benner et al
divide the patient, in analogy with the division Benner
and Wrubel (1989) draw between disease and illness, into
clinical situation of the patient and concerns of the
patient.
In dividing the patient into clinical situation and
concerns of the patient, Benner et al add the concerns of
the patient to the nurse's recognition of the patient.
Benner et al are repeating, in this way, Abdellah's and
Roy's gesture of adding the "patient as a person" to the
'body' of the patient (Chapter Three).
Concerns of the Patient as an Effect
I have discussed in Chapter Eight how the nurse's
recognition of the patient's situation and her action in
response to it produce, in achieving a correspondence
("commonalities") with the situation of the patient, the
patient's recognition ("distinctions") in relation to it;
that is, the patient's perspective of the nurse's
recognition of his situation and her action in response to
it.
So when Benner and Wrubel claim that the nurse is able to
recognize both: the "disease experience" and illness as
"the meaning that the patient brings to that experience"
(1989:45), I suggest, that the "meaning" the patient
"brings" to his "disease" is brought to the patient
through the diagnosis of his particular disease. The
physician who establishes on the basis of his knowledge
"commonalities" with the situation of the patient,
recognizes (diagnoses) a particular disease and effects,
at the same time, the recognition the patient has of his
disease. The patient's recognition of his disease are the
"distinctions" brought to him through the physician's
recognition of his disease.
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Similarly, the nurse who establishes a correspondence
("commonalities") with the clinical situation of the
patient, effects the patient's recognition of it; the
patient's recognition of his clinical situation in
relation to the nurse's recognition of his clinical
situation are the patient's concerns. The concerns of the
patient are the "distinctions" the nurse's recognition of
his clinical situation produces from his perspective.
How the nurse's recognition of the patient's situation and
her action in response to it produces concerns
("distinctions") from the patient's perspective, I want to
underline with the second part of the nurse's account
which I have employed above.
This particular advanced beginner nurse continues her
report and describes how she is treating a patient who is
bleeding (according to Benner et al, a "gastrointestinal
bleed") by "lavaging", that is, washing the patient's
stomach (and intestine) through a special tube with "iced
normal saline". The nurse says:
I started lavaging with iced normal
saline, and at the same time, I was asking
my patient: 'Are you O.K. ? Are you
comfortable?'... I didn't forget about
her, in all my anxiety, that she was
bleeding. She wasn't bleeding as profusely
as my other patient was, and this bleeding
occurred in this middle of the shift
rather than at the end ... But what was
good about this patient is that I didn't
forget that she was a patient, and I was
talking to her, and it made me feel good
because I was so scared (quoted in Benner
et al, 1996:264; emphasis mine).
The nurse establishes a correspondence with the clinical
situation of the patient in terms of "bleeding" which
"occurred in this middle of the shift"; and she attempts
to achieve a particular correspondence between her
activity of washing the patient's stomach (and intestine)
with "iced normal saline" and the situation of the
patient: that the "bleeding" stops.
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Yet this nurse obviously tries to recognize both: the
clinical situation of the patient ("bleeding"), her action
in response to it ('washing the patient's stomach'), and
the concerns of the patient she effects with her action.
She "is asking" her patient "at the same time"; she says:
"Are you O.K.? Are you comfortable?" The nurse is aware
that her action informed by her knowledge produces the
patient's concerns with regard to what she is doing. She
demonstrates, I suggest, how her action, in attempting to
achieve a particular correspondence with the clinical
situation of the patient brings, at the same time,
concerns for the patient.
Asking the patient about her concerns (for example, "Are
you O.K.?"), this nurse, I propose, comes close to
enacting Orlando's idea of an action carried out
"deliberatively". She apparently tries to initiate an
exchange of recognitions with the patient in order to
accomplish a kind of correspondence with the woman about
the action in process and thus about the patient's
situation.
However, the nurse does not tell the answer of the
patient. This nurse illustrates, I argue, on the other
hand, that talking to the patient in the way she pointed
out in the first part of her account: "being a little more
sociable, because .. we forget that they are humans, and
we just treat them like bodies", is considered, by this
nurse, as treating the patient as a human being; that is,
having recognized the patient's concerns from his or her
perspective.
The point I wish to make is that 'talking' about the
concerns of the patient is assumed to correspond with the
concerns of the patient talked about. She says: "I didn't
forget about her, in all my anxiety, that she was
bleeding". She stresses again: "I didn't forget that she
was a patient, and I was talking to her". I am suggesting
here that the nurse thinks that her idea of treating the
"patient" corresponds with what the woman considers to be
treated as a "patient". The nurse seems to equate that
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'talking' which did her a lot of good ("and it made me
feel good because I was so scared") had the same impact on
the patient.
The purpose of asking the patient is, following Orlando,
to initiate an exchange of recognitions between nurse and
patient in order to accomplish a correspondence about the
situation of the patient. Such exchange of recognitions
between nurse and patient, I want to illustrate with an
account by another advanced beginner nurse.
Correspondence Accomplished
Benner et al present in the Chapters (1, 3-6) pertaining
to their study about an advance in the nurse's recognition
in Expertise in Nursing Practice about 120 accounts or
excerpts of accounts from nurses working in critical care
nursing. Among these accounts are a few examples in which
the nurse refers en passant to what the patient said in
relation to the nurse's recognition of his situation. This
particular example, however, is special. It is the only
one in which the nurse actually reports an exchange of
recognitions about the situation of the patient between
herself and the patient (see also Chapter Twelve).
The patient has passed an operation (Benner et al, 1996)
and finds himself with various 'tubes going in and out' of
his body. The patient asks several questions about these
tubes which the nurse tries to answer. This exchange of
question and answer between nurse and patient reveals how
the recognition of the situation of the patient of either
one constitutes the recognition of the other as
"distinctions" in relation to their own.
The patient is, for example, intubated ("E-T tube")
through his mouth. The nurse tells him that this tube is
"new" and that his "body naturally wants to cough it out".
For the patient this particular tube means a "sore" throat
and that he feels "like I'm choking". What is for the
nurse a chest tube, is for the patient not being able to
understand "why he had this low pain when he coughed".
From the nurse's perspective the patient gets "plenty of
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fluid" through his intravenous line. The patient, however,
is worried about being "dehydrated". This is her account:
So I went in and we (the patient and I)
spent the first hour and a half - I was
lucky to get his blood pressure taken and
the rest of his vital signs because he was
writing me so many notes and I had to hold
the piece of paper while he wrote. But it
ended up, all of his question were totally
legitimate. Like, 'Why is my throat sore?
I feel like I'm choking.' And I said 'No,
the tube's new and your body naturally
wants to cough it out. And it will get
more numb, probably about the time they
decide to take it out'. (Laughs) And that
helped. And I untied his hands and I had
him explore all his tubes. He also had a
chest tube and he couldn't understand why
he had this low pain when he coughed; why
it hurt down there. So I had him feel the
chest tube and I showed him where it went.
Then I had him feel his nose, because he
had a scratch on his nose. It was the
tape, so I had him feel his NG tube and
then the E-T tube in his mouth and so he
got to feel everything on his hand. ...
But he still was kind of panicky and asked
'Aren't I really dehydrated?' So I showed
him his IV line and took it down and said
'Look, you get bag after bag of this so
you're getting plenty of fluid.' And he
calmed down. ... And he wrote me a note
that everything was ok and that it really
helped, my telling him I would be back and
look after everything. And he was really
calm the rest of the night (quoted in
Benner et al, 1996:62-63).
This example shows how the recognitions of the patient
about his situation are brought about by being treated in
particular ways after an operation. The concerns
("distinctions") the postoperative treatment brings for
the patient are made known to the nurse by the patient. In
this case, the patient appears to have taken the
initiative by asking questions which produce the answers
of the nurse, that is, her recognitions of the situation,
to be "distinctions" of his own recognitions and vice
versa. Yet the talk that ensues between the two helps to
accomplish a kind of correspondence about the situation of
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the patient. The patient "wrote" the nurse a note telling
her "that everything was ok".
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CHAPTER TEN
"PATIENT AS A PERSON"
Introduction
The account of a nurse quoted below, Benner et al classify
as a "paradigm case". It illustrates for them:
The way in which a nurse's clinical
judgment is shaped by knowing the patient
as a person, and the caring practices that
allow a person to reveal himself to the
nurse (Benner et al, 1996:20)
In order to read their statement about the "paradigm
case", it is necessary to recall a discussion in the
preceding chapter. I then pointed out that Benner et al
describe two recognitions of the nurse after her
"qualitative leap" to the proficient and expert stage as
"skills of seeing" informed by practical knowledge and
"caring practices".
Yet contrary to what Benner et al indicate, I have shown
that they only add the notion of caring to the cognitive
principle upon which they already assert a correspondence
between the nurse's recognition at the proficient and
expert stage and the situation of the patient.
From this position, it can be said that this "paradigm
case" illustrates how the nurse's recognition of the
"patient as a person" (which is another way Benner et al
describe the concerns of the patient) is taken to
correspond with the "patient as a person".
I have also pointed out in the previous chapter that
Benner et al add, similar to Abdellah and Roy, the
"patient as a person" to the 'body', that is, the clinical
situation of the patient. In Chapter Three I have
discussed, moreover, how such 'adding on' increases the
nurse's resource of producing the patient's recognition
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(that is, with regard to his person as well as his
clinical situation) and, if she assumes a
'correspondence', of excluding the patient's recognition
from her recognition.
So when Benner et al claim that this "paradigm case"
illustrates how the nurse's recognition of the "patient as
a person" shapes her "clinical judgment" (that is, how the
nurse knows what is important in the situation of the
patient), I argue that the nurse who accepts such claim
excludes the patient's recognition of his person as well
as of his clinical situation from her recognition.
Benner et al introduce this particular "paradigm case" by
describing the patient as a black man, age 60, whose arms
and legs are paralysed ("quadriplegic"), and who has had
radical surgery on his neck for cancer in the past which
left him "disfigured". At present, he has an "infection"
which apparently caused his "respiratory failure". Benner
et al point out that the "health care team" made the
decision ("agonizing) to connect this patient with a
respirator "knowing" that he might be dependent on it as
long as he lives ("might be impossible to wean
him") (1996 :20) .
The nurse begins her account of the "paradigm case" by
indicating that a decision to treat this particular
patient "fully" had been made ("I think we could have made
a decision on not treating the patient fully"). The
judgement to treat the patient "fully" involved, I assume,
the decision about placing the patient on the respirator.
If this is so, then, how this decision was reached, is
difficult to discern from the nurse's report. On my
reading of the account, the nurse substantiates her
judgement about the decision to connect the patient with
the respirator which she seems to have been in support of
("And I really stood up for him") after the fact.
This is the nurse's account:
Nurse 1: I think we could have made a
decision on not treating him fully, based
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on what he looked like and what we thought
he was. And I really stood up for him. I
don't think some people ever got beyond
just looking at him and just saying: 'This
man is disfigured and not able to take
care of himself, and whatever.' As far as
prioritizing the beds, if we were really
strapped for beds, they would think about
putting him on general care and taking him
off the ventilator. But no one thought it
was an easy decision.
Int: It sounded like you had a strong
feeling that he wanted to live. How did
that come about and do you know when it
came about?
Nurse 1: I think he always had it. He was
an incredible fighter. I mean I would see
him angry or I would see him withdrawn.
But even withdrawn, he was actively
withdrawn. He wouldn't look at you. He
would follow you, track you in the room
and everything but then would look at you
... At one point in time the physicians
were asking him: 'You want to die, don't
you?' They weren't trying to do him any
harm. No one ever didn't take care of him.
He just gravitated towards these excellent
physicians. I don't know.
Int: What do you think was different
about the way you saw him versus the way
the doctors saw him when they thought that
he wanted to die?
Nurse 1: I don't think they stood with
him and looked at him or gave him a Pepsi,
or saw him watch the ball game. He really
derived a lot of pleasure from living ...
I think it was more of a case of their
perception of quality of life versus our
perceptions of George's quality of life
and as we got to know him more, and what
he was like at the skilled nursing
facility, (we concluded) that the quality
of life for him was really very good ...
They didn't see him as a social director
on his unit. He was a spokesperson for the
patients, he helped people who had alcohol
and drug poblems. He had a girlfriend
there who was also wheelchair-bound and
they used public tansportation together.
They were the Valentine King and Queen. I
think the doctors just looked at him and
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saw 'This is as good as it gets, and this
is really depressing, and he is really
depressed and so why continue? This is
torture. ' He was really a big baseball fan
and wanted to watch the ball games ... to
me that is not someone who has given up.
(Later in the same interview after
describing his active measures to control
his day, she comments) Somebody who is
that manipulative or that active in
planning my day is really not somebody who
doesn't want to have to deal with living
or doesn't have the strength to go on
(quoted in Benner et al, 1996:20-21).
In Benner et al's comment, following the nurse's account,
they point out that the communication with the patient was
almost "nonexistent". They write: "At one point in the
story the nurse tells how hard it was at first to learn to
read George's lips, to understand what he was saying"
(Benner et al,1996:21). They quote the nurse as saying
that the patient "would be saying, 'Ballgame, ballgame,
ballgame,' and I would ask: 'You need to have a bowel
movement?' Finally I understood 'ballgame'" (Benner et al,
1996:20). Apparently, once the patient had been put on the
respirator, the nurse first learns to read the lips of the
patient in order to understand, for example, that he said
'ballgame'. This nurse, evidently, made efforts to
communicate with the patient.
With this in mind, I wish to exemplify with the above
"paradigm case" how the nurse assumes her recognition of
the "patient as a person" to correspond with the "patient
as the person". The points I want to underline are, first,
how the nurse's certainty about such correspondence
dissolves the very necessity of talking to the patient
about her recognition of him as a person. Second, how the
nurse's certainty that her recognition of the "patient as
a person" is 'corresponding', excludes the patient's
recognition of his person as well as of his clinical
situation - which the nurse produced in the first place -
from her recognition. That is, Benner et al's assumption
that the nurse's recognition of the "patient as a person"
helps her to know what is important in the situation of
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the patient ("clinical judgement") helps the nurse who
adopts this view to create an almost total social distance
to the patient.
Finally, I show how the nurse's assumption that the
nurses " as opposed to the physicians" recognition of the
patient's "quality of life" to correspond with his
"quality of life" produces the physicians' recognition of
the patient's "quality of life" as "distinctions" from the
nurse's perspective - effecting a social distance between
nurses and physicians.
The Nurse's Certainty about the "patient as a person"
Prompted by the interviewer about how and when her "strong
feelings" that the patient "wanted to live" came about
(the implication being that she knew that the patient
wanted to be artificially ventilated), the nurse answers
as if her 'strong feelings' arose as a result of
recognizing the patient's 'strong feelings' about wanting
to live. She says: "I think he always had it. He was an
incredible fighter" (emphasis mine).
She describes how she saw the patient "angry" or "actively
withdrawn". The latter is for her, not looking at her and
tracking her in the room and "then would look at you". She
points out that she "stood with him and looked at him or
gave him a Pepsi". She "saw" him watching ball games. The
nurse concludes: "He really derived a lot of pleasure from
living". She appears to be certain that patient George
derives from life what she thinks he is getting from it:
pleasure.
The nurse makes it rather clear that her ideas about
patient George wanting to live with the respirator guide
her recognition about the patient. Somebody who is a
baseball fan and wants to watch those games is to her ("to
me") not someone "who has given up". Or, somebody who is
"manipulative" or actively "planning" her day is, for this
nurse, somebody who wants to "deal with living" or has the
"strength to go on".
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The nurse's certainty that patient George "always" had
"strong feelings" to live is underlined by how she reports
about the physicians actually "asking him: 'You want to
die, don't you?'". Her rather ambiguous description of
"these excellent physicians" towards whom the patient
"gravitated" gives her away that asking the patient
himself was something she not only seems not to have done
herself, but of which she seems to disapprove of.
She even 'protects' the physicians for having posed the
questions to the patient: "They weren't trying to do him
any harm. No one ever didn't take care of him". As if
asking the patient is not caring for the patient.
Significantly, the nurse does not report the reaction or
the answer of the patient when being confronted with the
question by the physicians which brought him into a
position to make a decision about his life in one way or
another.
For this nurse it does not seem necessary that the patient
is consulted whether he wants to continue with the
respirator or not. She is certain that her recognitions of
the patient represent his "strong feelings" about wanting
to live with that device for the rest of his life. The
nurse's certainty about her recognition of the "patient as
a person" to correspond with the "patient as a person"
makes the very necessity of exchanging her recognitions
with the patient absent from her recognition of the
patient.
How the clinical situation of the patient is made absent
through the nurse's recognition of the "patient as a
person" from her perspective can be highlighted in this
example with the fact that the description of the
patient's clinical situation is missing in the account of
the nurse. Apart from her statement that: "This man is
disfigured and not able to take care of himself, and
whatever", she makes no reference to the patient's
respiratory failure, his infection, his being ventilated,
his paralysis of his arms and legs ("quadriplegic"), his
cancer, or his status after a radical neck surgery (Benner
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et al, 1996). The nurse does not describe with a word that
she may have observed this patient being in physical
discomfort because of the respirator and so on.
But more importantly, the nurse's recognition of the
"patient as a person" which produces, simultaneously, the
patient's recognition with regard to it as well as with
regard to his clinical situation makes, if assumed to
correspond with the "patient as a person" (that is, for
Benner et al, "clinical judgement" or knowing what is
important in the situation of the patient) those
recognitions also absent from her recognition, effecting
an almost total social distance to the patient.
I want to illuminate with this "paradigm case", finally,
how the nurse's recognition of the patient's "quality of
life" produces the physicians' recognition of the
patient's "quality of life" as "distinctions" from the
nurse's perspective.
Further "distinctions"
When asked by the interviewer what she thinks "was
different" between the "way" the physicians recognized the
patient "when they thought that he wanted to die", the
nurse answers: "I think it was more of a case of their
perception of George's quality of life versus our
perceptions of George's quality of life" (emphasis mine).
The nurse describes how "our" perception, which I take to
be her perception and those of her nurse colleagues, of
the patient's "quality of life" were constituted in
contrast to the perception of physicians. She says, for
example: "I don't think they stood with him and looked at
him or gave him a Pepsi, or saw him watch the ballgame".
The nurse is saying that the recognition of nurses when
standing with the patient and looking at him, giving the
patient "a Pepsi", or seeing him watching the ballgame,
practices the physicians are obviously not engaging in, is
a different recognition than that of physicians. She
appears to assume that the recognition of nurses is
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informed through the "quality of life" the patient
displays to them on those occasions and over time. She
notes "and as we got to know him more, and what he was
like ... (we concluded) that the quality of life for him
was really very good" (emphasis mine).
This nurse does not seem to think that the recognition of
nurses, like that of physicians, is based on knowledge
and, therefore, constituting the "quality of life" the
patient is recognized to have. Her notion that it works
the other way around, the patient's "quality of life"
constituting the nurse's recognition, and because nurses
are standing with the patient and seeing him over time,
the recognition of nurses is implied to correspond with
the "quality of life" of patient George.
In contrast to the recognition of nurses, she describes
the "way" physicians recognize the patient's "quality of
life" as "just" looking: "I think the doctors just looked
at him and saw 'This is as good as it gets, and this is
really depressing, and he is really depressed and so why
continue. This is torture'". Apparently "just" looking
does not give the physicians the input about the "quality
of life" of the patient nurses obtain from standing with
him and looking at him. Indeed, she comes close to saying
that in order to recognize the "quality of life" of the
patient it is necessary to stand with him and look at him,
for example, when he watches the ballgame. She says: "I
don't think some people ever got beyond just looking at
him and just saying: 'this man is disfigured and not able
to take care of himself, and whatever'" (emphasis mine).
Assuming a correspondence between the nurses ' recognition
and the patient's "quality of life" and appearing to deny
such correspondence to exist between the physicians'
recognition and the patient's "quality of life", the nurse
establishes the physician's recognition of the patient's
"quality of life" as "distinctions" from the nurse's




ORLANDO'S 'SOLUTION' AND BENNER ET AL'S 'SOLUTION'
Introduction
One chapter in Expertise in Nursing Practice is written by
Rubin. Her intention is to describe "primarily" the
practice of a sample of nurses who were identified by
their supervisors or head nurses "to be safe, but not
superior practitioners" (Rubin, 1996:171). The aim of
selecting a group of nurses with the same amount of years
of experience as expert nurses (more than five), but
considered to be not experts, was to capture "variability"
of nurses' practice (Benner et al, 1996:XVII).
How the practice of experienced but not expert nurses
varies from that of expert nurses is exposed, according to
Rubin, in their language. Rubin writes: "expert nurses
speak a language of needs rather than wants" (1996:185;
emphasis mine). Rubin exemplifies a "language of needs"
with a statement from an account of a nurse, considered to
be an expert, about her work with dying patients. The
nurse says:
You sort of assess what that particular
family needs. And when you come into a
room, and if you're working with them for
a long time, it just sort of is happening,
what they need (quoted in Benner et al,
1996:186; emphasis by Rubin).
This nurse obviously assumes that her assessment
(recognition) of the family's "needs" corresponds with
what the family thinks to be their needs. This kind of
certainty about her recognition is, for Rubin, evident in
the nurse's "language of needs". The "use" of this
language indicates, in her opinion, the "ability" of
expert nurses "to engage with their patient" (Rubin,
1996:186; emphasis mine).
154
According to Benner et al, the nurse's recognition is
"engaged" after her "qualitative leap" to proficiency and
expertise (see Chapter Six). Benner et al assert that the
nurse's "engaged" recognition, that is, one informed by
the nurse's "skills of seeing" and practical knowledge,
corresponds with the situation of the patient.
So when Rubin notes that the expert nurses' "language of
needs" is an "indication of their ability to engage with
their patients" (emphasis mine), then, the "language of
needs" implies, for Rubin, I suggest, Benner et al's
assertion about the nurse's recognition at the expert
stage to correspond with the situation of the patient.
The nurse who assumes, for one reason or another, that her
recognition corresponds with the situation of the patient
recognized, is seen to express this assumption in a
"language of needs". She practices, in Rubin's opinion,
Benner et al's assertion that nurses at the expert stage
have developed the ability to establish a correspondence
with the situation of the patient in everyday work.
Rubin distinguishes the "language of needs" of expert
nurses from the "language of wants" of experienced but not
expert nurses. She writes:
On those rare occasions when they speak of
a patient needing something, they
invariably speak either of asking the
patient to tell them what they need or of
the patient's need to control their
emotions or behaviour without help from
the nurse (Rubin, 1996:186).
But what is wrong with nurses who have been practicing
critical care nursing for more than five years asking the
patient to tell them their "need"? Asking the patient to
tell his "need" indicates, for Rubin, that these nurses
"use the language of wants" which is "a way of disengaging
from their patients" (1996:186; emphasis mine).
I have discussed in Chapter Six that Benner et al
associate an "objective disengaged criterial" (emphasis
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mine) recognition with the nurse's recognition that is not
corresponding with the situation of the patient. In
particular, they assert that the advanced beginner nurse's
recognition informed by theoretical knowledge is 'not
corresponding', that is, "objective disengaged criterial".
The experienced but not expert nurse's way of "disengaging
from their patients" (emphasis mine) which she shows,
according to Rubin, in a "language of wants" (or when the
nurse is asking the patient to tell his "need") implies
for Rubin, then, Benner et al's assertion about the
nurse's "objective disengaged criterial" recognition as
'not corresponding'.
That is, nurses who do not assume that their recognition
corresponds with the situation of the patient, show this
assumption in a "language of wants". These nurses are not
seen to endorse Benner et al's assertion that the nurse
develops a 'corresponding' ("engaged") recognition. These
experienced but not expert nurses have, as implied by
Rubin, not progressed from the advanced beginner to the
expert stage.
The difference between expert nurse and experienced but
not expert nurse is, then, according to Rubin, that the
former assumes a 'correspondence' and reveals this
assumption in a "language of needs". In contrast to the
experienced but not expert nurse , who does not assume a
'correspondence'. She expresses this assumption in a
"language of wants".
If one accepts that the expert nurse practices Benner et
al's assertion about 'correspondence' in everyday work, as
noted above, then the experienced but not expert nurse can
be seen, I suggest, to enact Orlando's idea of
"exploration" which implies that the nurse's recognition
is 'not corresponding'; and which considers an exchange of
recognitions between nurse and patient to be the condition
of accomplishing a kind of correspondence about the
situation of the patient and the action to be followed.
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On the view that the experienced but not expert nurse
achieves Orlando's idea of "exploration" (non-cognitive
and minimal cognitive interpretation) and the expert nurse
Benner et al's assertion about a 'corresponding'
recognition (cognitive interpretation) in everyday work,
my interest, as stated in the Introduction, is to show how
Orlando's 'solution' to the uncertainty of the nurse's
recognition differs from Benner et al's 'solution' to the
uncertainty of the advanced beginner nurse's recognition.
To this end, I turn to Rubin's discussion of an example
which Rubin qualifies to be a "paradigm case" of the
practice of experienced but not expert nurses. Rubin is of
the opinion that this nurse makes two "very important"
assumptions about a particular patient. On the basis of
the assumptions the nurse is thought to have made, Rubin
discusses the difference between the practice of
experienced but not expert nurses and expert nurses.
Since Rubin does not present the "paradigm case" 'in one
piece', I will state, first, some parts of the nurse's
account about a particular patient in order to orientate
the reader about the situation of this patient. Second, I
present one assumption this experienced but not expert
nurse has made, according to Rubin. In connection with
Rubin's discussion of this assumption, I draw out, third,
the crucial difference between Orlando's 'solution' and
Benner's 'solution' concerning the uncertainty of the
nurse's recognition.
The Situation of the Patient
This particular nurse was asked by the interviewer to
describe "a clinical situation that is vivid to you, that
you remember" (1996:172). Following Rubin, the nurse
responds in the following way:
Ivll tell one that I'm sure you've heard
before about someone who ... was admitted
on a Saturday and had a chronic illness
and was elderly and had lost her home and
was being asked to move into a nursing
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home and she had to give up her pets and
so on. And by Sunday, she .. had changed
her mind, was ready to die and was dying
and there wasn't a lot that could be done
to prevent it anyway unless she wanted to
be intubated and have a long course and
probably die anyway, and opted not to be
intubated and to take - what did she take?
- some minor Valium or something. I've
forgotten what, and stopped breathing,
basically. That to me was vivid, (quoted
in Benner et al, 1996:172).
The nurse tells about an elderly patient with a "chronic
illness" who is admitted on a Saturday, I assume, to a
critical care unit. This patient "had lost her home" which
appears to imply that the patient had already moved "into
a nursing home" and had already given up "her pets and so
on" when she was admitted to the hospital.
On the day after her admission, Sunday, this patient is
described to have "changed her mind"; that is, the patient
is recognized by the nurse as "ready to die and was
dying".
In order to get an idea about this "change" in the
patient's mind it is helpful to read how the nurse
describes the patient's breathing after the "respiratory
treatment" had been stopped (at least that is my
understanding of the excerpt). The nurse says:
A lot of difficulty breathing .. She was
extremely short of breath; she was
cyanotic; she was using her head to
breathe and her neck to breathe, and her
belly to breathe; and she was contracted
such that there wasn't a lot of motion to
begin with. So every word was an effort ..
It was sort of the respiratory treatment
that was supporting her through Saturday.
So as soon as she quit and made that
decision to stop that, then she started
getting really uncomfortable and
deteriorating even more quickly (as quoted
in Benner et al, 1996:181).
So the events appear to have evolved from the patient
being admitted on Saturday, then receiving some sort of
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"respiratory treatment" (which was not an artificial
respiration in terms of an intubation) until sometime on
Sunday, when the patient, according to the nurse, "had
changed her mind, was ready to die and was dying". The
nurse underlines how close she thought that the patient
was to her dying when she says:
I mean, there wasn't anything, unless,
unless, she was intubated .. there was
just nothing, no place for her to go. She
was going anyway As soon as she
even, if she just got tired and fell
asleep on her own, I knew that would be
the last time she fell asleep. She just
looked terrible (as quoted in Benner et
al, 1996:188).
In order to discuss that this account presents the
practice of experienced but not expert nurses, Rubin
analyses two assumptions this nurse makes about the
situation of the patient. I present one of these
assumptions.
The Nurse's Assumption
For Rubin, one of the assumptions this nurse makes is
"that the patient has decided not to struggle with issues
of living in her new setting"; the nurse is seen to arrive
at this assumption although she "admits" that she has no
"direct knowledge of the patient's having made the
decision to discontinue the treatments that were keeping
her alive" (Rubin, 1996:174). Rubin points out that the
nurse says, for example, "I don't know how she came to it"
(quoted in the excerpt below); Rubin emphasizes: "She does
not even seem to have indirect knowledge, such as reports
from others who were present, that this was, in fact, the
woman's decision" (1996:174).
Rubin supports the assumption the nurse is seen to have
made with the following excerpt of the nurse's account:
Nurse: She had lived up until that time in
her home and was very active in the
community, and had a lot of friends and
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support, but over the years that just sort
of dwindled. And I was just struck with
the rapidity of how quickly she changed
her mind, but how at the same time she
remained trustworthy, I guess, in her
decision.
Int.: But when you say, "changed her
mind," she changed her mind from what to
what?
Nurse: She changed her mind from
struggling with the issues of how to live
in her new setting without her furniture,
without her pets, without her former
support group, uh, to deciding not to
live.
Int.: Do you know how she came to go
through that transition? Did she verbalize
to you at all or did she talk to anybody
else about it?
Nurse: No. I don't know how she came to
it. I'm sure that it was not news to her
that she was chronically ill and had to
make some decisions. And I wasn't there, I
don't think I was there when the actual
change occurred. I mean, one day she was
wanting to struggle, could barely breathe
and so on. You know, frequent blood gasses
and all the treatments and she was, you
know, frustrated that she couldn't rest
and the next day she had pretty much
decided. So I guess it happened when I
wasn't there. I don't think I had a lot to
do with it. I think she had everything to
do with it (quoted in Benner et al,
1996:174; emphasis mine).
Rubin explains her reading of the account that the nurse
assumed "that the patient has decided not to struggle with
issues of living in her new setting" further when she
writes, for example: "this nurse makes no attempt to find
out the meaning, for this specific patient, of leaving her
home, her support group, her pets, and so on" (1996:173-
174) .
In connection with this particular assumption the
experienced but not expert nurse is seen to have made,
Rubin discusses the "meaningfull distinctions" this nurse
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should have, in Rubin's opinion, noticed. This discussion
about "meaningful distinctions" I utilize to show how
Orlando's 'solution' concerning the uncertainty of the
nurse's recognition differs from Benner's 'solution'.
The Crucial Difference
In drawing out the "meaningful distinctions" which are
missing from this experienced but not expert nurse's
account, Rubin states: "First of all this nurse makes no
meaningful distinctions between different patients"
(1996:175). Stressing her point that this experienced but
not expert nurse does not distinguish between "different"
patients, Rubin says: "Another way of putting this is that
the idea that their patients have individual, subjective
experiences of and understandings of their situations
seems to be completely unavailable to them"(1996:176;
emphasis mine). So what is the nurse to do in order to
recognize the "individual, subjective" experience and
"understandings" this particular patient has of her
situation 'leaving her home'?
What Rubin would have wanted this experienced but not
expert nurse to do is, to have recognized the patient's
information in terms of her knowledge which she should
have developed during her experience of more than five
years of critical care nursing. Rubin writes:
Presumably, a nurse with this number of
years in critical care would have taken
care of many elderly patients who had been
in situations similar to that of this
patient. One would expect that, on the
basis of this experience, she would
recognize that patients experience this
situation in many different ways. Her
recognition, for example, that other
patients have been able to find their
lives worth living despite their having to
undergo such a major upheaval, might allow
her to see her patient's current despair
as one possible response, rather than the
only possbile response, to her situation.
This would both allow her to empathize
with the patient 's perspective and to
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offer alternatives (1996:175; emphasis
mine).
The claim of Rubin is that the experienced but not expert
nurse's recognition of the patient's situation 'leaving
her home', if it would have been informed by her practical
knowledge (that is, her knowledge of "many elderly"
patients in a similar situation to that of this particular
patient), it would have allowed her to "empathize" with
and to offer "alternatives" to this patient.
To put it differently, Rubin implies that the expert
nurse, because of her practical knowledge of "many
elderly" patients, would have recognized the situation of
this particular patient and offered her "alternatives".
That is, following Benner et al's cognitive interpretation
of the expert nurse's recognition, the expert nurse can
assume that her recognition of the patient's situation of
'leaving her home' in terms of her knowledge of "many
elderly" patients corresponds (emphathizes) with the
situation of this particular patient.
From the view of Orlando's non-cognitive interpretation of
recognition, however, the expert nurse's recognition of
this particular patient in terms of her knowledge of "many
elderly" patients is seen to produce, simultaneously, the
patient's recognition in relation to the expert nurse's
recognition; that is, the patient's recognition as
informed by her "individual, subjective" experience and
"understandings" (Rubin, 1996) of 'leaving her home'
offers "alternatives" to the expert nurse's recognition
informed by her knowledge of "many elderly" patients.
Yet the expert nurse's certainty about a correspondence of
her recognition with the situation of this particular
patient dissolves, I propose, the very necessity of an
exchange of recognitions with this patient about 'leaving
her home'. Instead, it excludes the patient's "individual,
subjective" experience and "understandings" of 'leaving
her home' as "alternatives" to the expert nurse's
knowledge of "many elderly" patients from her recognition.
162
This exclusion of the patient's "individual, subjective
experience" and "understandings" of 'leaving her home'
from the expert nurse's recognition effects the social
distance between the expert nurse and this particular
patient.
On the other hand, Orlando's minimal cognitive
interpretation of the nurse's recognition which suggests
an exchange of recognitions between nurse and patient
implies that the experienced but not expert nurse, offers
the patient the opportunity to articulate her "individual,
subjective" experience and "understandings" of 'leaving
her home' ("alternatives") in relation to the nurse's
recognition based on her knowledge of "many elderly"
patients in order to accomplish a kind of correspondence
between nurse and patient about the patient's situation as
the precondition of deciding about the action to be
followed "deliberatively". The experienced but not expert
nurse creates, in this was, the possibility of decreasing
a social distance between nurse and patient.
The crucial difference between Orlando's 'solution' and
Benner et al's 'solution' concerning the uncertainty of
the nurse's recognition is, then, that the former suggests
while the latter dissolves the necessity of exchanging
recognitions between nurse and patient as the possibility
of accomplishing a sort of correspondence about the





Cognitive and Non-coanitive Theories of Knowledge
The claim of this thesis is that the nurse's recognition
is not corresponding with the situation of the patient.
This is the case regardless of whether the nurse is
informed by her "skills of seeing" and practical
knowledge, learned in everyday work, or by her theoretical
knowledge, learned in nursing school. This claim accepts
the position of non-cognitive theories of knowledge, for
example, Derrida's. In non-cognitive theories, the
person's recognition of objects is uncertain. This
position is opposed to cognitive theories which claim that
a correspondence between person and object is certain.
My interest was to show how the nurse's certainty about a
correspondence between her recognition as informed by her
knowledge and the situation of the patient in everyday
work excludes the patient's recognition from her
recognition. The effect is the creation of a social
distance between herself and the patient. Another aim was
to show how the nurse's uncertainty about a correspondence
allows nurse and patient to exchange their recognitions.
Such exchange, understood as the possibility of
accomplishing a kind of correspondence, decreases a social
distance between the two.
Achieving these aims involved an explication of how
Orlando's (1961) idea of "exploration" as an exchange of
recognitions between nurse and patient about the situation
of the patient implies a non-cognitive interpretation of
the nurse's recognition (Chapter Two). Orlando's idea of
"exploration", I have argued, constitutes, on the other
hand, a minimal cognitive interpretation; it states an
exchange of recognitions between nurse and patient as the
condition of accomplishing a kind of correspondence about
the patient's situation. Orlando's notion of the nurse's
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action decided upon "deliberatively" has been considered,
furthermore, as the enactment of Orlando's non-cognitive
and minimal cognitive interpretation of recognition; while
her notion of "automatic" actions are understood as the
enactment of the claim raised by cognitive interpretations
of recognition.
In Chapter Three I have elucidated how Johnson's (1974)
idea of reformulating "borrowed" theory into a science
unique to nursing constitutes conceptions of nursing of
individual nursing theorists as cognitive principles upon
which the assertion about a correspondence between the
nurse's recognition informed by a particular conception of
nursing and the situation of the patient can be made.
I have exemplified how the nurse's recognition when based
on Abdellah's (1960) conception of nursing of 'the whole
patient' in terms of "biological, physical and social-
psychological" nursing problems is not corresponding with
'the whole patient' or when based on Roy's (1984)
conception of the person as a holistic adaptive system is
not corresponding with the person as a holistic adaptive
system. That is, I have shown how the nurse's recognition,
for example, of the patient's "biological, physical"
nursing problems effects, simultaneously, the patient's
recognition of his "biological, physical" and of his
"social-psychological" nursing problems.
Moreover, I have pointed out, how Abdellah's conception of
nursing adds the "patient as a person" in terms of
"social-psychological" nursing problems to the disease
condition of the patient (or "biological, physical"
nursing problems), while Roy's conception adds the person
of the patient in terms of a cognator subsystem to the
"biological organism" of the person (or a regulator
subsystem). Such 'adding on' of the "patient as a person"
is only increasing the nurse's knowledge as the condition
of producing the patient's recognition of his situation.
Importantly, if the nurse assumes her recognition to
correspond with the situation of the patient, she excludes
the patient's recognition from her recognition and
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creates, in this way, a social distance between herself
and the patient.
I have discussed in Chapter Four how Dreyfus and Dreyfus
(1996) explain the person's acquisition of intuitive skill
in terms of the person's brain processes. This means that
Dreyfus and Dreyfus presuppose a physiological principle
as the condition of explaining that the nurse's
recognition at the proficient and expert stage corresponds
with the situation of the patient. Yet I have argued that
the brain processes are themselves effects of the person's
recognition. If this is so, then a physiological principle
as the condition of possibility of explaining the person's
skill acquisition is also its condition of impossibility.
I have further argued that a study about the nurse's skill
acquisition, following Dreyfus and Dreyfus, would require
physiological accounts of the nurse's brain processes.
These physiological accounts would be necessary in order
to validate the acquisition of an ability the nurse's
brain displays at the proficient and expert stage; that
is, an ability the nurse's brain did not possess at the
advanced beginner stage.
I have elucidated how Benner et al's study of the nurse's
skill acquisition, following Dreyfus and Dreyfus, is based
on cognitive accounts of the nurse's 'brain processes'.
The point is that Benner et al exchange a physiological
principle as presupposed by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1996)
with a cognitive principle in order to explain the nurse's
skill acquisition.
In Chapter Five I have elucidated how, for Benner et al,
cognitive and non-cognitive theories of knowledge are
descriptions rather than interpretations of the nurse's
recognition. This understanding of Benner et al has the
consequence that the claims of theories of knowledge are
inverted: a non-cognitive theory describes, for them, the
nurse's recognition as 'corresponding'; while a cognitive
theory describes the nurse's recognition as 'not
corresponding'.
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On this analysis, I have argued that Benner et al's
understanding of theories of knowledge to be descriptions
instead of interpretations is their raison d'etre for
rejecting the claim of cognitive theories of knowledge
with regard to the advanced beginner nurse's recognition
and theoretical knowledge; this rejection is, in turn, the
raison d'etre of their conception about a progression in
the nurse's recognition from the advanced beginner stage
to the stage of expertise.
These arguments I have substantiated in Chapter Six. I
have discussed how Benner et al's understanding of a
"Cartesian view" (cognitive theories of knowledge)
describes the person's, in particular the advanced
beginner nurse's recognition and theoretical knowledge to
be "objective, disengaged, criterial", that is, as not
corresponding with the situation of the patient; and I
have explicated how Benner et al reject the claim about a
correspondence between person and object as put forward by
cognitive theories of knowledge with regard to the
advanced beginner nurse's recognition and theoretical
knowledge from nursing school in everyday practice.
I have elucidated how Benner et al conceptualize the
nurse's development of "skills of seeing" and practical
knowledge as the condition upon which the assertion about
a correspondence of the nurse's recognition at the
proficient and expert stage with the situation of the
patient can be made; that is, how they re-constitute a
cognitive principle and how their assertion about a
'correspondence' at those stages repeats the claim of
cognitive theories of knowledge.
On Benner et al's understanding of a "Cartesian view", the
person establishes "similarities" and "differences" with
objects in the world. Further, they demand that the nurse
must recognize "commonalities" and "distinctions" with the
situation of the patient. Taking these matters together, I
have illustrated how Benner et al repeat the claim of a
"Cartesian view" (cognitive theories of knowledge) by
asserting that the nurse's recognition of "commonalities"
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corresponds with the situation of the patient at the
proficient and expert stage.
In contrast to this assertion about a 'correspondence', I
have illustrated how the nurse's recognition of
"commonalities" with the situation of the patient effects
"distinctions", that is, the nurse's practical knowledge.
I have emphasized that a non-cognitive theory of knowledge
explains how the nurse's practical knowledge
("distinctions") in everyday work comes about. The
implication is that a non-cognitive theory of knowledge
disintegrates the condition (the nurse's development of
"skills of seeing" and practical knowledge) from which
Benner et al derive their claim about an advance in the
nurse's recognition in terms of stages from advanced
beginner to expertise; that is, a progression from an
"objective, disengaged, criterial" recognition (not
corresponding) to an "engaged" recognition
(corresponding).
In Chapter Seven I have pointed out that Benner et al take
"our Cartesian legacy" (theories of knowledge with a
cognitive principle) to separate the person's emotion from
knowledge in a concrete sense and that this separation
entails, for them, a distrust in "emotional language".
In connection with Benner et al's rendering of "our
Cartesian legacy", I have argued two points: one is that
Benner et al consider the advanced beginner nurse's
emotions and theoretical knowledge to be separate; the
other is that they consider their conception about an
advance in the nurse's recognition to describe how the
nurse's emotions and practical knowledge become mutually
constitutive from the competent stage onwards.
I have elucidated how the understanding of Benner et al of
"our Cartesian legacy" of separating emotion from
knowledge in a concrete sense is not Vetlesen's (1994) in
that his theory of moral perception assumes a 'givenness'
of the person's mutuality of emotions and knowledge which
he conceives in a particular way.
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Benner et al's understanding of "our Cartesian legacy" of
separating the person's knowledge and emotions involves a
distrust in "emotional language". Since Benner et al
conceive the advanced beginner nurse's emotions and
theoretical knowledge to be separate, Benner et al, I have
claimed, distrust the "emotional language" of advanced
beginner nurses. This claim I have explicated by revealing
how Benner et al refuse to acknowledge the advanced
beginner nurse's mutuality of emotions and knowledge as
displayed in their language.
I have shown how Benner et al disclose their trust in the
"emotional language" of nurses from the competent stage
onwards by asserting that the nurse's recognition
corresponds with the situation of the patient. This
assertion implies, for Benner et al, that the nurse's
emotions and practical knowledge have become mutually
constitutive.
On the view that theories of knowledge are interpretations
rather than descriptions of the nurse's recognition, I
have noted that Benner et al add the nurse's emotions to
the condition (the nurse's development of "skills of
seeing and practical knowledge on the basis of the nurse's
emotions) which explains the advance in the nurse's
recognition. Benner et al's assertion that the nurse's
recognition is "qualitatively" different from the advanced
beginner nurse's recognition informed by theoretical
knowledge because it is based on the nurse's "skills of
seeing" and practical knowledge is, therefore, seen to
repeat the claim of cognitive theories of knowledge.
I have explicated how Benner et al assert that the nurse's
recognition in terms of "commonalities" and "distinctions"
corresponds with the situation of the patient; I have
explicated further how Benner et al correlate the nurse's
recognition of "commonalities" and "distinctions"
respectively with notions of good and not good; and I have
illustrated how, for Benner et al, the nurse's development
of practical knowledge through recognitions of
"commonalities" as good and "distinctions" as not good is
169
the development of the nurse's ethical knowledge in that
sense.
Opposed to these assertions of Benner et al, I have
exemplified how the nurse's recognition in establishing
"commonalities" with the situation of the patient effects
"distinctions" from her perspective and that, on this
view, the correlation of notions of good and not good
respectively with the nurse's recognition of
"commonalities" and "distinctions" is rather uncertain.
In Chapter Eight I have discussed how the nurse at the
proficient and expert stage is claimed to be able to
integrate her "practical" concern (such as, the
performance of a particular procedure) and her "ethical"
concern (such as, the suffering of the patient after the
performance of that procedure) on the basis of her
practical knowledge. According to Benner et al, the nurse
at the proficient and expert stage achieves this
integration of her "practical" and "ethical" concerns by
foreseeing the "ethical" concern (for example, the
patient's suffering after the operation) in order to
prevent the performance of a particular procedure as the
'cause' of the nurse's "ethical" concern.
In contrast to Benner et al's idea that the nurse develops
this particular ability of integrating "ethical" and
"practical" concerns on the basis of her practical
knowledge, I have argued that the nurse's "ethical"
concern is effected through the performance of a
particular procedure ("practical" concern).
In order to underline how the expert nurse's certainty
that her recognition of the patient's situation and her
action in response to it correspond with the patient's
situation and the action needed by it, I have recalled
Orlando's idea of "exploration" in Chapter Eight.
According to Orlando's idea of "exploration", the nurse's
recognition produces the recognition of the patient in
relation to it (non-cognitive interpretation); while the
exchange of recognitions between nurse and patient is the
condition of accomplishing a kind of correspondence about
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the situation of the patient (minimal cognitive
interpretation).
This accomplishment of a correspondence is, for Orlando,
the precondition of deciding about the action to be
followed "deliberatively". I have also reiterated that
Orlando's idea of an "automatic" action can be considered
as the enactment of the claim about a correspondence as
raised by cognitive theories of knowledge and that such an
enactment excludes the patient's recognition from the
nurse's recognition in that it prevents an exchange of
recognitions between nurse and patient effecting a social
distance between the two.
On this account, I have argued that Benner et al's notion
of an "intuitive" link between the nurse's recognition and
action at the expert stage is an automatic action. It
obliterates the very moment that the nurse could "foresee"
the "ethical implications" of her actions from her
perspective; or, that she could initiate an exchange of
recognitions with the patient about his situation and the
action to be followed.
I have exemplified how the exclusion of the patient's
recognition from the expert nurse's recognition is
enhanced when the performance of those automatic actions
involves the "physical closeness" and "co-operation"
(Bauman, 1989) of nurses and physicians.
In Chapter Nine I have shown how two different
recognitions of the nurse: care, as "understanding" the
patient's perspective of life that is a "higher kind of
knowledge", following Heidegger, and the nurse's
recognition of the "body" of the patient based on
theoretical knowledge, which Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1996)
indicate (in relation with the division of the patient
into disease and illness by Benner and Wrubel (1989) and
their claim that the nurse is able to recognize both)
denote two interpretations of recognition as
conceptualized by Heidegger's non-cognitive theory of
knowledge and by cognitive theories of knowledge.
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I have noted that Benner et al (1996), drawing on Dreyfus
and Dreyfus (1996), distinguish "theoretically" between
theoretical knowledge and "existential caring skills".
This distinction, I have shown, turns up in their study as
two distinct descriptions of the nurse's recognition after
her "qualitative leap" to proficiency. Benner et al
describe each recognition in connection with a particular
aspect of the patient: "skills of seeing" and practical
knowledge with regard to the clinical situation of the
patient and "caring practices" with regard to the concerns
of the patient. I have illustrated with an account of a
nurse how Benner et al's description of two recognitions
in relation with two different aspects of the patient
appears to make sense.
On the view that theories of knowledge are
interpretations, I have discussed that Benner et al only
add the notion of caring to the condition which explains
the nurse's recognition after her "qualitative leap" to
proficiency in the first place. Their assertion about a
correspondence between the nurse's recognition at the
proficient and expert stage is derived from a cognitive
principle which comprises the nurse's development of
"skills of seeing" and practical knowledge on the basis of
the nurse's emotions and caring.
From the position that Benner et al present one
interpretation of the nurse's recognition at the stages of
proficiency and expertise, I have argued that Benner et al
divide the patient, in accordance with the division Benner
and Wrubel (1989) draw between disease and illness, into
clinical situation of the patient and concerns of the
patient. I have pointed out that Benner et al add, through
this division, the concerns of the patient to the nurse's
recognition of the clinical situation of the patient. They
reiterate, in this way, Abdellah's and Roy's 'adding on'
of the "patient as a person" to the 'body' of the patient.
I have illustrated with an example how the nurse's
recognition of the clinical situation of the patient and
her action in relation to it, effect, in establishing
"commonalities" with the clinical situation of the
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patient, "distinctions"; that is, the patient's
recognition in relation to the nurse's recognition of the
patient's situation and action in response to it. On this
view, I have exemplified how an exchange of recognitions
between nurse and patient constitutes the condition of
possibility of accomplishing a correspondence between
nurse and patient about the situation of the patient.
In relation with a "paradigm case", I have explicated in
Chapter Ten how the nurse's certainty about her
recognition of the "patient as a person" to correspond
with the "patient as a person" dissolves the very
necessity of talking to the patient in the sense of
exchanging recognitions about the "patient as a person"
with the patient. I have argued further that Benner et
al's assertion that the nurse's recognition of the
"patient as a person" helps her to shape her "clinical
judgment"(to know what is important in the situation of
the patient) helps the nurse who adopts this position to
create an almost total social distance to the patient.
I have also shown in Chapter Ten how the nurse's
assumption about the nurses ' recognition in contrast to
the physicians' recognition of the patient's "quality of
life" to correspond with the patient's "quality of life",
produces the physicians' recognition of the patient's
"quality of life" as "distinctions" from the nurse's
perspective, thereby, effecting a social distance between
nurses and physicians.
In Chapter Eleven I have discussed how, for Rubin (1996),
the expert nurse assumes a 'correspondence' and reveals
this assumption in a "language of needs". This is, on
Rubin's analysis, in contrast to the experienced but not
expert nurse, who apparently does not assume a
'correspondence'. The experienced but not expert nurse is
seen to express her assumption in a "language of wants".
On Rubin's analysis, I have taken the expert nurse to
enact the assertion of Benner et al's cognitive
interpretation of the nurse's recognition at the expert
stage; that is, Benner et al's 'solution' to the
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uncertainty of the advanced beginner nurse's recognition
informed by her theoretical knowledge from nursing school;
and I have taken the experienced but not expert nurse to
enact the claims of Orlando's idea of "exploration" (non-
cognitive and minimal cognitive interpretation of the
nurse's recognition).
I have drawn out the crucial difference between Orlando's
'solution' and Benner et al's 'solution' concerning the
uncertainty of the nurse's recognition of the patient's
situation: while the view of the former allows for an
exchange of recognitions between nurse and patient in
order to accomplish a correspondence about the situation
of the patient as the precondition of an action decided
upon "deliberatively"; the view of the latter makes an
exchange of recognitions between nurse and patient about
his or her situation unnecessary. In other words: Benner
et al's 'solution', creates a social distance between
nurse and patient; while Orlando's 'solution' offers the
possibility of decreasing such distance.
Returning to From Novice to Expert
At the beginning of this thesis I quoted Benner et al who
have stated the response of nurses around the world to
From Novice to Expertise, that is, "to that account of
gaining clinical expertise" (1996:XIII), that is,
practical knowledge.
If one considers the nurses' response in the light of
Expertise in Nursing Practice as an extension of Benner's
(1984) first study and of its discussion in this thesis,
then Benner et al are implying that nurses worldwide
assume that their recognition of the situation of the
patient in terms of theoretical knowledge they learn in
nursing school is not corresponding with the situation of
the patient.
If theories of knowledge are taken to be interpretations
of the person's recognition and if theorizing recognition
has moved from a cognitive to a non-cognitive
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interpretation, then nurses who are uncertain about their
recognition of the situation of the patient as informed by
their theoretical knowledge from nursing school would
support the latter. Nurses who have been practicing
critical care nursing for more than five years and who are
still 'using' the "language of wants", that is, asking the
patient to tell his "need" (Rubin, 1996) would be further
supporting the claim of a non-cognitive interpretation of
recognition. Even Benner et al cannot help but note "that
experts made disclaimers about 'never' being certain
(1996:121; emphasis mine).
On the other hand, if the response of nurses "all over the
world" to Benner's (1984) account of practical knowledge
("clinical expertise") is considered on Benner et al's
(1996) conception about the nurse's recognition acquiring
the ability to read the situation of the patient, which is
to say, that her recognition at the proficient and expert
stage is asserted to correspond with the situation because
it is informed by her practical knowledge rather than her
theoretical knowledge, then, these nurses adopt, on
account of the discussion in this thesis, implicitly or
explicitly, the view of a cognitive interpretation of
recognition. This thesis has shown how the nurse's
certainty about a correspondence between her recognition
and the situation of the patient distances the patient
from the nurse by excluding his recognition from the
nurse's recognition.
Yet Orlando's (1961) idea of "exploration" offers a
solution in that an exchange of recognitions between nurse
and patient provides the possibility of decreasing a
social distance between nurse and patient through the
accomplishment of a correspondence about the situation of
the patient in everyday work.
If one accepts Orlando's idea of an "exploration" as a
condition of accomplishing a correspondence between nurse
and patient, then Benner and her colleagues make, from my
point of view, a substantial contribution to the
discussion of such condition, since their work engages
specifically with epistemological issues of the nurse's
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recognition and differs, in this respect, from Orlando's
study.
Benner and her colleagues differ also from a nursing
theorist like Johnson (Chapter Three) who is interested in
reformulating "borrowed" theory unique to nursing.
Instead, Benner and her colleagues utilize 'borrowed'
theory. For example, Benner (1984) draws on theories of
knowledge, such as Heidegger's and Gadamer's, in order to
point out that the nurse's recognition informed by
theoretical knowledge ("theory") is "challenged, refined,
or disconfirmed by the actual situation" (1984:3), that
is, not corresponding with the situation of the patient.
This is the reason which, to my understanding, justifies
Kesselring's (1997) statement about From Novice to Expert
being a "milestone". According to Kesselring, it is
considered as "one of the most important contributions to
the philosophic scientific understanding of contemporary
nursing" (my translation, I.V.). ("Das Werk gilt als einer
der wichtigsten Beitrdge zum philosophisch-
wissenschaftlichen Verstdndnis der zeitgenbssischen
Krankenpflege" (Kesselring, 1997:11).
That Benner's (1984) study constitutes a milestone in
nursing theory has already been pointed out by Latimer
(1993) in the context of discussing the methodology
underpinning her research. Benner's interpretation of
nurses' accounts, a "bottom down approach" of developing
nursing knowledge, is seen to be a "radical shift from the
normative top down approach to reforming clinical practice
represented by models for nursing" (Latimer, 1993:311),
that is, developing nursing knowledge in terms of
conceptions of nursing.
But as Latimer already notes that Benner's (1984)
"position is a notion that nurses' theoretical knowledge
is enriched, enhanced and sometimes transformed through
experience" (1993:312; emphasis mine), that is, through
her recognition of situations of patients in her everyday
work.
176
Since this 'transformation' of the nurse's theoretical
knowledge into practical knowledge involves, as this
thesis has shown at length, a cognitive interpretation of
recognition, it can be said that Benner and her colleagues
remain within the "normative top down" approach, if
understood as the position of nursing theorists (Abdellah,
19960; Roy, 1984) who seem to think that the nurse's
recognition informed by conceptions of nursing corresponds
with the situation of the patient.
The work of Benner and her colleagues (1984, 1989, 1996)
is an attempt, I suggest, of establishing "an alternative
truth theory that matches the appeal of the correspondence
theory of truth" (Benner et al, 1996:369; emphasis mine).
Yet in drawing, particularly on Heidegger, who in Being
and Time, tries to go beyond the logocentric tradition in
that he not any longer presupposes a cognitive principle
for his interpretation of recognition, Benner and her
colleagues provide the "philosophic-scientific"
(Kesselring, 1997) contribution which challenges, as has
been shown in this thesis, their own endeavour of
establishing "an alternative truth theory" to "the
correspondence theory of truth".
QytlQQk
Considering the utility of the thesis, it is necessary to
return to Benner et al's notion that theories of
knowledge are descriptions rather than interpretations.
Discussing this idea of Benner et al in Chapter Five (and
in the following ones, particularly in Chapter Nine), I
have pointed out that it involves an inversion of claims:
instead of acknowledging the claim of a cognitive
interpretation ("Cartesian view") about a correspondence
between person and object, this view describes, for them,
the advanced beginner nurse's recognition as based on her
theoretical knowledge which is not corresponding with the
situation of the patient; and in instead of accepting the
claim about an uncertain (not corresponding) recognition,
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following Heidegger's non-cognitive theory of knowledge,
Benner et al advance the claim in connection with their
conception (the nurse's development of "skills of seeing"
and practical knowledge on the basis of the nurse's
emotions and caring, the latter being derived from
Heidegger) that the nurse's recognition at the proficient
and expert stage is corresponding.
Inverting these claims means that Benner et al
misrepresent the claims of cognitive and non-cognitive
interpretations of recognition; that is, Benner et al
misread theories of knowledge in as far as they take them
to be descriptions rather than interpretations. The
consequence of such misreading is the inversion of claims
and subsequent re-constitution of a cognitive conception
(Chapters Four to Seven) as the condition of making the
assertion about the nurse's 'corresponding' recognition
at particular stages of the Dreyfus Model of skill
acquisition.
Unfortunately, Benner and her colleagues are not the only
nurse theorists who misread Heidegger's non-cognitive
theory of knowledge and thus remain within a cognitive
(Cartesian) view of recognition. Paley surmises on his
analysis of Heidegger in nursing literature - which does
neither include the study of Benner (1984) nor of Benner
et al (1996) - that "lived experience" research as
carried out by nursing theorists, does not constitute "a
realization, but rather a betrayal, of Heidegger's
phenomenology, being thoroughly Cartesian in spirit"
(1998:817).
Heidegger is, furthermore, not the only philosopher
misinterpreted by nursing theorists. Paley shows in
another paper how nursing theorists "largely
misunderstand" Husserl's concepts, such as
"phenomenological reduction, phenomena, and essence" and
that as a result: "their version of Husserl's philosophy
bears little resemblance to the original" (1997:187).
On this account, it is reasonable to expect that nursing
theorists will also misread a conception such as
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Derrida's diffFrance and are likely to draw implications
from it for research as well as for teaching in nursing
which comes, in Paley's words, "close to being
unintelligible" (1997:187).
At the same time, this thesis which reveals Benner et
al's particular misreading of theories of knowledge can
be utilized to cultivate an open and constructive
discussion - first and foremost - among nursing theorists
about their reading of interpretations of recognition in
general, about a move from cognitive to non-cognitive
interpretations in particular, and about the consequences
of the latter for research and teaching in nursing.
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APPENDIX
PROBLEMATIZING A SCIENCE UNIQUE TO NURSING
Introduction
Johnson's idea (1959a, 1959b, 1968, 1974) that a science
(theory) unique to nursing is to be developed from a
perspective of nursing on man rather than from a
perspective of the biological and the behavioural sciences
on man implies the possibility of generating a science
unique to nursing.
I want to problematize such possibility in relation with
Foucault's (1970) theory of knowledge and Roy's (1984)
conception of nursing about the person as a "holistic
adaptive system".
The Organizing Concepts of the Human Sciences
Munro (1994) notices that Foucault's (1970) concern in The
Order of Things is not only to explicate the emergence of
the human sciences. Foucault is seen to also delineate the
"closure" of the human sciences, psychology, sociology and
cultural anthropology as affected through their organizing
concepts (Munro, 1994:5). Foucault notes:
Thus, these three pairs of function and
norm , conflict and rule signification
and system completely cover the entire
domain of what can be known about man
(Foucault, 1970:357; emphasis in the
original).
In Foucault's analysis these concepts are not limited to
one discipline. For example, 'function' and 'norm' as the
"formal" pair for knowing what is on the level of
psychology analysis, revolves among the other disciplines:
In this way all the human sciences
interlock and can always be used to
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interpret one another (Foucault,
1970:358).
Munro suggests that this interlocking creates an effect of
"completeness", leaving no space for "new" sciences
(1994:5), since:
Everything may be thought within the order
of the system, the rule, and the norm. By
pluralizing itself - since systems are
isolated, since rules form closed wholes,
since norms are posited in their autonomy
- the field of the human sciences found
itself unified: suddenly, it was no longer
fissured along its former dichotomy of
values (Foucault, 1970:360-361).
If the domain of the human sciences is already covered by
the "epistemological regions" (Foucault, 1970:355) of
psychology, sociology and cultural anthropology, then, at
least on Foucault's analysis, any "founding" (Foucault,
1970:358) of a theory (science) unique to nursing would
have to be developed within those epistemological regions.
Ruling Apart
Despite an interlocking and a perpetual rotation of
concepts, the human sciences "rule through their division"
(Munro, 1994:6).
Their organizing concepts both "link together" and "hold
apart" the positivities of life, labour, and language
(Foucault, 1970:362; Munro, 1994). It is, according to
Foucault:
the choice of the fundamental model and
the position of the secondary models,
which make it possible to know at what
point one begins to 'psychologize' or
'sociologize' in the study of literature
and myth, or at what point in psychology
one has moved over into the decipherment
of texts or into sociological analysis
(1970:358).
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For Munro, "holding apart" of psychology, sociology, and
cultural anthropology, the study of literature and myth,
does not foreclose "multi-disciplinary" approaches as long
as the concepts are kept "distinct" (1994:6). Foucault
states:
it proved possible to conduct an admirably
precise study of the Indo-European
mythologies by using the sociological
model superimposed upon the basic analysis
of significants and significations
(1970:358; emphasis mine).
In contrast, the consequences of not ordering the human
sciences precisely, that is, keeping them apart, are, for
Foucault, a "disaster" (Munro, 1994:6).
We know also, on the other hand, to what
syncretic platitudes the still mediocre
undertaking of founding a so-called
'clinical' psychology has led (Foucault,
1970:358; emphasis mine).
The point emphasised by Munro on Foucault's analysis is
that the human sciences "rule through ruling each other
apart" (1994:6). They have their "justification":
in the play of oppositions, which makes it
possible to define each of the three
models in relation to the two others
(Foucault, 1970:358).
Each discipline is defined in opposition to the others.
The "negativity" of one is the "positivity" of the other
(Munro, 1994:6).
The Human Sciences and the eoisteme
Another point Foucault makes about the human sciences is
how they are distributed within the episteme. Foucault
delineates the "domain" of the modern episteme as a
"volume of space open in three dimensions" (1970:346-347).
In his analysis the "mathematical and physical sciences"
are situated in one dimension. The second dimension
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locates the "empirical" (1970:348) sciences of
"linguistics, biology, and economics" (1970:347). The
third dimension is that of "philosophical reflection".
Foucault notes that each of the dimension is linked with
another dimension to define a "common plane" (1970:347).
One 'common plane' combines the dimension of 'mathematical
and physical sciences', which Foucault calls the
"deductive" (1970:348) sciences and the dimension of
'empirical' sciences. The dimension of 'philosophical
reflection' links with the dimensions of 'deductive'
sciences and the 'empirical' sciences to form with each of
the two dimensions a 'common plane' (1970:347).
The place of the human sciences, psychology, sociology,
and cultural anthropology within this "three-dimensional-
space" (1970:347) is one of being 'excluded' and
'included', since the human sciences are situated in the
'interstices' of these three 'knowledge branches':
From this epistemological trihedron the
human sciences are excluded, at least in
the sense that they cannot be found along
any of its dimensions or on the surface of
any of the planes thus defined. But one
can equally say that they are included in
it, since it is in the interstices of
these branches of knowledge, or, more
exactly, in the volume defined by their
three dimensions, that the human sciences
have their place (Foucault, 1970:347;
emphasis mine).
Foucault points out that this "situation" places the human
sciences in "relation to all the other forms of knowledge"
(1970:347; emphasis mine). The other point Foucault makes
is that this 'relation' of the human sciences with the
dimensions of the 'deductive' sciences, the 'empirical'
sciences, and 'philosophical reflections' is one of
"perpetual controversy" (1970:345). The former claim to be
the "foundation" of the latter, while the latter:
are ceaselessly obliged in turn to seek
their own foundation, the justification of
their method, and the purification of




This precarious relation gives the human sciences their
"essential instability" (Foucault, 1970:348) :
we know what difficulties may be
encountered, at times, in the establishing
of those intermediary planes that link
together the three dimensions of the
epistemological space; for the slightest
deviation from these rigorously defined
planes sends thought tumbling over into
the domain occupied by the human sciences
(Foucault, 1970:348; emphasis mine).
Foucault notes that the disciplines of psychology,
sociology, and cultural anthropology are "dangerous
intermediaries" (1970:348) in the 'three-dimensional-
space' of knowledge.
Conceouence
If one considers, on this account, Roy's claim to develop
a "nursing science perspective" of the person's "adaptive
processes" (1984:31), then four possible consequences of a
science unique to nursing can be pointed out.
One is that of repeating gestures already made. Despite
Roy's claim to develop a "nursing science perspective" on
the person's "adaptive processes", Roy draws, by naming,
for example, 'organs, tissues, and neural stimuli' in
order to construct the physiological processes of the
regulator subsystem ("biological organism") on the
empirical sciences; while she draws on disciplines such as
psychology and sociology for the invention of the cognator
subsystem by placing knowledge "currently" known about
"human abilites" within four separate "cognitive/emotive"
processes.
The implication being that her exploration, for example,
of the regulator subsystem in terms of 'organs, tissue,
and neural stimuli' requires the "epistemological
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consciousness" (Foucault, 1970) of the empirical sciences
in terms of disciplines, such as anatomy and physiology.
A second consequence of developing a science unique to
nursing is to throw it into "confusion" (Foucault, 1970) .
Roy's promise that a "developing nursing knowledge" will
explore the interrelationship between the regulator
("biological organism") and cognator subsystems collapses
the "rigourously defined planes" (Foucault, 1970), for
example, between the empirical sciences and the human
sciences.
A third consequence of developing a science unique to
nursing is to establish "syncretic platitudes" (Foucault,
1970). As Munro (1994) points out, to keep the concepts of
each discipline "distinct", the disciplines "rule through
ruling each other apart". Such keeping "apart" leads to
"multi disciplinary" (Munro, 1994) explorations. For
example, the person's adaptive processes of "avoidance of
anxiety" may be explored by the discipline of psychology
and its formal concepts of analysis; and by the discipline
of sociology and its formal concepts of analysis; and by
the discipline of cultural anthropology and its formal
concepts of analysis.
If Roy claims that explorations of the interrelationship
between the adaptive processes of the regulator and
cognator subsystems increase the understanding of the
holistic nature of the human person, then such
understanding is achieved only by ruling those adaptive
processes through multi-disciplinary explorations apart.
A fourth consequence follows from the foregoing ones.
Since each discipline defines its formal concepts "in the
teeth" (Foucault, 1970) of the other disciplines, the
implication is one of "perpetual controversy" which
encourages more explorations of the persons adaptive
processes and thus produces an endless flow of current
knowledge about "human abilities".
Since Roy places "current" knowledge about "human
abilites" within four separate "cognitive/emotive"
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processes of the persons cognator subsystem, a perpetual
flow of 'current' knowledge concerning "human abilites"
implies a continuous process of updating her construct of
the person as a holistic adaptive system which renders any
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